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Abstract 
As a generalised field of study, artificial life has produced specific meanings and 
narratives about what it means to be alive: structured around the concepts of 
code, information, evolution, connectionism, emergence and cybernetics that 
connect silicon and carbon life together. Evolutionary computer games and 
popular programs have introduced the general player and user to advanced 
artificial life creations, with games based on the nurturing and breeding of silicon 
creatures placed within new digital natures conceived as computational regimes. 
Considered is the question of how it has become possible to talk of silicon entities 
as being alive, and to explore their relationship with carbon life as presented 
within evolutionary computer games. Similarities between digital and material 
proposed within computational regimes are also investigated. Playing computer 
games is developed as a productive practice that constructs meanings, stories 
and narratives within play. Tracing spiritual and scientific myths and narratives of 
construction, creation and change, reveals how common stories about life, nature 
and cosmos are employed in the building of bonds between silicon and carbon. 
Evolutionary computer games are presented as actively promoting themselves as 
artificial life products creating links with the life and biological sciences. Meaning 
produced within play is shown to naturalise and normalise specific definitions of 
life steeped in neo·Darwinian evolutionism and cybernetics, and how our digital 
creations have become perfected examples of the essence of this life. Whether 
this conceptualisation of life, nature and cosmos works within computational 
regimes is questioned and discussed. Reflecting similar arguments contesting the 
neo·Darwinian evolutionary perspective within biology, the assumptions employed 
within this framework are investigated and challenged. Utilising Bruno Latour's 
program of political ecology and his concepts of proposition and habit. An 
alternative framework is suggested to examine artificial life, utilising Bruno 
Latour's program of political ecology, his concepts of proposition and habit, and 
our relation with these entities. 
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Chapter 1 
Playing with Life, Nature and Cosmos: 
An Introduction 
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'Loading World' ... 
... the window announces as Creatures begins for the first time on my PC. Immediately 
I am presented with this new 'world' - the planet/place of Albia - a digital artificial life 
ecosystem ready to host new silicon life forms called Noms, the creatures it is my new 
duty to raise and breed. The Robinson Crusoe landscape of Albia - ready-made thatched 
dwellings and caves, tropical beaches, blue ocean and thriving 'natural' ecosystem of 
plants and insects - is matched by the high-tech devices scattered around the planet-
learning computers, transporters, incubators and such. Albia seems to be the perfect 
harmony of nature-technology deserving of the task at hand- to "actually create life on 
your PC" as the game box proclaims, the genesis of life within the technology of the 
computer and through the technoscience of artificial life. 
As a bit of a sceptic, I proceed with a slight touch of cynicism towards the birth of my 
first Nom. From the six Nom eggs available from the hatchery, three male and three 
female, I pick a male and place it in the incubator and wait. The incubator whirls and 
whizzes away, the egg comes to life (so to say), and within a minute or two, the 
incubator's door swings open and my first Nom pops out in its amazing Oisney-esque 
splendour and almost overbearing cuteness. The first task at hand is to give my new 
charge a name - still the cynic, he receives the simple designation 'It' as I complete his 
birth certificate (upon reflection 'Adam' may have been more suitable for the mythical 
journey at hand). Now, based in the artificial life technology that It is, he must learn 
everything from the bottom-up in a process of emergence. Luckily, I have been given 
some tools to help him along his way. In Albia I am extended by a floating hand that I 
control with my computer mouse. Attracted to movement, It finds my hand of great 
interest and follows me around. This is useful"':" as I type the names of objects into the 
keyboard that I am pointing to whilst It watches me, he attempts to repeat the words. 
He progresses from simple burblings to the production of whole words. My own 
cynicism begins to break down as It says 'Gavin' for the first time - along with new 'life' 
a new parent has been born - myself. After a process of learning aided by the 'learning 
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computers' which display basic directions and commands, and are acted out by a 
humanoid stick figure with their matching word, It and I seem to be able to 
communicate on at least a rudimentary level, although deterred by It's seeming lack of 
concentration and want to explore on his own. My responsibility to It is to protect him 
from the dangers of Albia - poisonous plants; the depths of water where he cannot 
swim; the nasty disease ridden Grendels who enjoy nothing more than slapping a Nom 
around and spreading sick- while allowing him to explore and enjoy a fruitful Albian 
life. 
Far from a game of parental pet keeping, one of the goals of Creatures is to breed (and 
engineer) new Noms, improving the Nom line. For this, It needs a female friend, so I am 
back to the hatchery to start the process over again with Eve (by this point, the mythic 
connotations of what I am playing through were not lost). Not before long, It and Eve are 
enjoying life together, growing through adolescence and into adulthood. With physical 
maturity (Noms develop throughout their whole life- both in their digital metabolism 
and their on·screen appearance), also comes sexual maturity, and soon I am hearing 
the 'blop' of Nom sex and Eve is soon pregnant. Noms lay eggs, and after gestation Eve 
is depositing hers and carrying on with her life. Soon the first 'natural' birth on my Albia 
occurs, and some time after that, through a combination of natural births and the 
occasional trip back to the hatchery, there is a lively population of Noms living Nom life 
on my screen. With a number of Noms present, however, my job becomes more difficult 
- not only because of the increased numbers to track and maintain, but also because 
the Noms lose interest in my hand figure, preferring each others' company to mine. 
Noms come across as wilful and independent little creatures; my challenge soon 
becomes adapting myself to Nom life rather than them adopting mine. With Nom life 
comes Nom death. If developing 'relationships' with the Noms in the game and 
watching Nom liveliness only softened my cynicism to the game, then attempting to 
prevent and then witnessing my first Nom death squashed it. Noms, in all their big-eyed 
overly innocent charm, are touching. 
And so life on Albia goes on, Noms living and multiplying under my (somewhat) careful 
eye - they enjoy the pleasures and dangers that Albia presents, and I tinker with Health 
Kits and Science Kits and keep them healthy and happy. This is certainly one level to 
which Creatures can be played - taking part in the day-to-day life on Albia in an 
overseeing role. Through investigation, I find that Creatures can be played in many 
other ways that take the game to new levels. Noms can be selectively bred for desired 
traits. If this is unsuccessful (or time consuming) players can genetically engineer new 
Noms with a variety of never before seen traits (memoms with fish tails that live and 
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breathe in the ocean or Noms of unusual colourings or costumes - including Star Trek 
Noms in Federation uniforms). Any Nom can be traded over the Intemet and Creatures 
boasts a multitude of sites aboutthe game, offering Noms for 'adoption', a practice I am 
soon enjoying. These expanded ways of playing the game are supported through the 
official Creatures website, where players can leam more about the game, link their 
personal Creatures sites, and find out more about Nom genetics and life, including 
artificial life and the links between silicon and carbon- based biologies that artificial life 
proposes. These ties are evident in the manner(s) in which Creatures is played. Before 
the computer algorithms that make up Noms' 'genetic code' were released by the game 
developers, players initiated the "Nom Genome Project" (analogous to the human 
version from which it finds its namesake) to hack and discover what this code was. 
Players selectively breed and genetically engineer Noms, including transgenic 
engineering with Grendels and other Albian creatures, to introduce traits into the Nom 
line that are not 'naturally' present. "Wolfing runs", where Creatures is left running at 
high speeds to encourage multiple generations of Noms in a short time span, allow 
players to perform evolutionary experiments within the game. The controversy that 
arose within the Creatures community when it was revealed that a player answering to 
the tag Anti-Nom was purposely torturing and abusing Noms and then placing them on 
his website, led to a heated debate on the aliveness of Noms and Nom rights. From this, 
numerous 'adoption agencies' were set up, where these neglected Noms could be 
fostered and adopted by budding Nom developmental psychologists, who made it their 
goal to resocialise them in a system not dissimilar to child protection social services. If 
the actual life status of these silicon creatures of computer code is debatable, the close 
resemblance to how users play within this new digital nature and Albian culture and 
their parallel 'real world' analogies points to more than a fleeting modelling of life. 
Noms and the other creatures of Albia seem to be alive enough, and alive enough to tell 
us about our own carbon based life. 
The Creatures series of games1 are artificial life experiments and evolutionary 
computer games, allowing players to 'create life' on a PC, following a genealogy of 
other computer games and (techno)scientific computer based research projects 
including the popular SimLife and SimEarth, Technosphere, Biomorphs, Tierra, the 
Game of Life and recently released Spore, by leading games designer Will Wright 
and producers Maxis and Electronic Arts (EA Games). Together, these programs 
1 There are three PC games in the series, plus add-ons and a version for children, Creatures Adventures, as 
well as versions for Playstation and Game Boy Advance. 
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present a multitude of computer algorithms that can reproduce themselves and 
evolve within the electronic and silicon confines of the computer, which come 
together under the umbrella of the technoscientific discipline of artificial life. 
Since its origin in the late 1980s, artificial life has paired life itself and computer 
sciences in the development of new human·made life forms, typically in robotics 
or computer software programs (as does Creatures), expanding the domain of the 
life sciences to possibilities of life outside of carbon based chemistry, from 'life· 
as·we·know·it' to 'Iife·as·it·could·be' (Langton 1996: 40). The status of life that 
Norns (and the other creatures artificial life practitioners create) claim, and is 
claimed for them, embodies a new rhetoric and set of definitions of life that has 
grown from post·war cybernetics, information theory (informatics) and neo· 
Darwinism, to which the technoscience of artificial life is intimately tied. This is 
an essence of life that is found in form and not matter, which is steeped in an 
allegiance with code, information, self·organisation, evolution, feedback and 
emergence. On a broader cultural scale the new life sciences, cybernetics, 
informatics and artificial life form key building blocks of an emerging sensibility of 
the posthuman most notably mapped by Katherine Hayles (1999). This holds new 
fluid informational relationships between humans and the things around us, 
including other non·human entities and importantly, a new cosmology of 
computational regimes. For Tizziana Terranova, posthuman evolutionism has 
initiated "a huge ontological shift not only in the nature of human society, but in 
that of our very bodies" (1996b: 167). She continues: 
This mutation has been brought about, on the one hand, by the exposure to 
simulated images in the most traditional media, and, on the other, by the 
slow penetration into our daily life of almost invisible technological 
gadgets ... The process of 'invasion' of the human body and psyche by the 
machine is destined to increase over the years (1996b: 167). 
The aim of this thesis is to explore this 'penetration' of the technological and the 
techno scientific through the convergence of the strands of technoscience, media 
and culture within evolutionary computer games and the Creatures series in 
particular. Hayles finds that this penetration has already found a place in how we 
define ourselves: 
When we compute the human, the conclusion that the human being cannot 
be adequately understood without ranging it alongside the intelligent 
machine has already been built into the very language we use. (2005: 148) 
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Creatures and its peers can be considered as 'intelligent machines' and as 
assemblages, tied and linked to other assemblages, in what the Critical Art 
Ensemble, influenced by Deleuze and Guattari, would call the 'Flesh Machine' 
(1998) - the collection of machinic processes that are both deterritorialising and 
reterritorialising what it means to be alive, of life itself. 
This thesis does not at all aim to decisively uphold or dismiss the claims of Norns, 
Grendels and other artificial life creations as being actual instances of life. This is 
not a judiciary panel on what is and is not allowed to constitute life. Such a 
project would quickly need to resort to a type of essentialism this thesis is keen to 
avoid and actively rejects. Instead, it intends to explore what life means in the 
posthuman and how it has become possible to talk of computer algorithms as 
constituting life. Brian Massumi, developing upon (or deviating from) Deleuze and 
Guattari, posits the question as: 
The question is not, Is it true? But, Does it work? What new thoughts does it 
make possible to think? What new emotions does it make it possible to feel? 
What new sensations and perceptions does it open in the body? (1992: 8) 
Further, this thesis aims to illuminate the ties between silicon and carbon life and 
how our silicon cousins are helping to shape and define what 'life itself' is and 
where and how as (post)humans we 'fit in' with this new understanding (and as 
shall be shown, it is carbon life that is made to fit within the framework we have 
created for silicon life forms, and not vice versa). More than just an examination 
of life, the implications of new posthuman sensibilities takes us beyond mere life 
to a more far reaching analysis. The relationships between space and time, reality 
and virtuality, and the actual and the artificial are all implicated in a more fruitful 
understanding of life in the posthuman. For Sarah Kember the "convergence 
between biology and computer science provides the context for an emergent 
technoscientific culture within which the status of autonomy and artificiality are 
highlighted and problematised" (2003: 1). This understanding needs to consider 
the ontological implications of what is at stake in this new posthuman 
informational evolutionism. 
Crucially, this thesis examines not a purely scientific research project, high art 
installation or other 'culturally elite' manifestation. Instead, it studies a popular 
medium and games that are and have been enjoyed by people the world over. 
Creatures and other evolutionary artificial life computer games provide a unique 
platform in which to explore the cultural and technoscientific shifts that are taking 
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place in the posthuman. As artificial life experiments do not need computers of 
high processing speed or memory, most artificial life programs perform equally 
well in the laboratory or on a home PC. The technology and science behind 
evolutionary computer games is often at the forefront of the artificial life field. 
Steve Grand, artificial life researcher and the programmer and developer of the 
original Creatures game, is unreserved about his claims for the game: 
A game it might be, but if you'll forgive the staggering lack of modesty this 
implies, Creatures was probably the closest thing there has been to a new 
form of life on this planet in four billion years. These creatures probably 
still represent the state of the art in synthetic life forms. (qtd. in Lyall 2002) 
In a reversal of the usual directionality from military to entertainment usage of 
technology, the UK Ministry of Defence has taken up the technoscience behind 
Creatures, in the development of "Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) ... a completely 
autonomous virtual organism which takes responsibility for control of the flight of 
the aircraft" or, in other words, "intelligent, human·like artificial pilots,,2 (see also 
Davidson 1998). Creatures, when including its fully on·line version Creatures 
Docking Station, claims to be the largest Artificial Life experiment in the world, 
larger than Network Tierra, the digital Internet ecological project initiated by 
American Artificial Life researcher Thomas Ray. The evolutionary computer games 
SimLife and SimEarth have both been actively marketed in the US as educational 
tools for high school teachers in biology, with special educational versions of the 
games released for this purpose. This must not be lost in either the theory or 
methodology of this thesis; these games are played for fun and enjoyment by a 
wide and diverse player base, breaking down the boundaries between culture and 
science, entertainment and education. They form prototypical examples of what 
Julian Sefton·Green proposes when he suggests that with new communication 
technologies emerging, it is no longer possible to concisely delineate applications 
or users into clean categories of age groups or purpose (1998: 4, 15). 
Creatures, SimLife, SimEarth and their peers do not identify themselves as either 
computer games or research projects. They are designed and played for 
entertainment, but are aware of and actively promote their technoscientific status. 
They encourage their players to learn about life in both its silicon and carbon 
based instantiations, actively making crossovers between the two. They position 
players directly in the role of an artificial life researcher (amongst other player 
2 http://www.creatures.co.uk/newstand/mediabox/ns_media_pr_17mar98.htm 
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roles - many of which are played concurrently) and engage the player in the 
production of new posthuman definitions of life and cosmology through their play. 
This thesis aligns with and expands on a growing literature and response to 
artificial life, technoscience and popular culture; most notably Sarah Kember's 
work in generating an active dialougue between feminism, media and 
communications and science (2000, 2005 and especially 2003). Kember finds 
that "ALife is an intrinsically interconnected discipline within which dialogical 
strategies and bioethics are being articulated, and it is constituted in and by a 
process of globalisation" (2003: 12). Her contribution to this diologue is to enter 
into the discussion, providing her own map of the field and a response initiated 
from a standard feminist oppositional standpoint, but growing (and remaining 
'limited') by this. Kember's is an account of artificial life that "few specialists 
would recognise" attempting to "situate the discipline of ALife within a wider 
technoscientific culture which includes, crucially, genomics, evolutionary 
psychology, memetics and organic metaphors of agency, technology and social 
processes" (2003: 13). Whilst my response in this thesis similarly contributes to 
such a dialogue, it specifically focuses on the discourses that artificial life are 
forming in its relation with and within popular culture and media, and in 
particular within computer games. Within the bounds of bioethics, the thesis 
explores and ultimately questions statements about life itself, both silicon and 
carbon, that artificial life, incorporated with evolutionary computer games, 
produces in its use of essntialist definitions of life. It runs alongside and moves 
beyond analysis such as Kember's to ask if a popular form of actual artificial life 
could be possible, one that does not rely on shared reductionary essentialist 
definitions between silicon and carbon. In doing so it utilises Latour's framework 
of political ecology (2004) in the formation of such a discussion. By taking 
computer games as a serious form of popular culture and media, this thesis 
develops and further contributes to a cultural perspective of computer game 
studies, one that places computer games within greater cultural landscapes and 
dynamics. 
This thesis can be placed within three key areas that form foundations to its 
structure and argument: reality, discussions on life, and the use of computer 
games as a form of scientific output. This is a thesis that incorporates discussions 
on new meanings of what it means to be alive, of 'life itself'. An understanding of 
the stories, produced since the middle of the twentieth century on the statements 
of life, forms the first foundation of this introduction. The key determinants of 
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informatics, cybernetics, gene action and evolution have produced a 
(de/re)territorialisation with new definitions that alter life's ontological and 
epistemological status. This has allowed new possibilities of posthuman 
definitions of life and new cosmologies. Emerging life (techno)sciences, such as 
artificial life, playa critical role in reterritorialising what it means to be alive 
within these standpoints. These new definitions of life itself have ontological and 
epistemological implications, that demand a close examination of 'reality' that 
initially highlight the realist·constructivist split that has been dramatically focused 
on within the science wars. This thesis takes a different approach in its 
relationship with reality and answers Bruno Latour's call to move tangentially and 
radically away from the realist·constructivist opposition in its entire myriad of 
forms. Instead, I take from recent materialist positioned work highlighting the 
intra·actions between humans and nonhumans, between the living and nonliving 
that are involved in the ever·continuous production of the world and reality we are 
embedded within. This exploration forms the second foundation of the thesis. The 
third positions the computer games this thesis examines as an area of science 
studies. It views such games as machinic assemblages, taking from Deleuze and 
Guatarri, that tie into other machinic assemblages that are deterritorialising and 
reterritorialising what it means to be alive. Seen in such a light, and with the 
claims that have been made about Creatures and other Artificial Life based games, 
this thesis considers games as science, actively producing new territories of life 
itself through play. 
Life 
At the forefront of artificial life and the posthuman are new definitions of life and 
what it means to be alive that find a connection with the recent focus on the gene 
as a key figure. This association is found not only in the life sciences, but also 
throughout contemporary Western society. American social commentator Jeremy 
Rifkin proclaimed a shift in history from the age of physics and chemistry to an 
age of biology in what he has designated as the "biotech century" (1999). He 
finds powerful new social currents emanating from new work in genetics and the 
life sciences: 
There are many convergent forces coming together to create this powerful 
new social current. At the epicenter is a technological revolution unmatched 
in all of history in its power to remake ourselves, our institutions, and our 
world. Scientists are beginning to reorganize life at the genetic level. (1999: 
1) 
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It is this shift in the management of "Life in a post·human mode [that] has taken 
centre stage in the political economy of advanced capitalism" (Braidotti 2006: 
37). Andrew Ross also instigates the life sciences at the centre of the social 
agenda. As with Rifkin, Ross finds a shift in focus to issues of nature and the life 
sciences: 
For, in many ways, it is the legacy of ideas about evolutionary science that 
is increasingly occupying the forefront of our social and political 
environment. If the authority of nature and biology has been kept at bay for 
much of this century, it has made a remarkable return in recent years, and 
is once again the ground of appeals to social policy and cultural 
righteousness. The contest over Darwinism, in one form or another, may 
turn out to be one of the more crucial debates of the next decade, and it is 
a debate that cultural critics and social theorists should be part of. (1996: 
7) 
For Sarah Kember this resurgence in Darwinism has involved a convergence of the 
biological and technical where, especially in artificial life and transgenic 
engineering, "there is an almost overwhelming sense of evolutionary possibility, 
and here more than elsewhere the evolution in question is more technological 
than biological, more informational than material, more possible than actual" 
(2005: 153). Central to this new revitalised reading of Darwinian evolutionism are 
new ideas about the essence of life that have emerged from the fields of genetics, 
cybernetics and informatics that are bringing together new scientifically legitimate 
meanings to the metaphors 'Book of Life' and 'Book of Nature' (Kay 1999: 225). 
Within this discourse, life has been refigured within the context of information and 
code. This informational evolutionism considers all life as self·organising, 
propagating, evolving informational units. This is an ontological shift that has 
displaced life from a material base to one of abstract form. Within this novel 
cybernetic neo·Darwinism, it is the gene and DNA that are placed at the forefront 
of what it means to be alive. Elizabeth Grosz stresses that the exploration of life 
traditionally found within the biological sciences should be central to theorist 
interested in the relations between subjectivity, politics and culture in order to 
"develop political strategies to transform the existing social regulation of bodies, 
that is, to change existing forms of biopower, of domination and exploitation" 
(2004: 2). Most famously described by Richard Dawkins as "the selfish gene" 
(1989) or more recently as our "common thread" (Sulston & Ferry 2002), the four 
nucleotide bases that make up the DNA of every living being (at least those found 
in carbon based chemistry) have, within this informational metaphor, been 
proposed as the code of life and as life itself. It has been work in genetics and 
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cybernetics, carried out during the mid-twentieth century, which has laid the 
foundation for this informational insight to life_ In genetics: 
The conceptualization, breaking, and completion of the genetic code, 1953-
1967, was one of the most important and dramatic episodes in twentieth-
century science, a manifestation of the stupendous reaches of molecular 
biology_ The so-called code - actually a table of correlations - outlined the 
logic of gene based protein synthesis, providing the key to what was widely 
perceived to be the "secret of life_" (Kay 1999: 226) 
Evelyn Fox Keller credits Watson and Crick as introducing the informational 
metaphor to the repertoire of biological discourse, although she also finds that as 
early as 1952 it was realised that "the technical definition of information simply 
could not serve for biological information ___ Thus the notion of genetic information 
that Watson and Crick invoked was not literal but metaphoric_ But it was 
extremely powerful" (1995: 18-19)_ During this same period of time, the new 
interdisciplinary area of study known as cybernetics was also finding new 
informational ways of formulating life_ For Katherine Hayles the period between 
1945-1960 "marks the foundational stage during which cybernetics was forged as 
an interdisciplinary framework that would allow humans, animals, and machines 
to be constituted through the common denominators of feedback loops, signal 
transmission, and goal seeking behavior" (1996a: 12)_ As with developments in 
genetics, the core of this new science is the metaphor of information_ In the last 
half-century parallel developments in genetics, cybernetics and the cross-
fertilisation between the two in an emerging "cyberscience" (Keller 1995: 88) has 
brought the information and life sciences together to "fuse into a single 
technological and economic force" (Rifkin 1999: 3)_ At the centre of this 'force' is 
the figure of the gene, an informational entity containing the 'book of life' that 
forms the central control to all the processes that constitute life in a discourse of 
'gene action' _ Despite evidence that the locus of control lays not with the gene but 
in "complex biochemical dynamics ___ of cells in constant communication with 
each other" (Keller 1995: 28), this focus on gene action is sustained_ In this set of 
dynamics, genes become part of a larger cellular and inter-cellular system, and 
there is a change of focus from 'gene action' to 'gene activation' _ The discourse of 
'gene action' has found a strength and persistence that Donna Haraway has 
termed "'genetic fetishism'" (1997: 14n- For Haraway gene fetishism is the 
substitution of "the master molecule [gene] for a more adequate representation of 
units or nexuses of biological structure, function, development, evolution, and 
reproduction" (1997: 147)_ It is this focus on the gene, and specifically on the 
gene as an informational unit, that artificial life practitioners have transferred to 
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the digital emplacement of the computer, finding the gene's digital twin in genetic 
algorithms (GAs), most simply defined as computer strings of code that can self 
replicate. It is this interchangeability between organic genetic and computer code, 
a strong informational metaphor and an ontological shift to an essence of abstract 
form, which allows for the expansion of life into the digital sphere of the 
computer. Sarah Kember offers a definition of life common to both carbon and 
silicon creatures: 
Life is defined in terms of the genetic/computer code - or in terms of 
information. Organisms (both natural and artificial) are regarded as being 
information processing and replicating systems which evolve, self·organise 
and are autonomous. (2000: 34) 
Here we find the ingredients to a posthuman formulation of life: a fluidity of 
information that is defined by form, not materiality, and by systemic process not 
material interactivity. 
Reality 
The strong informational metaphor and shift in essence from the material to form 
within the life sciences has prompted an ontological shift in the emerging 
sensibility of the posthuman. This goes beyond the definition of life to include the 
nature of reality itself and a new posthuman cosmology. Here, the universe is said 
to be made up of informational bits and operates as one (extremely large) 
cybernetic computer program. This new cosmology of the living universe, which 
will be explored further, is directly correlated with new digital emplacements and 
ecosystems, such as Creatures and other artificial life programs, as computational 
regimes. To be able to examine and account for this ontological shift, a close 
reflection of this thesis' epistemological and ontological positioning is in order. 
Bruno Latour has highlighted this need, stating: 
[S]cience students will have to take philosophy much more seriously; they 
even might have to redefine their own metaphysics in order to deal with the 
bizarre ontological puzzles revealed by their discoveries of the collective· 
things. (1992: 287·88) 
At the centre of this is the conceptualisation of the 'real': "Reality is once again 
becoming the issue at stake" (Latour 2002: 22). This thesis avoids arguments 
structured along the typical realist versus social constructivist yardstick, 
answering Latour's call to "abandon this frame of reference [along the axis of 
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Nature to Society] and set up another standard" (1992: 276). Instead of moving 
right to left along a Nature·Society alignment, Latour suggests merging these two 
poles, having a single transcendence instead of two. In this manner we become 
able to speak of both the human and nonhuman origin of knowledge without the 
necessity of separating the two. For Latour, this has five consequences or 
'modifications' to the Modern Constitution, the first being to lose the opposition 
between Nature and Society; "We live in a Society we did not make, individually or 
collectively, and ina Nature which is not of our fabrication. But Nature 'out there' 
and Society 'up there' are no longer ontologically different" (1992: 281). This 
leads to the second modification; that the social and the natural are a single focus 
of analysis "since both are the results of the practice of science· and technology· 
making" (Latour 1992: 281). This activity of nature/society making leads to the 
third modification - the "origin of reality" (Latour 1992: 282), that this production 
becomes the source from which natures and societies originate. The fourth 
modification is the central role of history through the productive role of actants in 
the origin of reality: 
[I]t is the experimental scene that produces and shapes new actants that 
then increase the long list of ingredients that make up our world ... They are 
a new social link that redefines at once what nature is made of and what 
society is made of. (Latour 1992: 283) 
The last modification Latour highlights has ontological implications. As there are 
no longer the two extremities to which ontological activity is focused, it is 
distributed amongst all actacts (or agents) engaged in reality making production. 
Latour sees this critically as a shift in perspective and focus from 'out there' and 
'up there' to a new region which he tentatively terms 'down there' (1992: 287): 
There is no separation between the object and the society; we Westerners 
go on doing what everyone has always been doing, that is, growing "down 
there" collective· things that may end up being nature "out there" and 
society "up there." (Latour 1992: 289) 
Aligning with Donna Haraway's claim that "Reality is an active verb" (2003: 6), 
Latour suggests that we are all actively involved in reality creation. Developing the 
ontological and epistemological positioning of this thesis 'down there' I 
incorporate a materialist positioning. In developing a materialist theory, Rosi 
Braidotti suggests, "new figurations are needed, to help us think through the 
maze of techno· teratological culture" (2002: 207). Karen Barad has offered such 
a positioning in 'agential realism' (1996, 1999), proposing science as a set of 
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productive material-discursive practices, matching Latour's non-Modern 
Constitution. Nancy Tuana also notes the problems underlying the dichotomy 
between realism and social construction: 
Our investigations are beginning to raise serious concerns regarding the 
adequacy of the metaphysical assumptions of realist positions. But our 
inquiries are also undermining the natural/cultural distinction posited or 
implied by social constructivist accounts. (2001: 221) 
Barad, too, finds that by placing realism and social construction at opposite poles 
of a dichotomy there is no space for the realisation of the mutually constitutive 
'intra-action' of being both materially situated and discursively constructed: 
The dichotomized positions of realism and social construction - which 
presume a subject/object dichotomy - can acknowledge the 
situated/constructed character of only one of the poles of the dualism at a 
time. Realists do not deny that subjects are materially situated; 
constuctivists insist upon the socially or discursively constructed character 
of objects. Neither recognizes their mutually constitutive "intra-action." 
(1999: 2) 
Against this, materialist positions such as agential realism attempt to incorporate 
the realisation "that there are cultural and natural/material causes for knowledge 
claims" (Barad 1996: 162). It accepts that there is an 'out there', but one that is 
constantly being produced by ourselves and by other agents/objects in a constant 
flux of intra-actions. "There is a reality - but we are in the midst of it, literally and 
collectively making it up as we go along" (Heldke 2001: 93). Grosz reminds us 
that the real is necessarily larger than what is humanly known: 
The real must be larger than and outside the known; it must contain not only 
the known but also what knowing leaves out, the interstices, intervals, gaps 
between and within knowable units, the differences covered over by 
apparent identity, the open rather than closed context of all material 
events, whose influence and effects reach "even to the stars." (2004: 192) 
Central to agential realism is Barad's reading of the scientific philosophy of 
physicist Niels Bohr, and especially of his conceptualisation of the constitution of 
phenomena - the relationship between what is observed (the object as 
phenomenon) and the observer (for Bohr - "agencies of observation"). Barad finds 
that, when examining the role of the agencies of observation in the act of 
observing phenomena, Bohr suggests "there is no unambiguous way to 
differentiate between the 'object' and the 'agencies of observation' - no inherent! 
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naturally occurring/ fixed/ universal/ Cartesian cut exists. Hence, observations do 
not refer to objects of an independent reality" (Barad 1996: 170). We are 
implicated in the reality of the objects we perceive; reality is a product of the 
intra-action between objects and agencies of observation. This intra-action 
generates significant implications that reflect and develop Latour's fifth 
modification: 
... I want to suggest that the interrelationship between these conceptions of 
objectivity and realism actually point to a more general issue- the mutually 
constituting relationship between ontology and epistemology, the 
distinction generally drawn between epistemological questions and 
ontological ones cannot hold, once we understand "subjects" and "objects" 
to be part of a nondualistic whole, and once we understand the real to be 
constituted, in part, by the activity of inquiry. (Heldke 2001: 95) 
For Barad this has the consequence that "Phenomena are constitutive of reality_ 
Reality is not composed of things-in-themselves or things-behind-phenomena, but 
things-in-phenomena" (1996: 176). She designates the relationship between 
objects and agencies of observation as one of intra-action and not interaction to 
"signify the inseparability of objects and agencies of observation (rather than 
interactions, which reinscribes the contested dichotomy)" (1999: 5). These come 
together in the formation of agential realism: 
Agential realism is an epistemological and ontological framework that 
provides an understanding of sciences as "material-discursive" practices. 
These practices are recognized as being productive rather than merely 
descriptive. However, what is produced is constrained by particular 
material-discursive factors and not arbitrarily construed. Agential realism 
theorizes agency in a way that acknowledges that there is a sense in which 
"the world kicks back" (i.e., nonhuman and cyborgian forms of agency in 
addition to human ones) without assuming some innocent, symmetrical 
form of interaction between knower and known. (1999: 2) 
Agential realism provides a number of benefits to a study such as the one this 
thesis proposes. Importantly, it recognises and constitutes cyborgian agency 
within its framework. This becomes crucial when examining an array of objects, 
other humans and nonhuman (and possibly nonliving) entities that are found 
within the game culture that evolutionary artificial life games bring together. 
Remembering that "any technology, insofar as it instantiates a program of action, 
involves a complex network composed of both human and nonhuman elements" 
(Hansen 2000: 43): in Creatures; Norns, Grendels, the ecosystem of AI bia, the 
game itself, the computer, the player, game developers, and the extended network 
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of other players, game reviewers, the audience, family and friends all 'kick back' 
in the creation of reality, both in the digital emplacements on the computer 
screen and in material reality. They are all constitutive of a continually produced 
agential reality. 
Secondly, adopting a materialist position embraces an embodied practice. For 
Barad "bodies serve as both the endpoint and starting point for objective 
accounts of our intra·actions. In other words, agential realism gives us an 
embodied account of objectivity" (1996: 185). Developing the idea of strong 
constructivism, Tuana stresses the point: 
What I believe must be added to strong constructivism is an enriched 
version of an embodiment hypothesis - the tenet that human ways of 
knowing, our concepts, meanings of terms, and modes of reasoning are 
grounded in patterns of bodily being. At an epistemological level the 
embodiment hypothesis is the belief that our concepts emerge from and 
are in part formed by the particularities of our bodies and of our bodily 
interactions with the physical world. At a metaphysical level the 
embodiment hypothesis involves a recognition of the always present 
complex interactions of material·social. (2001: 229) 
When taking on issues of technoscience, technoculture, virtuality and artificiality, 
developing an embodied theory and methodology is critical. This avoids a 
subjectivity divorced from its materiality for immersion solely in the digital (the 
popular cyberpunk escape from the meat body). The concept of living through the 
body and the primacy of bodily experience, especially when dealing with practices 
and digital technologies that are commonly thought of as divorcing experience 
from the body, "stresses the fundamental role of (corporeal) embodiment as the 
necessary background out of which all acts of inscription emerge and take on 
meaning" (Hansen 2000: 27). As shall be developed throughout the thesis, I take 
embodiment to mean the experience lived through the body, in all its material, 
virtual, real and abstract forms. 
Finally, a materialist positioning stresses the productive nature of phenomena and 
the intra·actions of objects and agencies of observation. Playing Creatures (and its 
peers) is a productive practice - new realities and new definitions of life itself are 
produced through play, and this concept will be argued throughout this thesis. 
Agential reality is not (only) representational; it is productive. Here, agential 
realism and the functional machinic philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari share 
common ground. The technological characteristic of video games is highlighted in 
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their production of reality. For Mark Hansen, technology is an ideal place to 
examine our encounters with the real: 
Technology ... compromises a privileged "index" of the material stratum 
(Deleuze and Guattari), the real (Lacan), or the unmediated flux (Hayles). 
As actual forces immanent to the real, technologies furnish an immediate 
material source of movement (active force) that does not rely upon the 
activity of thinking for its ontogenesis. Yet because technologies so 
drastically and fundamentally impact the process of thinking, they seem to 
afford an ideal site for analysing the encounter between thought and the all· 
too·amorphous real. (2000: 19) 
The role of technologies in agential realism and materialist positionings cannot be 
understated. They are measurement apparatuses and directly affect not only our 
perception and construction of the real (in our intra·actions with them), but also 
affect the practice of science. "Apparatus, in Bohr's sense are not passive 
observing instruments," Barad finds, continuing: 
On the contrary, they are productive of (and part of) phenomena. However, 
Bohr leaves the meaning of "apparatus" somewhat ambiguous. He does 
insist that what constitutes an "apparatus" only emerges in the context of 
specific observational practices. But while focusing on the lack of an 
inherent distinction between the apparatus and the object, Bohr doesn't 
directly address the question of where the apparatus ends. (1999: 5) 
Whilst still wishing to retain the ambiguous nature of apparatus (where does the 
technology of the computer and artificial life programs end and a Norn begin?), it 
is of equal importance to fully acknowledge the role of technology in the 
production and direction of science. Further, that our apparatus and instruments 
of measuring are technologies that directly effect what is measured and how. This 
is not to imply a technologically determinist argument, the social is not 
predicated solely by technology; but to recognise the embodiment of the 
production of science in technology as much as the (more typical understanding 
of the) reverse. Technology is not just an outcome of science; it is constitutive of 
it. It is the constitution of science in its intra·actions with its instruments and 
technology that provides its senses, measurements, and the production of reality. 
The recognition of instruments/apparatus/technologies in the productive activity 
of science acknowledges the "material embodiments of science" (Ihde 1991: 45). 
Don Ihde explores this in what he terms instrumental realism: 
One clear and crucial domain in which this neglect is obvious is with 
respect to instrumentation. I n contrast to its ancient antecedents, 
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contemporary science is clearly technologically embodied. Instruments 
form the conditions for and are mediators of much, if not ali, current 
scientific knowledge. They are concrete and material operators within 
scientific praxis. (1991: 45) 
Recognising the mediated and contextualised nature of science through its 
technological instruments means that they no longer remain invisible in the 
production of a scientific object. Technologies are not only constitutive of reality 
in instrumental realism; they are political. Making them visible aids in the 
clarification of "the misunderstanding that such technologies are 'neutral,' when 
in fact they are non-neutral" (Ihde 1991: 73). In his attempt to "clarify what is at 
stake in the practice of science" (1998: 174) David Demeritt suggests a model of 
artifactual constructivism where "the objects of scientific knowledge are the 
outcome of carefully contrived practice, not pre-existing objects waiting to be 
discovered and correctly represented by science" (1998: 177-78). Artifactual 
constructivism stresses that machi nes and other agencies "matter" in "the 
powerful and productive practices of science by which the reality of nature and 
our socially constructed knowledge of it are produced and articulated" (1998: 
181). This compliments materialistic positions in that it "does not deny the 
ontological existence of the world, only that its apparent reality is never pre-given" 
(Demeritt 1998: 178). Ihde finds that this has been best exemplified by the 
growing biotechnologies of postmodern science: 
... Postmodern science, technoscience, becomes a productive science in 
precisely the laboratory/factory sense. This in no way removes it from the 
close and necessary embodiment of science in its technologies. To the 
contrary, it blends the roles of science and technology such that it is 
virtually impossible to differentiate between these functions. And while 
physics remains the most costly and complex science ... there are at least 
indications that the new technosciences of biotechnologies may even better 
exemplify emergent Postmodern science. 
The constructed, the manufactured entities of micro·manipulated entities 
are precisely the organic/inorganic junctures, and the cloned and gene· 
manipulated entities being produced are more clearly the products of the 
Nature/Culture ambiguities now almost paradigmatic of Postmodern 
science. (1991: 134·135) 
Games and/as Science 
Arguing that Creatures and other artificial life games/programs are converging 
points of science and popular media places these as both a site of popular 
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entertainment and a site of (techno)scientific practice. Focussing on the media of 
the computer game warrants a further exploration of the ties that can be made 
between posthuman technoscience and popular media. This highlights questions 
such as do computer games count as (techno)scientific locations? How can they 
be considered within a larger technoscientific practice? Noel Castree and Bruce 
Braun have already highlighted the role of evolutionary computer games (here 
SimEarth) in the production of new natures: 
Indeed, in our emerging "network societies" there is now the promise of 
what Wark call "third nature" - that is, the simulated natures of everyday 
TV and magazines, games like SimEarth, or the extraordinary optics of the 
geographical information system (GIS) all of which provide new, powerful 
means of manipulating natures as "information." (1998: 4) 
Castree and Braun stress the embeddedness of games like SimEarth, SimLife, and 
Creatures within a number of practices and technologies that are coming together 
in the production of new informational and posthuman natures. In the production 
of science as a set of practices, Joseph Rouse emphasises that the range of what 
constitutes scientific practice extends beyond the strictly scientific field: 
Undoubtedly we can identify more or less distinctively scientific practices 
by their relatively dense interconnections with other scientific practices and 
by the issues and stakes that arise through those particular 
interconnections. Nevertheless, the traffic in all directions across whatever 
boundaries can thus be demarcated will be too heavy to allow for any 
significant autonomy of a domain of scientific practices ... The intentionality 
of scientific practices is often only fulfilled by such extensions beyond the 
laboratory and outside the field. (1999: 445) 
Charlene Haddock Seigried also questions the boundaries erected between the 
practice of science and everyday experience. From the pragmatist philosophy of 
John Dewey, Seigried reverses the question and considers what the scientific 
method is: 
Dewey urges us not to follow science in its ever·increasing specialization 
and arcane, technical vocabularies and interests, but to direct our attention 
in the opposite direction, back to where the experimental method 
originated; namely to ordinary experience. In fact, in his view, the scientific 
method of observation, reflection, and testing is the formalization of the 
method of experience itself. (2001: 117) 
She finds that in a pragmatist philosophy there is a concern only "with those 
aspects of the sciences that have relevance to everyday experience, either in 
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regard to issues that grow out of everyday experience or as they are reabsorbed 
back into it" (2001: 116). Evolutionary computer games both reabsorb and 
produce new experiences of what it means to be alive and definitions of life itself. 
Together with/as artificial life they form a constitutive part of the new life sciences 
that are fundamentally deterritorialising and reterritorialising the definitions of 
life; what our bodies are and our cosmology. Moving from the pragmatist 
philosohphy of Dewey to the functional philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari, these 
would be considered to be assemblages of machines. Deleuze and Guattari find 
machines everywhere, "Everywhere it is machines - real ones, not figurative ones: 
machines driving other machines being driven by other machines, with all the 
necessary couplings and connections" (1983: 1). Machines are productive forces 
that change, alter and redirect flows in the production of objects. Machinic 
production finds close ties with agential realism in that there is in both the 
material·discursive production of the real: 
[Man] does not I ive nature as nature, but as a process of production. There 
is no such thing as either man or nature now, only a process that produces 
the one within the other and couples the machines together. Producing· 
machines, desiring·machines everywhere, schizophrenic machines, all 
species of life: the self and the non·self, outside and inside, no longer have 
any meaning whatsoever. (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 2) 
Machines come together as assemblages; collections of machines assembled 
together to produce objects. Creatures and other evolutionary artificial life games 
and projects can be considered as such machinic assemblages, producing entities 
endowed with the status of life. This occurs within new natures under the guise of 
a cosmology that produces a specific ontological structure to reality within the 
framework of computational regimes. The machinic assemblages that Creatures 
and its peers associate with connect, converge and overlap the social and science. 
Within Creatures, players are both partaking in a popular form of entertainment 
medium as well as participating in cutting edge techno(life)science. It is in this 
way that we can speak of these games alongside science and as science practice. 
Michael Menser and Stanley Aronowitz state: 
Culture, science and technology, although distinct on specific levels, have 
been and continue to be inextricably bound to one another in such a fashion 
that each actually merges into the other, laying lines of contact and support. 
(1996: 7) 
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Creatures and its peers are tied to other assemblages across both scientific and 
popular social fields and to other assemblages that are also crossing borders3 . 
Together, they are producing new territories of life, what it means to be alive, and 
our relation with the world around us. They are engaged in technoscientific 
practice that engages with and supports other technoscientific practices across 
the life sciences and popular media that are producing new entities 'down there' 
such as Norns and their (our) kin. In turn this produces new natures 'out there' 
and new posthuman cultures 'up there.' They are producing specific definitions on 
what it means to be alive (as informational forms), to be (post)human (as fluid 
cybernetic feedback loops within other such feedback loops), and our relationship 
with the world around us (as a deterministic computable program). Creatures, 
considered within a scientific practice, opens what Emily Martin has termed the 
'citadel' of science as an institution and creates new currents and flows of 
information. This opens the study of science to the possibility that: 
The walls of the citadel are porous and leaky; inside is not pure knowledge, 
outside is not pure ignorance. This means the way is opened for a more 
complex, less flatly antagonistic attitude toward science than prevailed 
among some of us earlier. Scientific knowledge is being made by all of us; 
we all move in and out of the bustling city of knowledge production. (Martin 
1996: 102) 
Looking Ahead 
Developing Creatures and its peers as converging points of science and popular 
culture and exploring the stories about and surrounding life that evolutionary 
computer games produce, this thesis is structured around the development and 
production of meaning through the activity of play. Chapter two places the thesis 
within the context of historic and recent literature in both computer game and 
science and technology studies. Taking a historic cue from media effects and the 
anthropology of player cultures, recent work in computer game studies has 
rejected a straightforward effects argument through the contrasting theoretical 
standpoints of narratology and ludology. Narratology, primary developed through 
literature and film studies, views computer games as textual media. Ludology 
focuses on the activity of playas simulation, striving to recognise computer 
games as a unique media form. Finding ground between these viewpoints, this 
thesis develops computer game playas an active interaction where the activity of 
game play produces both the game itself and the meanings built within and taken 
3 Sarah Kember, in Cyberfeminism and Artificial Life (2003), maps out some of the cultural and scientific areas 
that artificial life is connected to and supports. 
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away from play. In exploring the production of meaning within play, the chapter 
recognises the need to relate computer game play into the greater cultural 
practices of which it is a part. Chapter two also reviews recent work in science 
and technology studies, expanding a 'Deleuzian episteme' that aligns with the 
materialist foundation of the thesis. Within this foundation the active production 
of play within computer games is recognised and built into a greater assembly of 
cultural and scientific production. 
Arguing that the intra·actions produced through computer game play have real 
effects, bringing a number of agents both living and nonliving together in play, 
this thesis utilises a conceptualisation of cyberspace as spaces of intra·action. In 
order to consider computer games as spatial where real things happen and where 
agents produce play and meaning, a review of cyberspace theory and the tying of 
'conceptual loose ends' is necessary. Taking from social geography and finding 
resonance with the materialist positioning of the thesis, chapter three builds a 
conceptualisation of cyberspace that incorporates both 'physical' and 'digital' 
space, and differentiates between the two. Within this conceptualisation it also 
considers our intra·actions within cyberspace as humans, developing an 
embedded standpoint that views the player as extended into the cyberspatial 
gamespaces created in computer game play. This replaces the more common 
conceptualisation of 'immersion' and similar travels in humans' use and 
habitation of cyberspace. The chapter also introduces Foucault's concept of 
heterotopia and considers the cyberspaces constructed through gameplay as 
examples. Considering gamespace as heterotopian further deepens an 
understanding of our dealings with and within digital space and its relationship 
with the physical. 
Building upon the spatial aspects of gamespace developed in chapter three, 
chapter four investigates playing computer games as a productive practice. 
Following a participatory engagement with games, it develops a method of 
enquiry that traces how meanings are produced through the intra·action of play, 
and finds structuring elements that guide, open and limit the possibilities 
available in gameplay. It builds from the spatial aspects of cyberspace to consider 
gamespace as a structuring element of play. Closely partnered with this, the 
underlying rule based programming of game is also developed as a second strong 
structuring element. The chapter develops a sense of a game's culture by turning 
to how the player is able to make sense of this structured environment, where a 
player is introduced to and becomes part of the assembly of agents that come 
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together. This multi·directional model introduces the concepts of structures of 
feeling, the development of intuition and the structuring elements of narrative 
scaffolding. It also introduces mythic possibilities as elements that align players 
within the culture of a game and guide and structure gameplay. Building this 
game's culture, the chapter ties the production of meaning through gameplay to 
the stories that are produced within play, including what statements these are 
able to produce. Within evolutionary computer games two matched narratives are 
found; the paired technoscientific and spiritual stories of life itself and the 
cosmological framework formed within the posthuman. 
Chapters five and six further investigate the technoscientific and spiritual 
narratives that surround artificial life and evolutionary computer games. Chapter 
five explores technoscience narratives of life itself, through definitions of life that 
draw connections with the life sciences allegiance with code, informatics and 
cybernetics through neo-Darwinian evolution, autopeiosis and cybernetics. It 
further expands these definitions, investigating the rhetoric and structure built 
around space and time within computational regimes. This also highlights the ties 
that are forged between the 'virtual universes' of artificial life emplacements, and 
our own material physical universe. Chapter six moves from the scientific 
discourse surrounding artificial life to investigate common sprititual narratives, 
exploring the concepts of Gaia, Mother Earth, Cosmic Christ and the living 
universe found within 'postmodern' spiritualisties. Embedded within this 
narrativity, the at once oppositional and complimentary figurations of a god of 
evolution (a patriarchal position) and god as evolution (an emergent systemic 
position) are found and the interplay between the two is examined, especially in 
relation to the positioning of the player and game system. In what at first appears 
to be contradictory and challenging god positions, a complimentary, if strained, 
arrangement within evolutionary computer games and postmodern spirituality is 
found. Developing the spiritual narrativity within evolutionary computer games 
and the progression of gameplay, the story of life as genesis is traced. This occurs 
through the three stages: the construction or worlds, the creation of life and 
change through evolution. This spiritual grand narrative is expanded upon and 
explored, connecting to artificial life's twinned scientific discourse. 
Building the scientific and spiritual narratives of artificial life through evolutionary 
computer games, chapter seven traces a genealogy of games, finding a common 
ancestor in the Game of Life. The chapter continues through two early research 
programs, Richards Dawkins' Blind Watchmaker (or Biomorphs) and Thomas Ray's 
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Tierra, both highly popular with lay users and enthusiasts. Computer games by 
game producer Maxis such as SimEarth and SimLife complete the genealogy and 
prepare for a fuller investigation of the Creatures series of games. Throughout the 
genealogy, tracing the development of scientific and spiritual narratives that 
connect silicon and carbon, and digital and material together, these evolutionary 
computer games and programs are presented as heterotopian emplacements, in 
that they become perfected instances of neo·Darwinian and evolutionary 
definitions of life itself and computational regimes. 
Focusing on the Creatures series of computer games, chapter eight examines in 
depth the development of a game's culture, structured around the dual 
conceptualisations of life as Ctechno)scientific phenomena and as vulnerable life 
forms in need of nurturing and care. This builds bonds of kinship and 
commonalities with carbon life. It explores the scientific discourse and meanings 
of life structured through play and the development of these through the playing 
out of a mythic discourse of construction, creation and change. Turning to the 
role and position of the player, the chapter explores the placement of the player 
as a patriarchal god figure and the interplay between this and the contrasting 
figure of the god within the system. These two positions of power are explored to 
discover how each becomes interdependent on the other, within computational 
regimes, in order to progress the system as universe. Throughout the chapter, the 
question of how it has become possible to consider silicon entities as living things 
is questioned, together with how the game's culture, including player involvement, 
develops the life status of silicon creatures and our relationship with this life. 
The thesis returns to the Massumi quote introduced in chapter nine to conclude, 
asking "does it work?" when considering the new narratives and meanings of life, 
nature and the cosmos that evolutionary artificial life computer games are 
producing through play. It suggests that what is produced is a recuperation of 
Modern notions of time and space and a unitary definition of life and cosmo that 
needs careful consideration when applied to the emergent processes underlying 
artificial life theory. The chapter reviews how evolutionary computer games have 
actively promoted themselves as artificial life products, creating links with the life 
and biological sciences and incorporates a discussion of Spore. The meaning 
produced within play naturalises and normalises specific definitions of life 
steeped in neo·Darwinian evolutionism and cybernetics, and how our digital 
creations have become perfected examples of the essence of this life. Challenging 
such a unitary view and utilising Bruno Latour's program of political ecology, his 
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concepts of proposition and habit suggests an alternative framework to examine 
artificial life and our relation with these entities. 
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Chapter 2 
Computer Games, Technoculture and Technoscience 
William Gavin Mackie Loading World 32 
Placed within the typically distinct fields of computer game studies and science 
and technology studies, this thesis draws from a wide theoretical net. It creates a 
converging point between disciplines as it considers evolutionary computer games 
as bringing players and other members of the assemblies brought together in 
gameplay, into the fold of media, technology and (techno)science. The thesis 
attempts to find shared ground between areas of interest. It postulates a unified 
theoretical vantage point that encompasses an underlying assumption of playing 
computer games as a productive practice, one that brings together an assembly 
of agents in the creation of meaningful (and hopefully fun) gameplay. It also seeks 
mechanisms in which computer games and play connect and are framed within 
the cultures and assemblages that surround them, including how these are 
connected and framed within games and play. 
Turning to computer games as an area of academic interest, the recent field of 
computer game studies has attempted to find a theoretical vantage point it can 
call its own. This has been focused on the issue of narrative and simulation within 
computer games. The more recent work within science studies explored in this 
chapter and moving forward from the 'science wars' (and on the borderlands of 
science and technoculture) provides a converging point with cultural studies, and 
forms the backbone of the theoretical positioning of this thesis. 
computer Games as an Area of Study 
Far from exploiting what Espen Aarseth has termed the "virgin soil" of computer 
game studies "ready to be plotted and plowed by the machineries of cultural and 
textual studies" (2004: 45), cultural and media studies (apart from a few notable 
exceptions) took some time to consider computer games as a serious area of 
study. Academics steeped in a heritage of film, literary and drama studies staked 
early claims in this field, largely assuming that computer games constituted a 
new form of media that could be subsumed within their theoretical frameworks of 
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narratology and textuality. Against this, an emergent branch of computer game 
studies, formed around the concept of ludology (the study of play) has rejected 
the notion that games are story·telling media, focusing instead on the notion of 
the act of playing as simulation rather than representation. These contemporary 
forms of computer game studies, largely crystallised after a formative year in 
2001, have focused on mapping and debating the theoretical frameworks of 
narratology and ludology. 
As an area of academic interest, writing on computer games predates the recent 
formation of computer game studies, with many of the typical responses new 
forms of media have come to expect, especially those intended for the young (and 
therefore vulnerable). The early promise of computers in the spheres of work, 
leisure and education where "computer systems are being developed to assist 
teaching and learning in the classroom and outside" and where computerised 
games and leisure activities "designed to fill time vacated by work" (Laver 1980: 
47), heralded a future where computers eased work pressures, aided in the 
provision of education, and supplied new forms of leisure and entertainment. 
Despite early predictions that computer games on "domestic television screens" 
(1980:55) would provide a large and expanding market and that "viewdata 
systems" similar to the Internet would "establish informal links across and 
between communities, and perhaps eventually between nations" (1980: 56), 
Murray Laver's mapping of the computer's increasing absorption into everyday 
life was quickly subsumed by worries of computer/arcade game addiction (and 
the deviance that comes with addictive behaviour) and the influence games, 
violent games in particular, were having on youth. Initial forays such as Loftus and 
Loftus' study of computer games (1983) painted a bleak picture of games and 
players with a world of teen "video game addict[s], look[ing] forward to going to 
the arcade more than anything in life" (1983: 89). This sparked concern for a 
generation of young adolescent men (considered the typical video game user) 
ready to turn to deviant behaviours (stealing, truancy, general anti-sociality) in 
order to feed their addiction. The (media) effects that the games were having on 
this generation were also under scrutiny, reflecting similar concerns that other 
new popular media forms such as penny arcades, comic books, cinema, and 
television have held before them, which led Loftus and Loftus to genuinely ask "Do 
video games 'teach' us violence?" (1983: 97). 
While the academic and social legacy of computer games as a dangerous social 
vice continues, more positive light has been brought to the field. As early as 1986 
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Brian Sutton-Smith's study of games and toys included computer games as a 
serious form of play_ Functionally tying the practice of play into the cultures from 
within which they occur, Sutton-Smith finds that toys, games and computer 
games specifically overcome problems of adaptation: 
[Games] can be seen as models of adaptation. They exist to stimulate some 
adaptive problem that the group is having. They exist to reduce that 
problem to a scale that is manageable. They reproduce the two sides of the 
problem ... and also the excitement that goes with the uncertainty of not 
knowing what the outcome will be. (1986:64) 
It is this functional theorising on computer games that is lacking in the recent 
development of computer game studies; the documenting and building of ties and 
links between computer games and the culture(s) in which they are situated and 
are embedded within. Social commentators have continually suggested a tight 
bond between the games of a culture and the greater values and practices of this 
culture (McLuhan 1964: 235; Barthes 1972: 53; Gailey 1993: 81). Mark J.P. Wolf 
comments on the computer game as a cultural influence: 
We may also ask how video games are related to the cultures producing 
them, and what they say about those cultures. Video games have become 
well integrated into other cultural forms and media, yet perhaps overlooked 
as a cultural influence. (1997: 22) 
Whilst recent attempts in computer game studies have made cursory attempts 
towards opening computer game studies to a more cultural perspective, there has 
not been any strong academic response to the question of the greater cultural 
aspects of computer games first raised by those like Sutton-Smith_ Through 
introducing a concept of ideology in the underlying rule-based nature of computer 
games, Gonzalo Frasca makes a tentative first step in relating computer games 
back into the cultural realm. Moving from the representation of characters, 
backgrounds and settings, through manipulation, goals, and the availability of 
players to change the rules (2004: 232), Frasca attempts to introduce the 
intentionality of the game designers as ideology within the games. By denying 
computer games the ability to 'story tell,' Frasca's model stops at the level of 
game designers and players influencing gameplay through the enforcing and 
interpretation of rules. Henry Jenkins, in attempting to open computer game 
studies up to a nuanced concept of narrative, where game designers become 
'narrative architects' (2004: 121), takes another step towards connecting games 
and culture. For Jenkins the environment of the gamespace allows for the 
development of narrative in one of four ways: 
William Gavin Mackie Loading World 35 
Spatial stories can evoke pre-existing narrative associations; they can 
provide a staging ground where narrative events are enacted; they may 
embed narrative information within their mise-en-scene; or they provide 
resources for emergent narratives_ (2004: 123) 
By keeping this narrative work at an individual and personal level, Jenkins (as with 
Frasca) fails to truly link computer games and gaming within cultural discourses. 
There is no connection made with cultural grand narratives, values or adaptations 
made within Jenkins' work. It becomes a separate task to extrapolate out to 
realise cultural work - for Jenkins, computer games evoke, enact or embed 
personal narrative work, and we then must embed this personal narrative within 
greater cultural narratives and values as a separate next step. This thesis, by 
taking the theoretical standpoint that computer games and particularly 
evolutionary artificial life computer games can be considered as assemblages 
connected to other cultural assemblages; an intimate bond between game and 
culture is established. The development of a game's culture, expanded upon in 
chapter four, also makes connections between culture and games. 
There are four major aspects of computer games that computer game studies 
have made its focus and which aid in the development of the thesis argument. The 
first is narrative: are computer games a narrative form of media, are they stories? 
The second, simulation, is seen as the structuring element of gameplay. 
Conceptualised in opposition to narrative by ludologists, simulation views playas 
an active emergent process rather than as a pre·existing story. Next is space, 
further explord in the next chapter: what is the spatiality of computer games? 
Finally, embodiment: how can we relate action of 'virtual' gameworlds to the 'real' 
players' inputs on joysticks and keyboards? 
Narrative 
There is a major focus within contemporary computer game studies on whether or 
not computer games can be considered as narrative structures or at least have a 
sense of narrativity within them. From Barry Atkin's proclamation that "however 
much the computer game might be ... 'more than a game', it is still a fictional 
form" (2003: 22) to the opposing yet equally proclamatory statement by Markku 
Eskelinen, "I think we can safely say we can't find narrative situations within 
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games" 4 (2004: 37) the topic has proved highly divisive within the field. As late as 
2007, the division between ludology, narratology and "the issues at stake seem to 
have been blissfully ignored rather than resolved" (Simons 2007). Ludologists, 
keen in their quest to map out computer game studies as a unique area different 
from film and literary studies, have rejected the notion of narrative outright in 
favour of other models of play; most notably simulation. Finding such a move 
premature, Jenkins suggests that ludologists "are so busy trying to pull game 
designers out of their 'cinema envy' or define a field where no hypertext theorist 
dares to venture that they are prematurely dismissing the use value of narrative 
for understanding their desired object of study" (2004: 120). Although Jenkins 
balances himself by stating that playing a computer game "can never be reduced 
to the experience of a story" (2004: 120), he finds games to provide "immersive 
narrative experience" (2004: 123) where narrative activities such as story building 
occur (see also Wallis 2007: 69). Torill Mortensen suggests that the platform 
engine of computer games "creates the surprise and the events, while the 
interpretation process forms them into a story to be told and shared with other 
players" (2007: 299), where players are engaed in story creation from gameplay. 
This thesis takes the stand that both narrative and story building are important 
aspects of computer gameplay. This is reflectd by James Wallis when he suggests 
that gameplay is supported by games offering 'a way of creating a story within the 
structure of a game, which not only helps to structure the narrative but adds to 
interaction and competition" (2007: 69). In the building of the narrativity of 
computer games, however, care needs to be taken. Gameplay - although a 
narrative producing experience, is not textual in itself5. 
Aarseth equates the ability of computer games to produce narratives to that of 
'real life': 
Ontologically, the capacity for generating memorable moments is 
something games have in common with real life. A story generating system 
does not have to be a story itself. In fact, while life and games are primary, 
real·time phenomena, consisting of real or virtual events, stories are 
secondary phenomena, a revision of the primary event, or a revision of a 
revision, etc. (2004: 50) 
4 Eskelinen defines the minimal definition of narrative as containing a temporal sequence of events 
(plot) and a narrative situation (2004: 37). 
5 Chapter Three opens gamespace as an environment that can be read 'textually', invoking Soja's 
conception of firstspace. The activity of gameplay, although occurring within this space, is a 
productive and not textual practice. 
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Aarseth relates story telling as an after effect of gameplay; that stories and 
narratives are something taken away from games, but are not involved in actual 
gameplay. Challenging this, a necessary part of gameplay is the production and 
continual reassessment of strategy, decision·making and actions, all of which are 
continually being built through the experience of gameplay. "Games not only 
become 'stories' after the fact, but stories can be an important part of the 
decision making process" (Simons 2007). It is the ability to make use of 
perceptions of past actions in the determination of present ones that makes 
gameplay possible. It is exactly this aspect of gameplay that Wallis finds exciting: 
The challenge of simulataneously telling a story and playing a game - or if 
you prefer, telling a story while thinking not only of plot but also of tactics, 
strategy, and how to avoid the other players derailing you - is exhilarating. 
(2007: 69) 
This is especially the case where players are required to repeat actions, through 
multiple 'lives' or similar game predicaments, in order to progress and improve 
gameplay. 'Story generating systems' are not after the fact; they are embedded 
within meaningful, and enjoyable, gameplay. It is this strategic aspect of 
gameplay that converges narrativity and game theory as "in order to determine an 
optimal strategy a game theorist (and a game player who calculates his or her 
chances) has to be able to compare the payoffs of all possible outcomes of a 
game" (Wallis 2007). 
This thesis develops narrativity and story generation through the productive 
practice of gameplay, relating and mapping this against similar work in the 
production of life narratives. By treating computer gaming as a productive 
practice, it sidesteps the lugology·narratolgy debate on the issue of narrative and 
instead develops story generation and narrativity as a contribution to the 
production of meaningful gameplay and meaning within games. This ties in with 
the development of a game's culture. It then ties these into the statements that 
players can take away from gameplay, and how these work in the formation and 
reinforcement of cultural grand narratives in the playing through of mythic 
possibilities. Particularly valid in the new formations surrounding life itself, grand 
narratives have "returned with a vengeance with a variety of posthuman scenarios 
being offered" (Ansell Pearson 1997: 221). Evolutionary computer games are 
fertile ground for the exploration of such narratives. 
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Simulation 
For those games theorists tending towards the ludologist standpoint, the rejection 
of narrative within games has opened up games as sites of simulation. For 
Aarseth, "the hidden structure behind ... computer games is not narrative - or that 
silly abused term, 'interactivity' - but simulation" (2004: 52). For Aarseth "the 
computer game is the art of simulation": 
[I]t is the dynamic aspect of the game that creates a consistent gameworld. 
Simulation is the hermeneutic Other of narratives; the alternative mode of 
discourse, bottom up and emergent where stories are top·down and 
preplanned. In simulations, knowledge and experience is created by the 
payer's actions and strategies, rather than recreated by a writer or 
moviemaker. (2004: 52) 
Considering computer games and computational environments as simulations 
predates ludology and computer games studies as an area of interest, and one of 
the basic modes of interaction we have with computers. Sherry Turkle has viewed 
contemporary culture as being increasingly marked by the logic of simulation, 
where "computers offer the possibility of creating and working within artificial 
worlds, whether to simulate the behavior of economics, political systems, or 
imaginary subatomic particles" (1984: 82). Turkle raises early concerns over the 
nature of the simulations we create in computers, along with our increasing 
infatuation with these digital worlds by asking the question of what happens if the 
computer simulations we produce are preferred to the 'real.' She views computer 
games as contributing to this as they "offer a chance to live in simulated, rule 
governed worlds" (1984: 79). 
Within writings on the character of simulation, two themes are recurrent; one, of 
rule governed worlds; and two, of the preference of the simulation over the real. In 
analysing interactive fiction, considered by many as a precursor to video games, 
Robert Kelly finds within increasingly complex simulations "the realization that a 
perfect model, a superior imitation, becomes the reality it seeks to si mulate" 
(1993: 52). He finds the danger lies within the underlying assumptions and rules 
upon which the simulation was programmed: "the game world would have us 
generate a fictional truth transferable to the real world, but it does so in a way 
that allows the user to generate no fictional truths for herself that are not pre· 
programmed into the game" (1993: 57). For Jesper Juul computer games are 
simulations whose "fictional world cues the player into making assumptions about 
the real world" (2005: 168). They both relate the rule·based nature of computer 
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programming and the assumptions used in programming the simulation to the 
'truths' or statements players are able to take from the game. This is a 
structuring element of gameplay - the game can only operate in the manner it has 
been programmed and cannot break from the underlying rules of its program. 
Players have no choice but to play within these rules. The game simulation allows 
only a certain set of statements to be taken away from play, but it is exactly this 
manipulation with simulations that Turkle suggests as a way of learning about the 
world: 
Some people say that not only is knowing how to manipulate complex 
simulation surfaces all they need to know about computers, but that these 
simulations are the best way of learning about the world. Others find such 
notions deeply problematic and even dangerous. (1996: 63) 
Although Turkle proposes that in video games the underlying "rules have given 
way to branching narratives" (1996:88), the programming of the game and the 
underlying assumptions used cannot be ignored in the structuring of gameplay. 
Finding an example in the evolutionary artificial life game SimLife, she finds that 
such games "teach players to think in an active way about complex phenomena 
(some of then 'real life,' some of them not) as dynamic evolving systems" (Turkle 
1996: 70). The (game)world becomes structured by the underlying assumptions 
of its programming and these become transplanted back to the original. Turkle 
postulates such a scenario: 
Simulation games are not just objects for thinking about the real world but 
also cause us to reflect on how the real world has itself become a 
simulation game. (1996: 71) 
It is this double reflection that is developed through the thesis: of our computer 
models simulating the 'real world', and this same 'real world' coming to be 
thought of in the same manner as our computer models. 
Space 
As simulational rule· based worlds, computer games have an obvious sense of 
space. Even early text-based interactive fictional games were often concerned with 
the exploration of new worlds and environments. Writers on the subject have 
developed both the presentation of space and the player's ability (or lack of) to 
explore this space, as well as the spiritual connotations such 'virtual space' may 
contain. Wolf finds that in the presentation of space, computer games share many 
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of the same conventions of cinematic use of space, although computer games 
also have some key points of differentiation: 
In a video game, not only the representation of space, but its very 
implication, depend on being programmed and actively created. Second, 
because the video game has no default structure for its off-screen space, 
that space can be shared and structured in new ways that did not develop 
in film or television. And finally, the video game, as an interactive medium, 
often gives the player some control over the point of view, allowing one to 
choose which spaces appear on-screen or off. (1997: 12) 
It is this building of digital environments with a sense of space that is observed 
'on-screen' and exists 'off-screen' as complete worlds that creates the allure of an 
endless cyberspace in computer games. Staub and Hussey have suggested that 
computer games and cyberspace more generally break away from the 
conceptualisation of material space as 'framed space', and create such an 
unframed spiritual space: 
But it is the abandonment of any idea whatsoever of framed space that the 
computer game makes its clearest statement about the nature of 
cyberspace. Indeed, what the computer game does is to substitute for 
material space the ancient concept of spiritual or sacred space as found in 
the art of medieval Christianity and Islam. This is space without end 
(Amen). (1998: 180) 
For Staub and Hussey computer games have offered sacred spaces that can be 
entered, explored and experienced at the player's volition. Approaching computer 
game space from an opposing perspective, Jesper Juul finds that it is actually the 
limits put on the spatiality of a game that structure game play, which places the 
player between what he has termed the rules and fiction of a game. Here, the 
digital environments of game worlds are not viewed as space without end. Quite 
the contrary, they are viewed with (often invisible) borders that limit the 
exploratory areas and aspects of the game and therefore guide the player in 
gameplay_ For Juul: 
... space in games is a special case. The level design of a game world can 
present a fictional world and determine what players can and cannot do at 
the same time. In this way, space in games can work as a combination of 
rules and fiction. (2005: 163) 
It is the limitations placed on players in the movement around gamespace that 
Juul finds of interest; how the exploratory space of a game is limited by the 
design of the game, and how these limitations frame gameplay. As well as 
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creating the setting for the game, "the fictional world also influences the players' 
understanding of the game rules" (Juul 2005: 167). The space of a game is a 
structuring element of gameplay. It upholds the rules of the game and guides the 
player in gameplay through the distinction of explorable and off·limit (or non-
existent) space. 
Juul also relates and builds links between the space of the computer game and in 
the space that the game is played. He finds again that it is the rules of the game 
that separate gamespace from the space that surrounds it. Within the space of 
the game, the rules of the game apply. Outside of the space the rules of the game 
no longer are applicable: 
Rules separate the game from the rest of the world by carving out an area 
where the rules apply; fiction projects a world different from the real world. 
The space of a game is part of the world in which it is played ... (Juul 2005: 
164) 
This thesis progresses this concept further as the case of computer games is a 
special instance of this general observation of all games. Unlike other games 
played in or on physical material spaces (such as a football field) where it is 
through a voluntary mutual agreement between agents involved in the game that 
the rules are obeyed, in a computer game adherence to the underlying rules and 
programming of the game is obligatory. The rules of a computer game determine 
what can and cannot occur in game play. On entering gamespace, the rules as the 
programming of the game establish what is and what is not possible. The player 
cannot break away from the rules within the gamespace_ It is the rule-based 
nature of gameplay and especially the programming of computer games that 
limits and structures where and what the player is able to do in the game_ For 
James Newman, "Video games present highly structured and, importantly, highly 
segmented experiences" (2002), but it is hiding of these rules in game design that 
allows the player "to believe she is in control" (Simons 2007). This thesis builds 
on this aspect of space and rules within games, considering gamespace as a 
structuring element of gameplay. By turning to work in social geography, and 
especially that of Soja and Foucault, the thesis builds a layered conceptualisation 
of computer gamespace. This can be read initially for its textual/semiotic context 
and secondly developed as a structuring agent in the production of meaningful 
action and gameplay. Developing the digital electronic spaces of computer games 
as special instances of space invoking Foucault's concept of heterotopia extends 
how we can exami ne the special status of computer games as spaces, as well as 
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the relationship between game and player. Exploring electronic digital space as a 
special instance also highlights defining features that it holds from physical 
material space. 
Embodiment 
When analysing and discussing computer gameplay, the question of embodiment 
should be high on the agenda as there is such an apparent contrast between the 
physical materiality of the player and corresponding digital drama of play on the 
screen. At first glance, gameplay appears to be a disembodied practice, with the 
player transported to the action and play, occurring within the 'virtual space' of 
the computer game, pixelated and displayed on the monitor. The action seems to 
be on the 'other side'; within the digital electronic space of the game the physical 
presence of the player seems forgotten in gameplay. This is far from the case. For 
Sutton-Smith, the adaptive problem of the computer game is to "beat the 
machine" through "physical skill and coordination of hand and eye, by strategy 
and by good luck" (1986: 66), reiterating the playing of computer games as an 
embodied practice. Embodiment, when attached to our encounters with digital 
electronic spaces, begs the questions - Where are we? And how do we reconcile 
our material presence with our 'virtual' or digital one? Following a tradition within 
technoculture studies of flow and movement between 'real' and 'virtual', Turkle 
finds environments in which players readily move into the gamespace in computer 
games, "with the computer behind them the video games provide imaginative 
worlds into which people enter as participants" (1984: 75). The inhabiting of 
virtual worlds by players, the movement between the body playing the video game 
and the player's presence within the gamespace all need close examination. 
computer game playing is usually conceptualised as either an immersion in or 
travelling to the gamespace by the player, finding cyberpunk oringins of a 
trajectory to escape the 'meat' body through digital transcendence. Martii Lahti 
finds that: 
One of the most often repeated and taken-for-granted assumptions in much 
writing on "cyberspace" is revealed in a tendency to treat new media, 
games included, as machines to realize desires for bodily transcendence, 
that is, an "out-of-body" experience. (2003: 158) 
Immersion features highly in such conceptualisations; For Janet Murray, most 
famously, it evokes the powerful experience of travel to "an elaborately simulated 
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space" metaphorically relating the virtual experience of cyberspace to the 
"physical experience of being submerged in water" (1997: 98). It is the digital 
presence of the player within the gamespace that takes priority in such 
conceptualisations, Sutton·Smith's observations on the 'physical skill' that is 
needed to play games is neglected and forgotten. It is through new separations 
and distinctions between a disembodied mind and body in which such digital 
travels take place. Even when repackaged as the 'virtual body' (Ryan 2001) 
metaphors of mind out of body transcendence permeate; immersion, travelling, 
reaching a foreign land, being taken prisoner are all common (Ryan 2001: 93). 
Even setting aside full immersion momentarily, Marie·Laure Ryan finds textual 
and digital spaces offer the user 'travel': 
Yet if the nomadic, alienating space of postmodernism prevents an 
immersive relation, I would not go so far as to say that spatial immersion 
precludes travel. Textual space involves not only a set of distinct locations 
but a network of accesses and relations that bind these sites together into a 
coherent geography. (2001:123) 
Even in instances when the material presence of the body is remembered, a 
distinction between the physical body and digital presence is created. For Lahti: 
This process relocates and doubles our body in such a way that it is 
simultaneously and interconnectedly present in two places at once: The 
player's body is next to the computer screen or television monitor, but her 
avatar, the "I" or vision that was part of the body, is travelling through and 
in the virtual space of the game opening behind the monitor. (2003: 164) 
Metaphors of travelling or immersion require that a distinction and separation be 
made between the physical material embodiment of the player and his/her 
disembodied, out-of-body digital self as game agent, a contemporary 
interpretation of older mind to body dualities. Here, the ontological ability to 
translate the player as abstract information allows a new duality between the 
physical and informational self. Moving towards a more nuanced and firmly 
embodied conceptualisation of players' involvement in the cyberspaces of 
gamespace, chapter three examines the spatiality of 'cyberspace' and our 
involvement and intra-action within this space as humans. Specifically, by 
retaining our core physicality as a key aspect of human embodiment and 
considering player extension into gamespace, we can consider key questions 
regarding human involvement in the digital spaces we are creating. How are 
humans included (or excluded) in electronic digital space? What kinds of 
relationships can gamespace/cyberspace make with the 'real'? Considering 
William Gavin Mackie Loading World 44 
computer games as forging new "cyborgian relationship[s] with entertainment 
technologies, linking our everyday social space and computer technologies to 
virtual spaces and futuristic technologies" (Lahti 2003: 158), an embodied 
conceptualisation of play lets one explore the political and ontological 
considerations of these new relationships. 
Incorporating Science and Technoculture 
Often considered the closest realised example of William Gibson's fictional 
cyberspace, computer games have an academic heritage with technoculture 
studies. As I will explore in the examination of the spatiality of cyberspace in 
chapter three, the legacy of first wave technoculture studies allured theorists with 
the promise of radical new forms of identity, spatiality, community, and digital 
travels. Typically, these positions were formed within structures that at once 
formed an opposition and recuperation of more comfortable modernist 
frameworks. J Macgregor Wise (1997), developing three epistemes in which to 
explore and analyse our relationship with technology, would locate this first wave 
of academic response within the modern episteme; centred on issues of time, 
causality and identity. Wise's tri·fold of modern, amodern and Deleuzian 
epistemes, each a "hermeneutical horizon that results from a particular set of 
assumptions, and that determines the questions that can be asked of ourselves, 
our society, our technology, or of our environment" (Wise 1997: xiv), offers a 
framework to distinguish and structure theoretical conceptions of space, time and 
technology. Understanding each episteme aids in the placement of conceptual 
frameworks that find a legacy within evolutionary computer games, as well as 
grounding and positioning the materialist foundations of the thesis argument. 
Wise finds the modern episteme the most prevalent and deeply entrenched of the 
tri·fold, as it has been central to philosophical conceptions of modernity and 
common·sense understandings of Western, industrialised society. Wise centres 
his exploration of the modern episteme on the Kantian notion of the separation of 
space and time, and the further separation between subject and object. 
Technology, within the modern episteme, confronts and manipulates time. It is 
transformative, converting time from 'natural' human time, or duree, into abstract 
time - sequenced, packaged and discrete. For Wise, this relationship that 
technology holds with time creates its most characteristic element within the 
modern episteme; its ability to seemingly collapse time and space. By abstracting 
time, technology attempts to master it, producing a disenchanted time that is 
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marked by sequence rather than as a priori form. Importantly, as explored through 
the thesis, it is this sequencing of time that has been adopted wholeheartedly 
within computational regimes, asserting a common ontological character between 
the computer ticking of sequenced programming instructions and the discretely 
sequenced divisions of a disenchanted time. 
As a consequence of this pattern of sequence given to abstract time, the modern 
episteme relies on a notion of causality to explain relationships between terms. 
This focus frames discourses on technology as located either within technological 
or social deterministic models (or a combination of both), but, it is this 
positioning within a framework of cause and effect that creates the limitations of 
both social and technological determinism. Both views are abstractions that 
create contradictory positions when viewed within the modern episteme. With 
questions of causality, also comes the question of control, bringing the 
understanding that technology is meant to bring the future under human control. 
In the modern episteme control becomes linked with the Kantian self/other 
differentiation and is then conceived of as mastery. Accounting for modern 
technology, humans have created machines as slaves within our control, but 
humans are considered enslaved by this very same technology. 
Moving from the modern to amodern episteme, Wise considers the conceptual 
model of the cyborg and actor· network theory as key motivators, with the work of 
Haraway and Latour formulating a response to the limitations of the modern 
episteme. Haraway's infamous ironic figuration of the cyborg forefronts the 
question of the borders between human and other and muddies distinctions, 
especially between human and technology, which the modern episteme held dear. 
The cyborg does not think in terms of difference, but rather in terms of alliances, 
articulations and spatial positioning. It is these that are also central to Latour's 
actor·network theory, considering social space in terms of agency, and the 
movement and influence of actors coming together within a network. Although not 
completely aligned with cybrgian theory, the actor· network perspective also 
stresses both the contingency of networks (they are not determined, permanent or 
universal) and their emergent qualities. They are rarely stable for long and 
continually introduce new elements and changing relationships between actors. 
For Latour, both humans and nonhumans can exert social influence within a 
network. This means that technologies are as much actors as humans are. 
Although not passive, actors do vary in the extent to which they i nfl uence or resist 
influence in the network. The network follows the mutual determinism of both 
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technology and society. Technology (artefacts and practices) needs to be 
perceived as impinging on human behaviour, as humans, in turn, shape 
technology. The focus here is not based on notions of identity, but of agency. For 
Latour, this erases the ontological split between Nature and Culture fortified in 
the modern episteme through the process of purification, where objects are either 
social or natural, but never both. Latour's project involves bringing new types of 
things to the fore - hybrids of nature and culture; in Latour's terms, the 'things 
down there'. 
A focus on networks and spatial alliances in the amodern episteme denies the 
primacy of time over space as was found in the modern episteme. Instead a 
spatial view of technology is established where: 
Artifacts exist in space, manipulate and manage space, and, through 
networks constructed by the enlisting of multiple actors, establish lines of 
power and domination that crisscross space. (Wise 1997: 36) 
While this places space prior to time, it still holds to (Kantian) distinctions 
between time and space. Wise looks to a third episteme to introduce a 
conceptualisation of assemblages within which one can trace numerous social 
actors across time and space, a non·random configuration coded to certain 
hegemonies. He finds such a response in Deleuze (and Guatarri) and so terms his 
third episteme the Deleuzian episteme. Within the Deleuzian episteme, Wise holds 
onto the amodern notions of artifacts as social actors, the construction of long 
networks, the deterritorialization of identity (through the proliferation of hybrids) 
and the social construction of time. In his use of the Deleuzian episteme, Wise 
attempts to account for differences in the distribution of agency without taking 
recourse to abstract macro·actors such as social forces. His argument is for the 
building of hegemony through technological systems, not only through the 
discourse deployed by and around that system or by any symbolic capital it 
articulates, but through affective investment and material asignifying practices, 
structures and constraints. A description of the relation between technology and 
language becomes crucial to any analysis of the social. Wise views this as what is 
missing from the amodern episteme, while some attempt to come to grips with 
the regularities that are perceived within and between actor· networks. 
As introduced in chapter one, Delueze and Guattari consider that the articulation 
of technology and language is the function of a machine, defined as an apparatus 
of functions that redirects flows. Keith Ansell Pearson considers machinic 
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assemblages to be constituent of all systems: "from the 'biological' to the 'social' 
and economic are made up of machinic assemblages, complex foldings, and 
movements of deterritorialization that serve to cut across and derange their 
stratification" (1997: 125). The thesis argument considers evolutionary computer 
games as bio·technoscientific assemblages formed as social media. Any 
technology, including a computer game, is necessarily part of a system of 
technologies, being a system with both human and nonhuman actors. A 
technology services and supports other technologies and is equally serviced and 
supported itself. The form of a technology will have resonances with similar forms 
of other technologies and technological systems. There are no singular forms, 
only multiplicities, which means there is no technology that is fully unique. What 
Deleuze and Guattari distinguish as the anthropomorphic stratum is in this way 
marked by a differentiating machine that forms and organises substances. The 
differentiating machine arranges artifacts (and people) in space, in spatial 
arrangements, and by extensive movement. Another machine - a territorializing 
machine - also works on the stratum. The territorializing machine invests 
substances (formed matter) with intensity (such as affect). This sets the 
possibility for mobility and attachment. Wise finds that the "processes of 
territorialization intensify particular formations; the territorialization of any 
substance is always in process" (1997: 68). Against this, processes of 
deterritorialization de·intensify particular formations and therefore cut across 
strata. This opens the stratum onto other strata and onto mythic territories or 
abstract machines. 
Within the Deleuzian episteme Wise describes, forms resonate with other forms; 
territories open up onto other territories; assemblages are always aggregates, and 
human space is always social. Social space includes the articulation of the 
machinic assemblages (technology) and the assemblages of enunciation 
(language). This double articulation defines a specifically human social space, 
which resonates with the amodern episteme where we are reminded that 
technology is always a social actor: 
Social space is a network of relations between actors (animate, inanimate, 
or both) that are themselves aggregates and themselves the result of an 
abstract machine of stratification. These relations are structured through 
the workings of the technical social machine, the semiotic collective 
machine, and differentiating and territorializing machines - all 
interconnected, mutually determining. (Wise 1997: 70) 
William Gavin Mackie Loading World 48 
Through abstract machines actors are comprised, distributed, valued, lived and 
connected. Here, agency is not a given, but distri buted, differentiated and 
territorialized. Wise suggests that communication and information technologies 
are especially important sites for analysis, as both appear to embody technology 
(the device) and language (the content). He notes the ambivalent nature of 
technology through following its stratifications in the direction of increasing 
deterritorialization. As one descends lower towards the foundations of rational 
institutions, the more ambiguous the materials are from which the institutions are 
constructed, and the more they are compatible with a variety of different 
hegemonic orders. This for Wise introduces the political: 
Our mappings of social space become political, then, in that they seek a 
less dominated space in which to stand, when we advocate a molecular 
politics. (Wise 1997: 74) 
It is such mappings of social space that have been taken up within the materialist 
perspective that forms the foundation of this thesis. Expanding a nomadic 
subjectivity within a materialist approach, Rosi Braidotti introduces an alternate 
foundation for ethical and political subjectivity. For Braidotti, "Philosophical 
nomadism rests on a cartography of our historical condition that highlights the 
relevance of a non· unitary vision of the subject" (2006: 11). The development of 
such a cartography forms a political mapping of social space that realises the 
conceptualisation of assemblages, tracing social actors across time and space 
found important in the Deleuzian episteme. Braidotti uses cartography as a way of 
linking embedded subjects within figurations: 
Figurations are not figurative ways of thinking, but rather more materialistic 
mappings of situated, or embedded and embodied positions. A cartography 
is a theoretically·based and politically·informed reading of the present. A 
cartographic approach fulfils the function of providing both exegetical tools 
and creative theoretical alternatives. As such it responds to my two main 
requirements, namely to account for one's locations in terms of both of 
space (geo·political or ecological dimension) and time (historical and 
genealogical dimension), and to provide alternative figurations or schemes 
or representation for these locations, in terms of power as restrictive ... but 
also as empowering or affirmative. (2002: 2) 
Here Braidotti takes from Felix Guattari who conceptualises cartographic 
mappings within models of subjectivity: 
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... every individual and social group conveys its own system of modelling 
subjectivity; that is, a certain cartography - composed of cognitive 
references as well as mythical, ritual and symptomatological references -
with wh ich it positions itself in relation to its affects and angu ishes, and 
attempts to manage its inhibitions and drives. (Guattari 1995: 11) 
Cartographies move beyond the amodern mapping of networks within space to 
consider, in Deleuzian terms, the various strata joining as vectors within the 
formation and continual production of assemblages. These strata are embedded 
with spatiality and historicity and include the subjectivity of the human and 
nonhuman agents within networks and assemblies that come together within an 
assemblage. Centralised on playing with the essence of life itself, evolutionary 
computer games tie themselves with similar life producing assemblages in what 
the Critical Art Ensemble have termed the Flesh Machine: the machinic processes 
and assemblages deterritorialising and redefining what 'life itself' is. Finding new 
definitions of life steeped within informational evolutionism and cybernetics, these 
games move the essence of life from a material to abstract informational 
ontological structure that has implications outside of merely defining life. 
Elizabeth Grosz suggests that in order to respond to such moves, there must be a 
re-examination of 'where we come from' (2004:2): 
We need to return to, or perhaps to invent anew, the concepts of nature, 
matter, and life, the most elementary concerns of the cosmological and the 
ontological, if we want to develop alternative models to those inscriptive 
and constructionist discourses that currently dominate the humanities and 
social sciences, in which the transformation of representation is the only 
serious political issue, and where the body is of interest only in its reflection 
through discourse, its constitution in representation, or its mediation by 
images. (2004: 2-3) 
This thesis turns to the new natures and entities (re)created within evolutionary 
computer games as a site for a cartographic mapping of new meanings - of life, 
nature and cosmos, actively produced through play, whilst finding connections 
with similar productions in other media and technoscientific assemblages. Don 
Ihde suggests that, similar to Descartes seeing and not seeing himself within his 
camera, we do the same with our cybertechnologies (2202: 86). These 
technologically enabled sites become places of exploration and intra-action 
between the world and us: 'seeing' a specific story and definition of life, nature 
and cosmos. Guattari views such examples of popular media as important in the 
investigation of human subjectivity: 
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Should we keep the semiotic productions of the mass media, informatics, 
telematics and robotics separate from psychological subjectivity? I don't 
think so ... [T]echnological machines of information and communication 
operate at the heart of human subjectivity, not only within its memory and 
intelligence, but with its sensibility, affects and unconscious fantasms. 
(1995: 4) 
Similarly, Braidotti finds that one of the most 'distinctive traits' of 
contemporary culture is the convergence of previously separate 
technologies (2006: 30). Here she finds that: 
The distinction between bio·technologies and genetic engineering on the 
one hand and information and communication technologies on the other is 
untenable. They are equally co· present in driving home the spectacular 
effects of contemporary technological transformations, especially in terms 
of their impact on the gendered human subjects. (2006: 30) 
Evolutionary computer games combine both bio-technoscience and 
communication technologies. The new silicon life that they claim to create and 
host is produced through the technology of computer games, blending bio-science 
and bio-technology with/in communication technologies enjoyed by players 
across the world. These games present silicon entities that present lifelike 
behaviour patterns and life histories that resonate with carbon and human life. 
Within a posthuman imagination, these silicon entities form interesting play-
things that tell us about our own life, as well as poised as the next developmental 
stage of life on earth within an informational evolutionary standpoint. Katherine 
Hayles finds within these projections that there is "a tendency to extrapolate from 
relatively simple mechanical behaviours to much more complex human situations 
and a consequent redescription of the human in terms of the intelligent machine. 
These machine constitute, we are told, a new evolutionary phylum that will occupy 
the same niche as Homo Sapiens" (2005: 132). Within this story, silicon life is set 
on a path of succeeding humans as the dominant form of life on earth. It is 
exactly this rhetoric that Ansell Pearson finds in new forms of grand narratives 
and discussions of "life on earth taking pace in terms of the evolution of techno-
organic life that has cultivated positive feedback loops between 'intelligence' and 
biology resulting in an accelerated evolution, with the increasing hegemony of 
artificial life over natural life being understood as a Lamarckian invasion and take-
over of so-called dumb and blind Darwinian selection" (1997:148). This version 
life, offered within artificial life and the posthuman imagery it promotes, describes 
a specific and unitary vision of what it means to be alive; what living is and how 
the living are placed in relation to each other, their surroundings and the universe. 
Evolutionary computer games offer a means by which to examine, explore and 
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intra·act with this life. For Don Ihde, such technologies are 'prosthetic devices' 
allowing users new 'eyes' in the exploration of the world. Finding inspiration in 
Haraway's 'god·trick' he warns of how '''the eyes' made available in modern 
technological sciences shatter any idea of passive vision; these prosthetic devices 
show us that all eyes, including our own organic ones, are active perceptual 
systems, building in translations and specific ways of seeing, that is, ways of life" 
(Ihde 2002: 71 italics in original). 
In response to the universalisation these offer, Bruno Latour calls for a practice of 
political ecology to challenge 'Science' as "the proliferation of smooth, risk·free 
matters of fact, with their improbable cortege of incontestable knowledge, 
invisible scientists, predictable impacts, calculated risks, and unanticipated 
consequences" (2004:27). Instead of rejecting any form of universalism outright, 
Latour argues for an incremental or emergent universalism that has been hard 
won through the practice and debate of 'sciences' (2002: 44). Similarly, Braidotti 
calls for a different approach to what she terms 'moral universalism.' For 
Braidotti, "The ethics of nomadic subjectivity rejects moral universalism and 
works towards a different idea of ethical accountability in the sense of a 
fundamental reconfiguration of our being in a world that is technologically and 
globally mediated" (2006: 15). Finding resonance with the materialist position of 
the thesis, Latour presents the challenge as one of political and scientific 'war': 
It is not the final goal [of universalism] that is to blame, but only the 
strange idea that it could be reached without being at war with real 
enemies. In contract to the history that sought to modernize, the West has 
to admit to the existence of war in order to make peace: to accept that it 
has enemies, to take seriously the diversity of worlds, to refuse to accept 
mere tolerance, and to resume the construction of both the local and the 
global ... The common world we took for granted must instead be 
progressively composed, it is not already constituted. The common world is 
not behind us and ready made, but ahead of us, an immense task which we 
will need to accomplish one step at a time ... The common world is now up 
for grabs. (2002: 29) 
What is important for Latour is the separation of two previously confused 
elements: "on the one hand, the multiplicity of the new beings for which room 
must be made from now on so that we live in common; on the other hand, the 
interruption of all discussion by recourse to a brutally and premature unified 
external reality" (2004: 39). Evolutionary computer games challenge both 
elements. They produce a multitude of new entities and intra·actions between new 
and existing entities that need space, but do so within an ontological framework 
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that clai ms a unified external real ity across digital and material spaces. The 
silicon creatures within artificial life, which claim to be counted as alive, do so 
through recourse to unitary definitions and conceptualisations of life, nature and 
cosmos that state common essences between digital and material. The 
concluding chapter of the thesis returns to Latour's political ecology, proposing 
possible elements of a debate to re·examine the new 'natures' and silicon entities 
artificial life produces, without resorting to an unquestioned universalism that 
equates digital and material. To gear the thesis towards this, there needs to be an 
examination of a fundamental aspect of artificial life emplacements: the new 
digital spaces they create and how these are being conceptualised, especially 
against physical material space. Historically, this has been viewed as the virtual 
and the real. The next chapter explores this common duality and reconfigures the 
relationship between digital and material in order to produce a nuanced 
conceptualisation of spatiality, which acknowledges the common elements of all 
space whilst retaining the distinctive characteristics digital and material space 
hold. 
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Chapter 3 
Finding Space in Gamespace 
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In its history, cyberspace has been conceptualised as a place of human 
habitation, immersion and travels, with discourses often connected to utopian 
virtualities that have not firmly engaged with the real spaces created by computer 
games and other digital technologies. This has produced the need to tie 
conceptual loose ends in the consideration and analysis of computer gamespace. 
As Juul suggests when realising the structuring effect gamespace has on play 
(2005: 163), an understanding of the spatial is key in coming to a reading of the 
operations of gameplay. Coming to a conceptual framework of the digital space of 
games paces, and their relation with material space, illuminates the special 
character these spaces attribute. This chapter examines computer gamespace 
with the purpose of identifying spatial practice within such spaces, along with its 
relationship with material space. It traces a historic path that has paired digital 
and material space within specific shared discourses and, importantly, a common 
ontological backbone that intimately connects the digital with material. This is 
seen through the theoretical development of cyberspace, of which computer 
games have often been viewed as the most developed form. The chapter then 
turns to social geography to form an understanding of the importance of space 
and the spatial that has emerged in relation to the production and distribution of 
knowledge/power. In keeping with the materialist foundations of this thesis, a 
conceptualisation of space that opens up a trialectics of 
historicality/sociality/spatiality and knowledge/power/spacetime exists. This 
chapter bridges such a social geography to an understanding of the (non)spaces 
of cyberspaces and games paces. 
Playing a computer or video game seems to offer a transposed and dual spatial 
experience - that is, the player seems to be present in at least two spaces at 
once, "in more than one spatial domain" (Taylor 2003). The first and most 
obvious is the player's physical presence in front of the computer, television or 
other monitor and games console. Through the physical interface of the keyboard, 
mouse and joystick, the visual interface of the monitor display and the audio 
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interface of the speakers, the player also appears to be transported into the space 
of the game. It is in this gamespace, visually pixelated and displayed on the 
monitor, where the action takes place; where input from the user is translated and 
presented as gameplay. This playing field is an electronic space, a digital space, 
and therefore a discrete space, mathematically pixelated through computer 
programming and displayed to the player in a format that s/he intra·acts within. 
It forms a prototypical, if not fully realised example of William Gibson's 
formulation of cyberspace. Conceptualised from within cyberpunk science fiction 
and transferring the transcendental desires of Virtual Reality, cyberspace has 
offered the promise of providing humans (and nonhumans) electronic 
communication technologies to inhabit and communicate through. From Murray's 
'immersion' (1997: 98), Ryan's 'virtual body' (2001) and Stone's 'crossdressing' 
(1992), commentary on digital technologies has often offered romanticised 
notions of how (non)human actors use, are constituted by, and interact in the 
cyber·arena, usually through an underlying assumption that humans can, do or 
will inhabit cyberspace. Caught up in this transcendental trajectory and central to 
this conceptualisation of cyberspace as (non)space are the dialectics of the real 
versus virtual, actual versus imaginary, and physical versus digital. Such 
conceptualisations do not make clear their use of space, time and relationships 
with and between the 'real world' and 'virtual reality' or 'cyberspace.' It is within 
conceptualisations of human digital habitation that structures that connect 
material and digital space have been formulated. These connect with posthuman 
ideals that have abstracted information from its substrate. 
Developing a nuanced understanding of digital space and our (human) 
involvement within these spaces, this chapter develops digital space and 
cyberspaces as real and actual spaces, but as spaces whose characteristics 
cannot be easily equated as identical to material space(s). Additionally, it 
recognises the plurality of cyberspaces in that there are a multitude of digital 
spaces, each needing to be considered in its own terms of spatial construction. 
The chapter turns to work in social geography to build a spatial model that is 
sympathetic to the materialist positioning of the thesis. From such a standpoint, 
gamespaces are acknowledged as social spaces in constant co·construction, in 
which questions of embodiment and emplacement can be addressed. This allows 
for a more sophisticated investigation into specific gamespaces, along with an 
exploration into our relationship with the digital spaces we are co·creating. 
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The Development of Cyberspace Theory - Finding Bodies in Space 
Cyberspace matters both within and outside of the sphere of evolutionary artificial 
life computer games. Real things happen in the cyberspaces we produce, 
construct and intra·act within, forging human and nonhuman, living and nonliving 
assemblies, networks and assemblages that effect both cyberspace 
emplacements and in physical material world around us. As Rob Shields has 
noted, "these avatars, video·game characters, software agents and virtual objects 
not only stand in for flesh and blood persons and physical places but they can 
have significant and shocking impacts on the real·life status and well·being of 
people" (2003: xv). First wave technoculture studies trace and form a historical 
genealogy that continues to structure common conceptualisations of cyberspatial 
emplacements, especially the gamespaces of evolutionary computer games. 
Within these early conceptualisations cyberspace has been held as other space, 
removed from physical space due to its infinite quantity and 'non·real' 
disposition. Human habitation and community building also shaped early 
cyberspatial considerations, and through concepts such as travelling and 
immersion, as well as an early preoccupation with digital transcendence, 
produced ontological connections between digital and material. Framed within the 
paired dialectics of real/virtual, actual/imaginary, and physical/digital that have 
shaped these early conceptualisations, the (tele)presence of human and 
(non)living entities within digital (non)spaces leaves the reader with a lack of 
clarity. Considering cyberspace as a place of human habitation, fulfilling 
transcendental desires of escape from an imperfect world, highlights both 
effortless human movement between the 'real' and the 'virtual' and a privileged 
position cyberspace has held against the 'real' as 'other,' between the actual and 
the imaginary. Here, cyberspace becomes an other space in which humans could 
eventually move to, leaving behind the messiness of the 'real'. Within the 
posthuman and the cosmology of computational regimes, this conceptualisation 
has been structured and modelled on the construction of digital space. It is this 
model that has then been reflected back to material space. 
In her investigation of communities and agency within the reciprocally 
constituting spheres of technology and culture, Allucquere Rosanne Stone (1991) 
traces the development of technoculture and cyberspace in four epochs, providing 
a vantage point for the mapping of the conceptualisation of digital space within 
first wave technoculture studies. For Stone, people are studied in a complex social 
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network that is mediated by little technologies that are delegated significant 
amounts of time, agency, and humour. Her four epochs trace conceptualisations, 
constructions and expectations of cyberspace as both a technology to 
communicate through and a space to inhabit. Stone's first three epochs trace the 
historical development of communication technologies - from the development of 
the academic paper and the communities of academic virtual 'witnesses' this 
literary technology brought together (first epoch), to the early communication 
technologies of the phonograph and radio creating communities of virtual 
audiences (second epoch), and early online communities formed around bulletin 
board services (BBS) such as CommuniTree in San Francisco (third epoch). It is 
Stone's mapping of her forth epoch through William Gibson's Neuromancer that 
exemplifies an early preoccupation with cyberspace as an imagined space, that 
humans can not only interact through and engage with, but also wholeheartedly 
inhabit. Here cyberspace realises the desires of its creators and designers and 
becomes a site of human habitation, leaving our physical 'meat' bodies behind, or 
at the least setting them aside for the moment. It is this metamapping of a future· 
present discovered through cyberpunk science fiction novels, as well as the 
dreams and desires of a technological elite, that Tiziana Terranova (1996a) 
describes as a productive guide to the future, where cyberpunk fictional texts 
form examples of new technological experiences. Reflecting the common themes 
of first wave technoculture studies, Terranova found the cultural theorist often 
"assumes that these texts and practices are the expression of an emergent 'new' 
sensibility: they are simply the avant·garde of a new relation to technology which 
will be shared by the rest of the world in the future" (1996a: 80). This meant new 
communication technologies were seen to be producing an epochal shift already 
mapped and guided by cyberpunk science fiction. By tracing her history from the 
starting point and creation of 'virtual' communities through the technologies of 
text and communication, Stone extrapolates a (future) trajectory where 
cyberspace becomes the entry point for the production of two things: an 
apparatus for the production of community, and an apparatus for the production 
of the body: 
Because cyberspace worlds can be inhabited by communities, in the process 
of articulating a cyberspace system, engineers must model cognition and 
community; and because communities are inhabited by bodies, they must 
models bodies as well. (italics added, Stone 1991: 103) 
Although Stone reminds us that no matter how virtual the subject becomes, there 
is always an attached material body and consciousness is firmly rooted in the 
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physical. Stone's fourth epoch is reminiscent of transcendental desires of escape 
to an apparently new cyberspatial frontier. Inspired by what were new 
relationships and forms of interaction that electronic communication technologies 
were precipitating, Stone found the excitement of digital spaces in the 
postmodern modes of expression they allowed: 
The new spaces instantiate the collapse of the boundaries between the 
social and the technological, biology and machine, natural and artificial that 
are part of the postmodern imagery. They are part of the growing 
imbrication of humans and machine in new social forms I call virtual 
systems. (1992: 85) 
For Stone these then new expressions allowed for alternative notions of 
community to form, not based on physical bodies and their proximity, but on 
virtually modelled bodies and shared interests. Her 'virtual' space is "an 
imaginary locus of interaction created by communal agreement" (1992: 84) where 
the concepts of distance (inside/outside) and the physical body took on new 
meanings. In such virtual space, communities came together not based on the 
proximity of presence, but on shared interests. Within these communities 
individuals were represented not by physical bodies but by created avatars. This 
led Stone to consider a form of 'computer crossdressing' where on·line personas 
lead quasi·lives of their own, separated from the 'real'. 
Stone's forays into cyberspace acknowledge the ability for subject 
experimentation, change and fluidity. Kevin Robins has suggested that in 
cyberspace "there are possibilities for exploring the complexities of self identity, 
including the relationship between mental spaces and the bodily other" (1996: 8). 
Cyberspace became a new world to transcend our physicality and engage in new 
virtual interactions. It is this technoculture heritage of identity exploration that 
continues to shape writing on the body within computer game studies, where 
computer games are presented as offering the ability for human digital immersion 
and travels (see chapter two). Discourses of virtual travels at once highlight a new 
digitally formulated mind to body dichotomy as well as foreshadowing the 
creation of an ontological connection between material and digital spaces. Within 
this new equation, it is the ability to abstract humans as informational beings, 
separate and divisible, from their 'meat' bodies; popularised through cyberpunk 
'jacking in' and Hans Moravec's (1990) infamous digital human futures, that has 
laid a foundation for a shared informational ontological structure between 
material and digital. 
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Found throughout a body of early technoculture writing, and one that reverberates 
within conceptualisations of artificial life emplacements and evolutionary 
computer games, a second underlying assumption is the vision of cyberspace, or 
the virtual space of the computer, as a singular utopian answer to the problems 
and deficiencies of the real. This typically heralded a common future that would 
be different and better than the present. Within this conceptualisation, the new 
electronic world became more desirable than the reality that we normally find 
ourselves surrounded by. Kevin Robins recognised this early tendency to crusade 
cyberspace as a utopian vision for postmodern times (1996), reminding us that a 
utopia is both a nowhere (outopia) and also something good (eutopia). 
Cyberspace has been attributed with this same vision - as a 'nowhere·something 
good'. This gave cyberspace an unreality usually attributed to utopias - as 
unrealisable (non)places of perfection. Robins finds that considerations of 
cyberspace as a utopian (non)place were driven by a feverish belief in 
transcendence, where technology had the ability to deliver us from the limitations 
and frustrations of an imperfect world. Here: 
[Cyberspace and Virtual Reality] have seemed to offer some kind of 
technological fix for a world gone wrong, promising the restoration 
of a sense of community and communitarian order. It is all too easy 
to think of them as alternatives to the real world and its disorder. 
(Robins 1996: 24) 
For Robins, part of the imagery of the technologies of virtual reality, was the 
transcendental theme of "moving on from the old realities to a brave, new, virtual 
world" (Robins 1991: 55), with the advent and convergence of artificial 
intelligence, robotics, and animation technologies. Repeating themes of digital 
immersion and travels, Robins uncovers the belief that humans would find our 
true and full potential only when immersed in cyberspace, in what he considers 
the techno-fetishistic approach to new imaging technologies. Rob Kitchin 
reiterates this thematic, finding cyberspace often represented as a 'new world' or 
'new frontier' "popularised as a place of exploration and discovery; an unmapped 
territory to be inhabited and economically exploited" (1998: 20)_ This is the 
idealisation of cyberspace as a new world; an ideal world beyond gravity and 
friction. Robins asks that we consider the possibility of inhabiting this other world 
of simulation, in a perfect symbiosis between technology and user: 
The real world that once was beyond is now effaced: there is no longer any 
need to negotiate that messy and intractable reality. The user is now 
reconceived as an aspect of, and operates entirely in terms of, the logical 
universe of the simulation. (Robins 1991:66) 
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Here, Robins foreshadows the development of computational regimes, which form 
exactly this 'logical universe of the simulation' and continue to constitute both 
humans and the 'messy and intractable reality' within its logic. The utopian 
thematic has been often repeated within early technoculture writing, including 
Mark Poster's postmodern new 'multimedia' world (1996), where unstable, 
multiple and diffuse subjects engage in a simulational and multiple reality. This 
opens up possibilities that were seen to offer the ability to "mime and to multiply, 
to multiplex and to improve upon the real" (Poster 1996:94). This is a cyberspace 
of not only limitless possibilities, but limitless space as well. Robins recognises 
that the favoured position cyberspace and Virtual Reality had been given as 
'other' to a flawed 'real' and offers that these technologies "have seemed to offer 
some kind of technological fix for a world gone wrong ... It is all too easy to think 
of them as alternatives to the real world and its disorder" (1996:24). While 
cyberspace and Virtual Reality offer spatial environments, within the framework of 
early technoculture studies, they were often viewed as other than 'real,' as both 
virtual and imaginary, offering a type of (non)place set apart from the actual real 
world. The cyberspace (post)modern utopia Robins describes is spatial, but a 
spatiality where virtual space is as a space removed, an elsewhere of cyberspace, 
even if such boundaries with the real remain muddied and confused: 
The new technological environments of virtual reality and cyberspace 
confuse the boundaries between internal and external worlds, creating the 
illusion that internal and external realities are one and the same. (Robins 
1996: 13) 
This internal reality of cyberspace became a place for salvation and 
transcendence. Similarly, Michael Heim (1991), when considering cyberspace, 
viewed it as a 'not·quite·actual' space, existing in contrast to the 'real,' but 
operating as if it were real space. Failing to find a utopian imaginary in 
cyberspace, Heim attempted to keep our experiences within cyberspace to the 
philosophical, associating cyberspace as the domain of the awesome and sublime 
- a place to escape and find alternative thoughts and feelings. Here, as before, 
cyberspace is identified as a (non)place that is there but not actual and intimately 
tied to the 'real' but separate and 'other.' 
It is this theme, that the cyberspaces we create provide an ideal counterpoint to 
the imperfect world around us, which has been retained and developed within 
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artificial life and evolutionary computer games. Within digital artificial life 
emplacements, a utopian vision of neo·Darwinian and cybernetic definitions of life 
emerges, offering life itself digital transcendence from its current messy carbon 
based existence. As will be explored in chapters five and six, artificial life 
emplacements offer the realisation of a specific spiritual and scientific discourse 
on what it means to be alive; our natures and cosmology. This set of discourses 
centre on life as propagating strings of code, following simple first level 
instructions showing emergent intelligent behaviour, all in a computational regime 
of interconnectedness. Scientifically, these focus on the informatics and 
cybernetics of life as code, while spiritually the interconnectedness of all things is 
highlighted in a new spiritual cosmology. The cyberspaces that we are producing, 
inoculating and intra·acting with in the production of artificial life provide perfect 
partnerships and environments, with their rule based nature and discrete time (as 
CPU clicks) and space (as programmed pixels), for exploration of life itself within 
the scientific and spiritual idioms of neo·Darwinism and cybernetics. They 
become utopian spaces. 
Together, this conceptualisation of cyberspace couples the real with the physical 
and actual, and the virtual with the digital and imaginary. Cyberspace, as 'other' 
space, removed and separate from the 'real,' finds itself in a dialectical opposition 
with physical space. Doel and Clarke (1999) examine three ways in which the 
virtual and the real, the digital and the actual, and presence and telepresence 
have come to be understood, and offer a fourth standpoint that they hope 
reconciles and presents a more grounded approach to considerations of 
cyberspace. In their analysis, Doel and Clarke find that the virtual is invariably 
collapsed into and contrasted against a badly analysed version of the real. They 
find that this collapse usually takes place along two paths. The first path shows 
the virtual as a 'false approximation' of the real, and the second shows the virtual 
as a 'resolution' or the 'hyperrealisation' of the real. Similarly, in comparing the 
simulations of virtual worlds to maps, Rob Shields observes that each: 
... end up taking on a life of their own. Somewhere along the way they begin 
to diverge, either when it is realised that no map can be so complete that it 
represents an actual landscape fully, or when they become prized as more 
perfect than messy materiality. As virtual worlds, they become 'virtuous', 
utopian. Virtual worlds become important when they diverge from the 
actual, or when the actual is ignored in favour of the virtual- at which point 
they become 'more real than real'. (2003: 4) 
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Doel and Clarke offer three versions of virtual reality that encompass these views. 
The first of these considers virtual reality as a simulation or false approximation 
of the real. In commonsensical terms, this is where the virtual is to the real as the 
copy is to the original, and as such has the attributes of being secondary, 
derivative, and supplemental. The virtual can never be anything more than a pale 
imitation of the real: a mere simulation. Here, the virtual is an incomplete 
approximation of the real. From this standpoint there is a strict separation of the 
real and the virtual; they are immutable and essential forms. In these versions of 
virtuality, it is virtual reality that lacks the real. 
Doel and Clarke's further versions of virtual reality contrast with the first. Instead 
of the virtual as a copy of the real, they examine the argument that "the virtual is 
perfectly real" (1999: 266). The virtual as real prescribes a perfection of the real 
in two ways. The first, in what Doel and Clarke term 'suppletion,' displays the 
(hyper)realisation of the real. The virtual is here considered as a resolution of the 
real, forming a relationship to the real as the perfect is to the imperfect. This 
version is still devoted to lack. Rather than the virtual lacking reality and 
authenticity as a mere copy, however, it is the real that lacks virtuality. In a real 
world marked by scarcity, Doel and Clarke find calls for a society of creation and 
invention, where every conceivable possibility should be realised, even if only in 
thought. There is no radical disjunction of immutable and inalienable forms 
between the real and the virtual in such a system; the virtual is a dilated version 
of the real. Here, the virtual and the real are now distinguishable according to 
quanities (more or less) rather than qualities (powers and effects). The difference 
between the real and the virtual is measured in terms of the range and territory 
that they can command. It is here, and with Doel and Clarke's third formulation 
s(ed)uction, that we can place much of early considerations on cyberspace. 
Moving beyond the suppletion of the virtual over the real leads to Doel and 
Clarke's third version of virtual reality, 's(ed)uction', or the virtual illusion of a 
final solution. This version of virtual reality views it as a final resolution to the 
fault ridden world given to us while reflecting the recurrent dreamwork of 
modernity, and modernist technoscience in particular, to decode and de·bug the 
world fully - to escape and have done with the world. It follows through the 
banality of suppletion to further find the fatality and extermination of the real. 
This is a fetishised version of the virtual, which amounts to living in the 
(tele)presence of a full realisation of the world's possibilities. In such a view the 
real is seen as a 'real drag' with its friction, extension and duration of matter in 
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extensive spacetime. Cyberspace, telepresence and virtual reality offers the 
possibility of going beyond the tedious gravity and friction of reality and offers 
Robins' brave, new, virtual world. The 'brave new worlds' of artificial life 
emplacements have been developed with suppletion and s(ed)uction as 
conceptual frameworks supporting them. As examples of life itself they have 
moved beyond the mere modelling and simulation of life (as a false 
approximation) and ask to be counted as living digital ecosystems in their own 
right, offering not only a suppletion of carbon based life, but also a s(ed)uction for 
life itself in its neo·Darwinian and cybernetic perfection. This is perceived as the 
next level of informational evolution. In this manner, silicon life becomes the 
benchmark for, and the future of, organic life (and not the other way around), 
moving from a mere approximation to exemplify life itself. 
Returning to a second meaning of the virtual as 'perfectly real,' where the virtual 
is as real as the 'real,' Doel and Clarke suggest that discourses of hyperrealisation 
and ex·termination make the mistake of confusing the virtual with the possible or 
probable. Similarly, in building a relationship between the existing forms of the 
real and virtual and non·exisiting forms of abstractions and probabilities, Rob 
Shields builds a four·part definition of the virtual: "The virtual is ideal but not 
abstract, real but not actual" (2003: 43). Here, in contrasting the virtual against 
his notion of the concrete, Shields distinguishes the virtual from the actual 
(instead of the prior paring of the virtual against the real), giving the virtual credit 
as real but not actual. Care must be taken in defining what is meant by the 
'virtual' in such a description, distinguishing the 'essentially virtual', the form of 
virtual Shields refers to here, from the 'digitally virtual', or the virtual commonly 
associated with cyberspace. Moving to cyberspace and the digitally virtual, 
Shields finds that "Cyberspace provides an example of the binding of the virtual, 
concrete, abstract and probable into a complex whole which has measurable 
impacts on everyday life" (2003: 80). The 'virtual' of virtual reality is not 
'essentially virtual', it has actual qualities with real effects. 
Doel and Clarke also recognise the already innate virtual feature of the real, where 
the virtual is not separable from the real, either as a false approximation (or mere 
simulation) or as a forced realisation (sublimation of real limitations; actualisation 
of latent potential). The real is always already virtual- Doel and Clarke argue that 
reality is the actual and the virtual. The illusion of the 'virtual', positioned apart 
from the real (and removed from it), finds momentum in the modernist desire for 
an unlimited realisation of the possible to its exhaustion of, and escape from, the 
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real. Through recognising the dual nature and folding of the actual and virtual, in 
that the actual is always also partially virtual and the virtual is always also 
partially actual, Doel and Clarke open up conceptualisations of cyberspaciality to 
the social production of space, aligning with social geography and the materialist 
positioning of the thesis. Cyberspace produces real spaces, spaces of intra-action, 
and spaces that structure and limit or offer possibilities in our intra-actions 
with(in) them. This is exemplified in gamespace, where space becomes a key 
element in the structuring and direction of gameplay and is integral for the player 
and other game agents in the production of meaning from play. Cyberspace, 
therefore, shares common ground with social geography, and this thesis' 
materialist positioning, through its continued social production. Exploring the 
social geography of Soja, Lefebrve and Foucault builds a framework to explore the 
spatial aspects of cyberspace, in its productive and structuring aspects. 
Whilst sharing a conceptual framework in its continued social production, care 
must also be taken to recognise the differences that exist between the varierty of 
forms of space. Doel and Clarke observe that when considering cyberspace as a 
hyperrealisation of the real, it has been measured against the physical in terms of 
quantity and not quality, with cyberspace offering limitless possibilities against 
reality's scarce resources. When coming to an understanding of how the various 
(non)human, (non)living actors are constituted and use and make sense of 
cyberspace, considered as socially produced actual space, there needs to be a 
close re·examination of the qualities that these spaces hold, as opposed to the 
quantity of space they possess. Here, distinguishing between the associated 
qualities that make physical space and digital space distinctive gives insights into 
our relations with the various cyberspaces we engage within. Specifically, through 
acknowledging the molecular quality of physical space and the digital pixelated 
quality of cyberspace, cyberspaces acquire the distinctive quality of other than 
spaces, but otherness is related here to the quality and not the (potential) 
quantity of the space. Accounting for this difference in quality is especially 
critical in the ability to place humans within a digital framework, in how we are 
included and excluded in the cyberspaces and gamespaces we construct. 
Foucault's spatial configuration of heterotopology provides a manner of 
investigation into human intra-action in the cyberspaces and gamespaces of 
artificial life emplacements, in the production of these spaces, our positioning 
within them and how space becomes involved in the production of meaning that 
they are associated with. 
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Incorporating Social Geography 
Social geographers Henri Lefebvre and Edward Soja highlight the social within 
spatiality and make clear the spatial's consistently fluctuating and constructed 
nature across space, time and the social. Their productive conceptualisation of 
space resonates with the materialist positioning of this thesis, recognising the 
always co-constructed attribute of space and the real. Taking from such a social 
geography, the distinctions that have typically separated cyberspace from the 
'real world' dissolve, as both find common grounding within an understanding of 
lived space_ This supports a nuanced understanding of cyberspaces as real 
spaces_ A second insight of cyberspaces and gamespaces is made through 
Foucault with his concept of heterotopology, the examination of 'other than' 
places. Cyberspaces and gamespaces are analysed here as heterotopias, as 
emplacements that serve as places of alternative ordering within the social 
landscape. 
Developing Lived Space 
Edward Soja and his concept of Thirdspace (1996) aid analysis of cyberspace and 
its spatiality. For Soja, Thirdspace is where everything comes together: 
subjectivity and objectivity, abstract and concrete, the real and the imagined, the 
knowable and the unimaginable, the repetitive and the differential, structure and 
agency, mind and body, consciousness and the unconscious, the disciplined and 
transdisciplinary, and everyday life and unending history. It is an understanding of 
space that finds home with a materialist notion of production and a Deleuzian 
understanding of the lines, vectors and assemblages involved in such production. 
In Thirdspace, Soja makes a close connection and development of the work of 
Henri Lefebvre, as both find groundwork in the (social) production of (social) 
space and the spatial politics of the social processes of production and 
reproduction. 
Lefebvre (Soja 1996) creates a fusion of (objective) physical and (subjective) 
mental space into social space through his critique of a 'double illusion' that 
reverberates with the similar realist-constructivist yardstick Latour challenges us 
to abandon (1992: 276). Within this double illusion, the first illusion - the illusion 
of transparency - makes space appear open to the free play of human agency, 
willfulness and imagination and is formulated within a constructivist framework. 
The second illusion, the realistic illusion, over-substantiates the world in a 
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naturalistic or mechanistic materialism or empiricism. This traditional realist 
account sees social space as natural and naively given, or naively, objectively and 
concretely present to be fully measured and accurately described. Within this 
understanding of space that cyberspace, in its lack of concrete physical attributes 
naturally available for objective measurement, becomes 'other' space paired with 
virtuality and the imagination. Spaces are viewed as wholly constructed, on the 
other hand, within the first illusion of physical and cyber transparency. There is 
no differentiation in quality between each type of space, and here we find Doel 
and Clarke's suppletion and s(ed)uction of the real by cyberspace. 
Forming a critical attack on this double illusion, Lefebvre opens the way to a 
trialectic of spatiality; a production of space that agrees with the materialist 
positioning of this thesis. He insists that each 'field' of human spatiality (the 
physical, the mental, and the social) should be seen as simultaneously real and 
imagined, concrete and abstract, material and metaphorical. He develops this 
thematic trialectic through the three matched concepts: Spatial Practice, 
Representations of Space, and Spaces of Representation. Such a theme provides 
an ability to analyse the spatial quality of cyberspaces and aligns with a 
materialistic positioning. Gamespace is developed acknowledging the 
representational and represented aspects that these designed and programmed 
spaces hold. The development of spatial practice gameplay and our intra·actions 
in cyberspace require these. 
Spatial Practice (or Soja's Firstspace) produces a spatiality that incorporates 
production and reproduction, where the spatial practice of a society is revealed 
through the deciphering of its space. Spatiality is given the quality of a substantial 
text to be carefully read, digested and understood in all its details. Human 
spatiality is defined primarily by and in its material configurations, and 
explanation shifts to an inquiry into how these are socially produced: 
The social production of Firstspace is treated as a historical unfold ing, an 
evolving sequence of changing geographies that result from dynamic 
relations between human beings and their constructed as well as natural 
environments. (Soja 1996: 77) 
Representations of Space (or Soja's Secondspace) is the dominant space of any 
society and is the storehouse of epistemological power. It is the conceived space 
of language, discourse, texts and logos. The imagined geography tends to become 
the 'real' geography, with the image or representation coming to define and order 
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reality. Spaces of Representation (or Soja's Thirdspace) is both distinct from the 
other two spaces and encompasses them. It is directly lived space; the space of 
'inhabitants' and 'users'. It combines the real and the imagined, and is thought 
on equal terms (not privileging one over the other). Soja's Thirdspace and 
Lefebvre's most encompassing notion of social space comprise of all three 
spatialities: the perceived, the conceived and the lived. Spaces of representation 
team with symbols, politics and ideology, and with the real and the imagined 
intertwined. They contain all other real and imagined spaces simultaneously. 
Traditionally, spatiality has been relegated to the periphery as reflection, 
container, stage, environment, or as an external constraint upon human behaviour 
and social action. Soja reasserts Lefebvre's emphasis on the importance of 
spatiality in knowledge formation: 
We are first and always historical·social·spatial beings, actively 
participating individually and collectively in the construction/ production-
the "becoming" - of histories, geographies, societies. (Soja 1996: 73) 
For Soja and Lefebvre, Thirdspace is seen as a 'possibilities machine' and is the 
starting point for a strategic reopening and rethinking of new possibilities 
focusing on the ontological trialectic of Spatiality, Historicality and Sociality. 
Doreen Massey finds similarly the attributes of possibility and production in 
space. In setting the groundwork for her defence of space, Massey (2005: 9) 
outlines three propositions as key for understanding the spatial. These resonate 
with Thirdspace and Spaces of Representation. Massey's first proposition is that 
space is a product of interrelations and constituted through interactions from the 
global to the miniscule, agreeing with the materialist formation of intra·actions 
between agents and assemblies. Her second is that within 'the sphere of the 
possible' space is predicated on the existence of multiplicity and plurality, which 
is especially important for explorations into cyberspace. Formed through the 
intra·actions of intra·relations, with distinct trajectories, space must be plural and 
multiple. In her third proposition Massey forges alliances with materialist 
theorising. Here space is recognised as always under construction: 
Precisely because space on this reading is a product of relations· between, 
relations which are necessarily embedded material practices which have to 
be carried out, it is always in the process of being made. It is never 
finished; never closed. Perhaps we could imagine space as simultaneity of 
stories·so·far. (Massey 2005: 9) 
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Michel Foucault and Heterotopias 
Recognising that cyberspace produces real spaces, an understanding of lived 
productive (cyber)spaces can be formed. This is a movement away from 'other' 
space, where cyberspace was conceptualised as an alternative utopian (non)place 
for a messy and scarce 'real,' to a understanding of 'other than' space. Here, 
cyberspace is acknowledged as just as real as physical space but set apart in its 
qualities or attributes. Built with computer bits, cyberspace is real space, discrete 
and represented as identically proportioned digital points or pixels, matrixed, 
knowable and definable. One can intra-act within cyberspace with real and 
meaningful effects. It is also a space that is not physically inhabitable by human 
bodies. Despite the desires and efforts of first wave technoculture studies and 
practitioners one cannot physically walk, jump or jack into cyberspace. The 
physical body remains in front of the screen. Building a conceptualisation of 
space that recognises this 'other than' concept further highlights and develops 
understandings of our intra-actions with these spaces. To do this, the thesis turns 
to Foucault and his development of spatiality through heterotopology. 
Foucault developed his conceptualisation of spatiality centred on the paper 'Des 
Espaces Autres,' presented in 1967 (which Soja finds complementary to his own 
theory of Thirdspace). Foucault named his approach to space and spatial thinking 
'heterotopology', moving out of modernist conceptions of space and time through 
the foregrounding of space over time, and spatiality over historicality. Central to 
the concept of spatiality between Lefebvre, Soja and Foucault is: 
... that the assertion of an alternative envisioning of spatiality ... directly 
challenges (and is intended to challengingly deconstruct) all conventional 
modes of spatial thinking. They are not just "other spaces" to be added on 
to the geographical imagination, they are also "other than" the established 
ways of thinking spatially. They are meant to detonate, to deconstruct, not 
to be comfortably poured back into old containers. (Soja 1996: 163) 
Recognising the 'other than' quality of cyberspace is a recognition that there are 
no 'old containers' in which it can be subsumed by established modes of thought. 
Realising cyberspace as real negates its propensity for suppletion or s(ed)uction, 
denying the all too easy inclination to view such space as 'other' (non)space as 
not quite real, imaginary or some how hyperreal. Recognising the differences 
between physical and digital space challenges conceptualisations of human 
cyberspatial travel and habitation. There is also the recognition that cyberspace, 
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games paces and digital emplacements of artificial life have real specific 
relationships with physical material space, in the manner they are co·constructed, 
and the use and production of meaning within these spaces and how this 
production is related back to physical space. Foucault's heterotopology and his 
conceptualisation of heterotopias provide a framework in which to position 
cyberspace emplacements of artificial life worlds and gamespaces. 
Foucault (1998) describes contemporary space in terms of emplacements, 
defined by the relations of proximity between points or elements. In formal terms, 
these can be described as series, trees and lattices. This creates a space that 
both recognises and is critical in the production and workings of networks and 
assemblages, and the relations that have brought them together. We are not living 
in a homogenous and empty space, but in a space that is laden with qualities: 
... we do not live in a kind of void, within which individuals and things might 
be located. We do not live in a void that would be tinged with shimmering 
colors, we live inside an ensemble of relations that define emplacements 
that are irreducible to each other and absolutely nonsuperposable. 
(Foucault 1998:178) 
Of interest to Foucault are the emplacements that have the curious property of 
being connected to all the other emplacements, in such a way that they suspend, 
neutralise, or reverse the set of relations that are designated, reflected or 
represented by them; those emplacements that are linked with all the other 
emplacements and yet are at variance somehow with them. He finds that these 
types of emplacements come in two varieties. The first of these are utopias; 
emplacements of no real place. Utopias are socially perfected or the reversals of 
society and are spaces that are fundamentally and essentially unreal and non· 
actualised. The second are heterotopias: 
There are also, and probably in every culture, in every civilization, real 
places, actual places, places that are designed in the very institution of 
society, which are sorts of actual realized utopias in which the real 
emplacements, all the other real emplacements that can be found within 
the culture are, at the same time, represented, contested, and reversed, 
sorts of places that are outside all places, although they are actually 
localizable. (Foucault 1998: 178) 
Within heterotopology Foucault gives six basic principles to the systematic 
description of heterotopias that can be utilised when analysing the cyberspaces of 
games pace. The first is that all cultures establish heterotopias; they are a 
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constant of every human group. They take forms that are very diverse and there is 
no absolute universal. Secondly, each heterotopia has a precise and specific 
operation within society, and the same heterotopia can have one operation or 
another depending on the synchrony of the culture in which it is formed. The third 
is that a heterotopia has the ability to juxtapose, in a single real place, several 
emplacements that are incompatible within them. The fourth is that heterotopias 
are also connected with temporal discontinuities. Heterotopias open up onto 
heterochronias. While the first four principles frame our conceptualisation, 
Foucault's fifth and sixth principles become central in an understanding of both 
our intra·actions with and in cyberspace and the meanings that are produced and 
extrapolated back to the material physical world. His fifth principle shows that 
heterotopias always presuppose a system of opening and closing, that both 
isolates and makes them penetrable at the same time. They can offer what 
appears to be pure and simple openings, but which generally conceal curious 
exclusions: 
Everybody can enter these heterotopian emplacements, but actually this is 
only an illusion, one believes he is going inside and by the very fact of 
entering, one is excluded. (Foucault 1998: 183) 
Through entering a cyberspatial emplacement, we are at the same time excluded. 
Humans, despite desires for cyberspatial immersion, are simply not digital. Laurie 
Taylor finds that in playing a computer game "taking in my own actions does not 
allow me to pass through the screen, but only to act on the screen because the 
screen acts as a divider until I can find a way into the game space" (2003). The 
last principle is that heterotopias have a function in relation to the remaining 
space that is spread between two extreme poles. They can have the role of 
creating a space of illusion that denounces all real space, which are heterotopias 
of illusion. In the case of evolutionary artificial life computer games, however, they 
can create a different real space - as perfect, as meticulous, and as well arranged 
as ours is disorganised - these are heterotopias of compensation. Artificial life 
emplacements offer such heterotopian emplacements of compensation for neo· 
Darwinian and cybernetic definitions of life itself. 
Return to Cyberspace(s) 
Relating the work of social geography to the analysis of cyberspace, three things 
become possible that allow a nuanced investigation into spatial practice and 
gamespace. These are an acknowledgement of the real qualification of 
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cyberspace, recognition of the qualities cyberspaces offer, and the multiplicity of 
cyberspaces. These three elements come together to allow an investigation into 
specific gamespace emplacements and patterns of spatial practice. They allow an 
investigation into space within the spatial categories of the concrete, abstract, 
virtual, and the probable. In exploring the virtual, Rob Shields suggests "the 
solution is not to debate the reality of the virtual, but to develop a more 
sophisticated theory of the real and the ways in which the virtual and the concrete 
are different really existing forms," (2003: 21) and how they relate to each other. 
Cyberspaces as Productive Constructed Space 
Through the development of social geography, the social, productive and 
continually co·constructed dimensions of lived space are recognised. Space is 
acknowledged as a lived space of intra·actions with interrelations that are 
continually in a productive process of co·construction. Within the same 
framework, cyberspace is also recognised to be more than its virtuality. As lived 
space, cyberspace includes aspects of the abstract, virtual, concrete and the 
probable or possible. The bringing together of these aspects under a common 
lived space allows the past dialectics of real/virtual and actual/imagined that 
have been employed to set cyberspace apart from the 'real world' to be 
challenged, dissolved and set·aside. First wave technoculture studies, associated 
with the virtual as imagined and dialectically opposed to the 'real world,' have left 
legacies of suppletion and s(ed)uction that still inform artificial life 
emplacements, conceptualised as hyperrealisations of life itself. These offer a 
perfected transcendental form of silicon life that becomes the benchmark for 
unruly carbon life to conform. By changing tac and incorporating the multiplicity 
of relations that come together in these cyberspace emplacements - human, 
nonhuman, living, nonliving and those whose life status is under debate - within a 
social conception of space and cyberspace, an investigation into the spatial 
practices that both produce and continually construct artificial life emplacements, 
and shape relationships of power within them, can occur. Gamespaces have 
always held this productive quality. Investigating interactive fiction (the digital 
predecessor of computer games), Robert Kelly finds that the construction of 
digital space "operates by involving the reader in the construction of a fictional 
world that operates only through the action of the reader ... As both part of the 
narrative process and as co·creator of this fictional world, the user can therefore 
come to 'inhabit' the narrative" (1993: 52). Acknowledging the role of the player 
in the construction and manipulation of space within gamespace, and the 
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strategic importance of spatiality, takes an analysis of gamespace out of a solely 
semiotic investigation. 
The Distinction of Cyberspace 
Whilst maintaining a spatial framework of cyberspace as constantly and 
continually co·constructed, the unique qualities of cyberspace must be 
acknowledged. Cyberspace is a social space, but it is also a different space; an 
'other than' space included within yet distinguished from the physical space 
around it. Doel and Clarke remind us that cyberspace as a virtual reality has been 
commonly compared to real space, in terms of quantity. Cyberspace, that is, has 
been conceptualised as a limitless space encompassing all possibilities, 
compared to the limited space of lack found in the real. Turning this comparison 
around, the thesis looks to the qualities of virtual reality as cyberspace that 
distinguish them from the physical. Acknowledging cyberspace as perfectly real 
does not necessitate that digital space and physical space hold identical 
properties. Each needs to be recognised for their similarities as well as their 
differences. Cyberspace can be defined by its pixelated structure, as 
mathematically defined points (or vectors) coded by bits and bytes. The co· 
constructions of cyberspace form discrete spaces, and this discreteness can be 
found throughout. From the 'zeros' and 'ones' that make up each discrete 'bit' of 
information (as zero or one, off or on) in the programming that supports 
cyberspace emplacements, through the execution of each program through the 
timed discrete CPU clicks of the computer hardware, the mathematical mapping 
of cyberspace (typically finding a Cartesian gridwork), the precisely defined size of 
'virtual worlds' (allotted memory space) and the discretely packaged pixels 
displayed on the monitor, cyberspace is defined throughout by its discrete nature. 
It is this pixelated and discrete underpinning that contributes to the classification 
of cyberspaces as other·than heterotopias. Recognising cyberspace as 
heterotopian is important for analysing the ontological frameworks, and for 
conceptualising the bodies that are found on both sides of physical·digital 
borders. 
Cyberspace's pixelated character provides a number of qualities that offer it a 
unique position. As it is pixelated, cyberspace is discrete; it is a space that is 
discretely defined by pixelation, programming and the execution of this 
programming. As with any product of computer programming, cyberspace is 
logically founded on rules. Cyberspace emplacements both obey and conform to 
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the programming underlying the running of the program. Sherry Turkle, 
examining the rule· based property of computer games, finds that "[a]t the heart 
of computer culture is the idea of constructed, "rule·governed" worlds" (1984: 
66). Although she finds that more recent games have become more opaque in 
their programming and are now pushing ever more 'realistic' simulations, where 
"rules have given way to branching narratives" (1996: 68), it must be 
remembered that computer programming is inherently logical and rule based, no 
matter how complex and emergent the programming. It is exactly this structure 
within logical mathematical rules that affords cyberspace its association as the 
ideal computational regime. Rob Kitchin, tracing computational regimes through 
Benjamin Woolley, finds that: 
... at the heart of cyberspace lies a fundamental belief in the mathematical 
structure of nature, in the computability of the universe. The idea that the 
world can be understood through mathematics - that mathematics is the 
alphabet of creation ... is a belief in the aesthetics of a natural order that 
can be revealed in and by mathematics and then be reproduced - and 
heightened - in virtual worlds. (1996: 58) 
Unsurprisingly, computer generated digital worlds display exactly this 
mathematical understanding. Within evolutionary computer games it is the 
wholesale transfer through acts of suppletion and s(ed)uction of this Platonic 
logical mathematics to the physical under scrutiny. This move denies both the 
fundamental differences between molecular and digital space and the availability 
and formation of political resistance. For Massey: 
Any assumption of a closed instantaneity [for example, a computable 
universe] not only denies space this essential character of itself constantly 
becoming, it also denies time its own possibility of 
complexity/multiplicity ... If this is the imagination which is to replace 
modernism's temporal alignment of regions then it is a move ... to a 
claustrophobic holism in which everything everywhere is already connected 
to everywhere else. And once again it leaves no opening for active politics. 
(2005: 77) 
Also highlighted, in considerations of cyberspaces as heterotopian emplacements, 
is our ability or inability as humans to enter and inhabit these spaces. We are 
reminded of one of heterotopogy's basic principles - that heterotopias are spaces 
of exclusion - that one is actually excluded upon entering a heterotopia. Despite 
conceptual frameworks of travel and immersion and being grounded in an 
embedded and molecular body, we are excluded from cyberspace as not digitally 
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constituted. We are unable to fully make the ontological jump from molecular to 
pixelated. Kitchin, through Sobchack, finds that "cyberspaces are spaces that are 
entered and interacted within from the site of the body: it is the fingers that type 
or move a joystick, it is the whole body that enters a virtual reality space, not just 
the eyes or the brain" (1998: 83). This entrance is exclusive, as the physical body 
does not enter cyberspace. Kitchin/Sobchack agree that "ideas of disembodiment 
are largely misnomers" (1998: 83); there is no division of self in our intra·action 
with(in) cyberspaces, we are always coming from an embedded practice. Arguing 
for the inescapability of an embodied subjectivity, Michelle Kendrick finds that 
"the bodiless entity that hypothetically exists in cyberspace depends, in myriad 
ways, on the referent of the corporeal body in front of the computer. The 
relationship between the embodied user, the creation of 'alternate' subjectivities 
in cyberspace, and the technology of the computer, is tightly intermeshed" 
(Kendrick 1996: 152). An embodied practice, therefore, denies complete 
cyberspatial immersion or habitation, as the physical body must always be 
accounted for. 
Cyberspace emplacements do have qualities of the heterotopian/utopian mirror, 
though, especially in considerations of the posthuman. In cyberspatial 
emplacements we see ourselves where we are not, even if this is mistaking our 
digital intra·actions for telepresence. We see ourselves where we are absent, 
reflected back to us as our digital posthuman selves. Moving from computer 
programming and cyberspaces as a simulational model to that of suppletion and 
s(ed)uction, our reflected posthuman selves question whether it is cyberspace or 
physical space that is actually being reflected. We no longer look for material 
qualities in our cyberspace reflections; we start to look for posthuman digital 
qualities in ourselves, projected to us and reflected back from new posthuman 
subjectivities. Sherry Turkle finds the 'threat' of the simulated worlds in 
cyberspace is that they may be preferred to the 'real': 
Computers offer the possibility of creating and working within artificial 
worlds, whether to simulate the behaviour of economics, political systems, 
or imaginary subatomic particles. Like Narcissus and his reflection, people 
who work with computers can easily fall in love with the worlds they have 
constructed or with their performances in worlds created by others. 
Involvement with simulated worlds affects relationships with the real one. 
(1984: 82) 
Evolutionary artificial life computer games can be said to follow this pattern. The 
digital environments and entities that have been created as simulations and 
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instances of life and nature in turn affect the life and nature they model. This is 
moved further to cyberspace as suppletion rather than simulation as Turkle later 
considers that: 
Simulation games are not just objects for thinking about the real world but 
also cause us to reflect on how the real world itself has become a 
simulation game. (1996: 71) 
We must be wary of the manner in which our intra·actions with/in cyberspace are 
extended, developed and projected back as posthuman. As Robert Kelly 
comments, "The game would have us generate a fictional truth transferable to the 
real world, but it does so in a way that allows the user to generate no fictional 
truths for herself which are not pre·programmed in to the game" (1993: 57). We 
cannot lose site of the social co-construction of cyberspace as lived space. Our 
posthuman cyberspace selves are never innocent; they are caught in the 
operational power of spatial representations of cyberspace as a strategic location. 
The Multiplicity of Cyberspaces 
Sharing common underlying structures, cyberspatial emplacements possess 
many commonalities, but are also recognised in their plurality. Cyberspatial 
emplacements take many forms and typologies and each one is unique. As an 
emplacement, each cyberspace realises its own spatiality. Jennifer Light stresses 
the importance of not oversimplifying cyberspace emplacements to a singular 
framework by comparing the concept of 'the city' to cyberspace: 
Like reducing complex differences among cities to an oversimplified single 
truth about 'the city' there is a risk in similar portrayals of cyberspace. As 
in other eras, electronic communications and other technologies have 
multiple, sometimes contradictory effects ... Writings about a generic 
'cyberspace,' like writings about 'the city,' are troublesome since there are 
differentiated cities and differentiated cyberspaces. (1999: 127) 
Cyberspaces, then, are multiple: there is no singular cyberspace just as there is 
no singular space or city. Massey recognises this important facet when ensuring 
in cyberspace that "multiplicity is fundamental" (2005: 91). Gamespaces, like 
cyberspaces, also need to be recognised as distinct forms of cyberspace offering 
graphically complex digital emplacements, and because gamespaces and 
cyberspaces are digital rather than physical, there is no need for them to 
resemble the layout of physical space. It is usual, yet for Massey 'ironic', for 
graphic interpretations of cyberspaces to follow a Cartesian spatial convention, 
William Gavin Mackie Loading World 76 
and what follows is a specific mapping of space. Space is built according to a 
three dimensional x·y·z matrixed gridwork, or is at least presented as such (many 
game spaces exist in two or two·and·a·half dimensions, as is the case with 
Creatures, but retain visual cues of three dimensional space). 
Gamespaces, and cyberspaces more generally, are spaces that are presented to 
the player·user through monitors, screens and other visual technologies. These 
act in the same manner as a frame or window, presenting a vantage point for 
viewing into the cyberspace emplacement. Mark Wolf reminds us that the 'off· 
screen' space in a computer game can be as important as what is currently on 
view (1997:12). Gamespace may not always be visually available to the player. 
Intra·actions between other game agents, and even the player's lack of attention 
to off·screen spaces, can have impact of gameplay. In increasingly complex 
computer games, with increasingly intricate spaces and independently minded 
game agents, activity out of the player's sight and direct involvement impacts 
gameplay and the continual co·construction of space, reality and the 
interrelations of the assembly of agents involved in gamplay. This is especially 
true for artificial life emplacements where the creatures that inhabit these digital 
spaces operate through independent programming and actively intra·act with 
each other and their environment, independent of player·user intervention or 
supervision. Wolf also highlights the importance of understanding space for the 
player in successful gameplay as "the video gameplayer has a stake in the 
navigation of space, as knowledge of the video game's space is of tern crucial to a 
good performance" (1997: 13). Massey considers the increased speed of 
communication new technologies are allowing: 
... the really serious question which is raised by speed· up, by 'the 
communications revolution' and by cyberspace, is not whether space will be 
annihilated but what kinds of multiplicities (patternings of uniqueness) and 
relations will be co·constructed with these new kinds of spatial 
configurations. (2005: 91) 
Moving cyberspace out of its cyberpunk heritage of new utopian worlds of 
limitless possibility and promised habitation, then, builds cyberspaces as co· 
constructed lived spaces of human and nonhuman, living and nonliving intra· 
action. The gamespace emplacements of evolutionary computer games bring 
together an assembly of agents formed for the production of play. This assembly 
is formed by both human agents of players, game producers and programmers, 
observers and other participants as well as nonliving and artificial life entities that 
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call these digital emplacements home. The assembly brought together at once 
both continually co·constructs the social space of the game as well as producing 
play through its intra·actions. The next chapter examines this assembly as the 
formation of a game's culture. 
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Chapter 4 
Games and a Game's Culture 
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The games of a people reveal a great deal about them. Games are a sort of 
artificial paradise like Disneyland, or some utopian vision by which we 
interpret and complete the meaning of our daily lives. In games we devise 
means of nonspecialised participation in the larger drama of our time. 
(McLuhan 1964: 238) 
For Marshall McLuhan, games, as the "extensions of social man [sic]", become 
the "faithful models of a culture" (1964:235). Christine Ward Gailey has echoed 
this view, stating that "Games played in a society embody the values of the 
dominant culture; they are ways of reinforcing through play the behaviors and 
models of order rewarded and punished in the society" (1993:81). Roland Barthes 
joins this sentiment when he declares: "All the toys one commonly sees are 
essentially a microcosm of the adult world" (1972: 53). All find in games and 
gameplaya meaningful connection with the culture in which they are situated. 
The assemblies that come together in the co-construction of computer games - in 
their spatiality, play and in the production of meaning - are intimately tied to 
other cultural assemblies and assemblages. E. F. Provenzo in his study of the 
'Nintendo generation,' and drawing from McLuhan, develops the computer game 
as a 'cultural text' that is a part of the computer's selection and amplification of 
the culture in which it is situated (1991:74). He positions computer games as 
powerful teaching aids and important sites of cultural transmission. Leslie 
Haddon also places the computer game as a part of the 'cultural industry' 
alongside film and music (1993: 134). Although claiming computer games as 
culturally significant, through recognising games as social spaces of the intra-
actions of the assembly of agents brought together in gameplay, care should be 
taken when suggesting a 'textual reading' of computer games. They cannot simply 
be read; there is no ready-made text present at all. Computer games involve the 
active involvement of play in gamespace. Conceptual ising computer games as 
specific spatial emplacements that bring together assemblies of agents in the 
construction of space and production of play (and meaning) opens up a 
materialist conceptualisation of games that considers games as emplacements in 
which play occurs, in a productive and collective manner. With this in mind, this 
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chapter looks to develop a cultural examination of computer games and gameplay 
that considers the assemblies of agents brought together and how these are 
structured to produce common meanings and a culture through gameplay, and 
how these can be related to the greater culture in which they are located. 
Computer games, where the player is implicated within the assembly in the 
production of gameplay, problematise any uni·linear and consumption lead 
model, and demand instead a multi·directional model of meaning production and 
dissemination. A multi·directional model, therefore, provides the player a critical 
role in the production of gameplay and brings together the various agents (human 
and nonhuman, living and nonliving) that are involved in the culture of a computer 
game - the assembly of agents that are involved in the production of play. 
Acknowledging the collective assembly involved in the production of play 
highlights the production of common meanings between agents, or of a common 
sense for the game. This is especially important between the producers and 
players of the game, and between multiple players, as defining, and critical 
agents within the assembly. It is also important to recognise the dominant 
position key agents within the assembly hold; not all positions within the 
assembly are equal. 
Within computer games, the player finds an active role in the production of play 
(further than an active role in decoding or consumption of the text). As an active 
participant, and recalling computer games' rule· based character (as computer 
programming), it is necessary for the player to have some understanding and play 
'by the rules' to use and enjoy the game. Computer games are structured and 
structuring spaces where the player must engage with and play within the 
programming of the game in order to produce effective game play. This thesis 
investigates the creation of a game's common sense in the production and 
maintenance of a game's culture through the use of structures of feeling, intuition 
and hegemony. Structures of feeling introduce the player to the game's culture 
and the common sense of the game, incorporating various items available before 
gameplay even commences. Articles such as game packaging, instruction 
manuals, associated websites, and introductory video vignettes all come together 
to align the (potential) player to the culture of the game. The intuitive nature of 
computer games (in their positioning and inclusion of the player through the 
interface) reinforces the common sense of the game's culture and naturalises this 
through gameplay. Finally, the game's culture can be effectively thought of in 
terms of hegemony, recognising the different agents' ability to negotiate new 
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positions in the game whilst acknowledging the dominant position within the 
game culture of key agents, such as the producers of the game and the game 
itself. As a hegemonic order the active positions of all the agents within the game 
culture are considered in the production and maintenance of meaning for the 
game and its culture. 
Developing the common sense of a game within a hegemonic order of a game's 
culture leads to the final level of analysis this chapter proposes for the study of 
the production of meaning within computer games and gameplay. How computer 
games structure gameplay to aid play's translation into meaningful narratives is 
covered, and how game elements allow players to produce stories and meanings 
from the games they play. Story telling and the ability to produce game narratives 
are essential elements of effective play, both from and during. The mythic 
possibilities of a game open the game to a reading of myth (from Barthes) and 
locate game elements that structure play. In this way, the player is structured 
through the retelling of mythic grand narratives by the progression of gameplay. 
Narrative scaffolding, similarly, are those game elements which structure play so 
that the user is able to construct a coherent narrative from gameplay. Both 
mythic possibilities and narrative scaffolding aid the player in the creation of 
sensible gameplay, and in the ability for the player to create stories and 
narratives. Both can be analysed with consideration to what kind of game 
experiences and narrative computer games make possible within their procedural 
rule based structure. 
Developing a game's culture through the production of intuition, common sense 
and structuring elements opens computer games up to an embodied and 
experiential reading. Such a reading can consider how agents including game 
elements co·construct and structure gameplay and how these translate into the 
production of meaning. It observes what kind of experiences computer games 
offer and how these experiences can be related back to the greater culture in 
which the game is situated. 
Studying Evolutionary Artificial life Games 
,Since childhood, I have had an active interest in computer games and new media. 
From arcade halls and home game systems, from the Atari 2600 forward, 
computer and video games always formed part of my leisure activities, played 
alone and with friends. Strategic and 'sim' styled games have always held a 
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particular interest, engaging many hours of play with popular titles such as 
SimCity. The activity and involvement needed to engage with and manipulate 
simulational game environments held the challenge of both understanding the 
simulation model of each game and how to control or influence game 
occurrences. 
While studying for my Masters this interest in gaming, combined with a brief 
academic history in the biological sciences, gained a fresh academic angle under 
the guise of new media studies. The outcome of this was the production of a 
dissertation (Mackie 1998) focusing on the original Creatures game and its 
inclusion of artificial life technoscience. At that time my study was structured 
within a foundation of textual studies, examining the narrative that players play 
through within games, but also moving beyond a simple textual analysis to show 
interest in three specific areas: aesthetics, space and fable. The results formed 
the groundwork of this thesis, showing how scientific and spiritual narratives and 
discourses of artificial life combine to give meaning to the field, and how these 
have been translated as a primarily Jeudo·Christian fable told through gameplay. 
From a scientific discourse of emergence and connectionism, to gameplay 
structured within a contemporary genesis story, Creatures and its predecessors 
displayed a converging point of science and popular culture. 
The dissertation opened a number of avenues for further research and 
examination that formed the early framework for this current thesis. This was 
initially based around the subjects of the definition and story of life that artificial 
life produces, and how is this being connected with carbon life. Findings from the 
dissertation pointed to a unitary epistemological position of life itself presented 
within artificial life, which then made crossovers between silicon and carbon. 
There was room to explore this proposition and position further, as well as the 
definitions of life that have and are being used to argue that artificial life produces 
actual instances of silicon life, and how this is being translated and related to 
carbon life. Creatures, evolutionary artificial life computer games and popular 
research programs form ideal locations for study, bringing together science and 
popular culture. The assemblies that evolutionary artificial life computer games 
form, the assemblages they create and the other cultural and scientific 
assemblages these games associate with, bring together a diverse collection of 
individuals, cultural spheres and entities. Transversing popular culture and 
computer and biological sciences, these games and popular research programs 
produce new definitions of life itself and new relationships between humans and 
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computer·generated creatures we now call kin. They construct new spaces, 
(re)creating nature and producing a new cosmology of holistic 
interconnectedness. They reterritorialise definitions of life itself and introduce 
users to silicon life, forging new relationships of nurturing and kinship between 
silicon and carbon. 
As such, evolutionary computer games become contemporary examples of Don 
Slater's concept of the diarama (1995), a foundation from which games are 
positioned in this thesis. A diarama is a model for science produced outside of its 
usually closed gates, providing a space in which a general audience can 
experience its wonders. Slater investigates the diarama as "spaces of absolute 
virtuality" (1995: 218) where the real is (re)created, a reminder of Doel and 
Clarke's formulation of suppletion. Evolutionary computer games display the 
same attributes as the diarama, as virtual spaces in which nature has been 
(re)created. For Slater, diaramas produce two types of wonder: wonder at the 
experience of being transported into a fully realised unreal world, and the wonder 
at the (hidden) technology that makes it possible. It is this production of wonder 
that constitutes science as a cultural experience: 
Science as a popular cultural experience is constituted through a 
demonstrable capacity to make nature wonderful, to make it do wonderful 
things, to have a command over nature's own principles which offer the 
power to make it perform at will and according the ends of human 
imagination and excitement. (Slater 1995: 226· 7) 
Slater typifies this command over nature as 'natural magic' - the power of science 
and technique appearing as a new form of magic (to those who do not understand 
them). The 'trick' of this magic is to hide the apparatus and technique 
(technology) that makes it possible to make its representations (or simulations) of 
nature. As shall be illustrated, it is common within artificial life emplacements to 
forget the technologies of the computer hardware and underlying programming 
that support and define how these digital ecosystems work. Slater associates the 
ease of this trick with a degree of realism: 
In the form of magical representation, the technical accomplishment of 
realism is the basis not of knowledge of the world but of the production of 
simulated worlds, worlds in which we can pleasurably inhabit through the 
very opposite of the modern attitude - by suspending our disbelief. (1995: 
232) 
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Artificial life computer games move a step beyond this pleasurable inhabitation of 
a new world; the player is fully implicated in the production and demonstration of 
the world and science through gameplay. Beyond the traditional diarama that 
individuals were immersed within but not actively involved with, computer game 
players are found to be active participants within the space. Evolutionary artificial 
life computer games are found within a specific game genre, typically referred to 
as 'god·sims' for the god·like position the player is placed in. This reflects the 
position and power that players have in their influence in the production of 
gameplay. Given this level of involvement, a key player position found within these 
games is one of a researcher, with players actively using games to perform 
research experiments. The traffic between game and research program, therefore, 
is heavy; they cross over and share the usually sanctified sphere of science and 
techno science, often conceived as an impenetrable 'cultures of no cultures' 
(Martin 1996: 99). To this end, early Maxis releases SimEarth and SimUfe have 
found second lives as populist artificial life research projects and high school 
biology teaching aids, moving beyond their status as entertainment games. 
Scientific research programs such as Tierra are also freely available and actively 
distributed to hobby·ists and general users, creating a similar path from research 
program to entertainment tool. 
As spaces of active involvement and lay scientific production, evolutionary 
computer games hold a great deal of knowledge. Investigating the integration of 
spatial, temporal and interactive media that come together within multimedia, 
Florian Brody finds that the computer has occasioned a shift that complicates the 
relationship of text and memory. Complimenting the diarama as a space where 
knowledge is held and shared, Brody's memory theatre is a space of exploration: 
When we see books as spaces that we are able to enter and explore, much 
like a house, we find ourselves in memory spaces, similar to the theatres 
used in the classical ars memorativa. The Memory Theatre ... was a theatre 
that would contain the concepts and the knowledge of the world. By 
entering the theatre, one would gain access to that knowledge and be able 
to grasp the concepts contained. (1999: 142·143) 
In developing a Memory Theatre, Frances Yates (1966) finds that there has been 
great effort made towards achieving a detailed attempt to use the principles of the 
art of memory in association with the heavens, to form a total world·reflecting 
system. In describing his own Memory Theatre, Robert Fludd finds it to be a 
totality, "I call a theatre (a place in which) all actions of words, of sentences, of 
particulars of a speech or of subjects are shown" (from Yates 1966: 331). 
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Investigating evolutionary computer games, especially in conjunction with 
artificial life research projects, the definition of life that is presented can be 
examined in such a totalising manner. This is especially significant when the 
model of artificial systems is transferred back to the 'real' in acts of suppletion 
and s(ed)uction, where computer models (both of computer 'game' and 'research 
project') hold and become the total knowledge of living models. Gamespace, 
therefore, holds the potential of memory holding the concepts and knowledge of 
I ife itself. 
For this thesis, studying these games and research programs - the gameplay that 
ensues and the meanings of and about life that gameplay produces - I have 
conducted a game ethnography, actively playing the games that this thesis details 
and investigating the various forms of media attached to gameplay. This includes 
engaging with official, unofficial and player websites, news forums and user 
groups as well as following press reviews and coverage. This form of participant 
engagement and visual anthropology is similar to others studying computer 
games (see, for example, Pearce 2007: 311). Playing, watching others play and 
discussing gameplay has highlighted how such an investigative method of 
researching games needs special consideration, including the questions we ask of 
them and how we formulate a response. The introduction of players to a game, 
learning and manipulating the mechanics of gameplay, how players relate and 
position themselves within both game and player communities, and the narratives 
and stories taken away from gameplay, move beyond a textual or ludic reading of 
games. This chapter explores this development of a game's culture with the 
purpose of developing a framework in which to analyse and discuss cultural 
perspectives of games and gameplay. 
With open·ended games typically found within evolutionary computer games, and 
especially within the Creatures series, a game's culture is particularly significant in 
the development of gameplay. Usually played on a PC, evolutionary computer 
games place the player in an overseeing role, charged with the care and 
maintenance of a digital ecosystem and its inhabitants, with no completed end 
state. There is no set of achieved goals that aim towards the player 'winning' the 
game; the game continues as long as the assembly collectively continues its intra· 
actions. 6 Gonzalo Frasca (2001) differentiates such endless games as paidea-
games with no 'winning plot' - as compared to those of ludus - games with rules 
6 The exceptions here are notable for the modernist narratives of escape they recuperate. In SimEarth, 
for instance, a successful game ends ironically with all civilised life escaping the Gaian planet it 
supported, leaving the planet lifeless. 
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and plot that end in victory or defeat. Evolutionary artificial life computer games 
are openended, which allows the assembly more autonomy in the shape and path 
gameplay takes, and often ludus style 'sub·plots' will be introduced within the 
game, with more defined goals and objectives coordinated between players. These 
can range from attempting to achieve certain traits and characteristics within the 
creature population, achieving a desired number of generations within the 
population, or overcoming environmental stresses (purposely) introduced to the 
digital ecosystem. It is players' involvement in the greater game's culture, the 
intra·action and collaboration between players and the flexibility of the game's 
mechanics that contribute to the ability to support a variety of play styles and 
game goals. Within this flexibility, however, there is also a convergence of play 
and meaning taken away from the game, and this hegemony must be accounted 
for. A cultural perspective to games and gameplay allows for both. It is in the 
development of a game's culture that this thesis turns to investigate the meanings 
and statements about life that evolutionary computer games produce through 
gameplay. 
Computer Games as Assemblies - the Multi-Directionality of Intra-Actions 
The first challenge that computer games hold in the development of an 
understanding of the production of meaning is recognising computer games' 
distinctive nature as a media form. There is no ready· made 'text' available to be 
read, decoded or analysed. Computer games are simulational, spatial and played 
with and within. Any narratives or stories taken from games are produced through 
the activity of gameplay. It is this challenge of a media form that is both 
interactive and simulational, whilst giving at least the air of a 'cultural text' that 
has formed the basis of much of the discussion between narratology and ludology 
within computer game studies. Within media studies, the classic encoding· 
decoding model implies a linear media system of production to consumption of 
media messages. This has always been inherently problematic; producers and 
consumers are neither solely producers nor consumers, they are always partially 
both. Lev Manovich makes the point that all media is interactive, in the 
production of text, emphasising the active decoding of text. He warns of the 
danger of a purely physical interpretation of 'interaction': 
When we use the concept of "interactive media" exclusively in relation to 
computer·based media, there is the danger that we will interpret 
"interaction" literally, equating it with physical interaction between a user 
and a media object.. at the expense of psychological interaction. The 
William Gavin Mackie Loading World 87 
psychological processes of filling-in, hypothesis formation, recall, and 
identification, which are required for us to comprehend any text or image at 
all, are mistakenly identified with an objectively existing structure of 
interactive links. (2001: 57) 
Computer game players, placed in a concretely active position, within the 
assembly of agents brought together in the production of play, challenge the use 
of an encoding-decoding model to examine computer games and play so that it is 
no longer feasible to think conceptually of a uni-directional flow of 'textual' 
production and receivership. In their position of active production (rather than 
active consumption), game players contest both the directional flow of messages 
and the existence of any ready-made text ready_ There is no game without play. 
Without being played, the game is only a potential. The player is therefore critical 
in the production of gameplay; play is based in and a result of intra-action. 
That is not to say that there are no opportunities within computer games for 
'textual' readings. Reminded of Soja's conceptualisation of Secondspace, and 
contrary to ludologists' insistance that games hold no opportunity for textuality, 
gamespace is open to a semiotic spatial analysis. This is especially fruitful in the 
analysis of evolutionary games where the (re)creation of nature as a technology 
(as computer cyber/gamespace) is key to the games' formation. As the digital 
environment in which play occurs, and nature is (re)created, gamespaces become 
new natures, the 'natural' environment that sets the stage for the drama of life 
itself. In his investigation of the objects of modern living spaces, Jean 8audrillard 
recognises the importance of design and 'atmosphere' in the production of 
meaning: 
... both mobilise the values of play and calculation - calculation of function 
in the case of design, calculation of materials, forms and space in the case 
of atmosphere. (1996: 30) 
A semiotic reading of the gamespace becomes a key feature of the relationship 
between technology and nature in evolutionary computer games, bringing 
together both design and 'atmosphere.' An analysis of evolutionary games, 
however, must also go beyond a semiotic analysis to investigate how these 
gamespaces are co-constructed and structure social order, intra-action and 
experience. Gamespace is a constructed space, and is continually co-constructed 
by the assembly of agents brought together through play. Recognising this 
continually returns thought to how the player and other agents are implicated in 
the production of play. As spatial environments, computer games are structuring 
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environments in which play occurs. Being programmed, gamespace is also 
structured space by design. 
The computer game (in that it is associated with specific rules of engagement and 
simulation, and of memory) and the game player join together as key agents 
within the assembly brought together in the production of gameplay. It is the 
computer game's programming that structures what mayor may not occur in the 
game, creating the parameters of gameplay through rules and directing the user 
in play. The game player must decipher and understand the rules and navigate 
through the gamespace in order to have meaningful gameplay. Newman pinpoints 
this relationship in what he terms the 'On·Line' experience: 
The On· Line relationship between primary·player and system/gameworld is 
not one of clear subject and object. Rather, the interface is a continuous 
feedback loop where the player must be seen as both implied by, and 
implicated in, the construction and composition of the experience. (2002) 
Reminded of our materialist position where assemblies are made up of agents 
that need not be human or living, gameplay becomes the product of at least two 
agents: the computer game and the player. And we must critically include the 
producer(s) as agent(s) as well, in their key role of structuring the underlying rules 
of the game (programming), and of programming the game characters and other 
game elements, both in their operations and aesthetics. Here, we can begin to 
produce a multi·directional model for the production of gameplay, which at the 
same time recognises the various roles and importance of the different agents 
within the assembly. This expands upon an encoding·decoding model as it places 
the player in an active productive position, highlighting the very networked intra· 
actions involved in gameplay. 
Opening an understanding of gameplay as a productive practice problematises 
the linearity of meaning transmission in gameplay. The player, the game 
producers and the game itself, in its spatiality and underlying structure of 
programming and rules, present a skeletal outline of a multi·directional model. 
The production of gameplay can be further expanded to include the greater 
variety of agents that come together to form a game culture, and take part in the 
production of stories taken from gameplay. T.L. Taylor finds that it is just such an 
expanded notion of gameplay and networks which is key in the production of 
individuals as players: 
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Most people come into game culture through their networks and learn to be 
gamers within specific social contexts ... We should not overlook the power 
such introductions provide in both legitimating inhabitation of that space 
and providing the tools to stay ... This is instructive because it means the 
paths into game culture are vital. (2008: 53) 
An active game culture is key to understanding evolutionary artificial life computer 
games, where game playing communities - web·sites, newsgroups, forums, 
etcetera - become important parts of gameplay, and where game objects and 
'game characters' in the form of artificial life creatures also shape the production 
of gameplay. As predominantly open-ended games of paidea, which do not have 
any specific pre-defined winning 'goal' (other than a broad and ever present goal 
of progressive evolution through reproduction and genetic engineering) the 
possible goals of the evolutionary computer games are often defined and debated 
within this larger assembly. This could be the breeding or genetically engineering 
specific artificial life creatures or species with certain characteristics, to 
attempting to 'correct' or 'rehabilitate' creatures with 'challenging' behavioural 
patterns. The larger assembly may help define game goals (and therefore the 
production of meanings from gameplay), and can also contribute to the variety 
and breadth of the game through the inclusion of the trading of creatures, the 
development of new game tools, the hacking and development of game 
programming code (all in an programming environment similar to open sourcing), 
and through debate on newsgroups and web forums. The Internet is a key factor 
in the ability to take gameplay to this level and in the production of a game's 
culture. 
Bringing in an wider range of agents to the production of play, it is possible to 
further open the multi-directional model outlined above (for what will be termed 
immediate gameplay) to a more developed model that further deconstructs the 
directionality of meaning production (termed extended gameplay). An extended 
model recognises the contribution to the development of the game (and 
gameplay) that a range of agents can make, and also acknowledges the feedback 
of such production to the producers of the game. Through extended play, the 
game producers also become active receivers, incorporating new game elements 
and styles of play developed by players, and the extended assembly involved in 
the production of play, into new editions and updates. It is hard to deny the 
amount of labour many players devote to the playing and development of 
computer games, especially games such as Creatures where players have 
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developed new Norn species, game objects and even new digital ecosystems. By 
taking this involvement in gameplay, players produce new aspects of the game 
while further extending it. In turn, the producers of the game incorporate these 
elements, and new aspects of gameplay can be incorporated into new 'official' 
additions to the game or to later versions. A fuller multi·directional model allows 
for the development of players as (at least) partial producers of the game, and for 
producers to be (at least) partial receivers of new game elements. A multi· 
directional model gives breadth and diversity to the various roles in the 
production of gameplay and meaning, and in the continued production of the 
game itself. 
By recognising the variety of agents that are involved in the production of a 
computer game and gameplay, an extended multi·directional model also 
highlights the concept of a game's culture. This culture develops from the 
assembly involved in the production of the game and gameplay and finds 
importance through moving the underlying rules and assumptions found in the 
game's programming and simulation into common sense through a process of 
naturalisation. The move from rule or procedure of computer programming to 
common sense of a game's culture is paramount in naturalising and normalising 
the statements that can be taken from gameplay. In evolutionary games, where 
the common sense of the game is formed around the production of new 
definitions of life itself, a game's culture can be analysed by observing how the 
discourses of the technoscience of artificial life are incorporated and translated 
into the common sense of the game. Gameplay is critical in the development and 
maintenance of a game's culture. It also sets up the common sense of a game 
and brings a player into the game's culture, through structures of feeling, how an 
intuitive sense of game play is found through the player's position and the 
interfaces within gameplay, and how a game's culture can be thought of as a 
hegemony. 
Structures of Feeling - the Development of Common Sense 
Raymond Williams developed the concept of structures of feeling to describe the 
manner in which a culture comes to develop and structure itself: unplanned and 
yet seemingly willed. A structure of feeling defines for Williams "a particular 
quality of social experience and relationship, historically distinct from other 
particular qualities, which gives the sense of a generation or of a period" (1977: 
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131). Structure of feeling is introduced to the analysis of computer games to 
provide a means to investigate how computer games bring the player into a 
game's culture, as a member of the assembly of agents involved in the production 
of gameplay, and how players begin to structure the common sense of that 
culture. For Taylor, becoming a computer game player is 'deeply informed' by 
such things as "how people come to know about a game, get reiews of it (formal 
or informal), get their hands on it, and indeed have people to play" (2008: 53·4). 
These structures of feeling occur within social networks and form a game's 
culture. In developing Williams' work, Michael Pickering (1997) finds, in 
structures of feeling, a unit of analysis that defines and describes a sense in which 
particular activities are combined into a way of thinking and living for a particular 
time and place. He finds that structures of feeling: 
... arise out of the need to give shape and identity to the localised nature of 
characteristic social experiences, and to articulate a group's sense of itself 
in the social world, as they can then act back on subsequent experiences by 
structuring the ways in which such experiences are understood as 
characteristic and significant. Emerging from the urge to understand what 
is experientially new and different for a generation or group, and to express 
a sense of identity which crystallises in differentiation from what has been 
inherited from the past, structures of feeling come to mediate the group's 
collective understanding of social experiences and of relations between the 
social world and a group's place within it. The movement is one of thinking 
about the process of living to living through the product of that thinking. 
(1997: 33) 
For computer games and a game's culture, structures of feeling introduce 
(potential) players to a game's culture; how the underlying rules and simulation of 
the game are translated and presented to the player or others coming to the 
game, and how these become common for the members of a game's culture. It 
hopes to form a cohesive group definition to the assembly involved in the 
production of a game and gameplay. This is an important step in the production 
of gameplay; it is almost impossible to playa game without at least some set of 
basic understandings of its culture, to have a feel for the game. (Potential) players 
can grasp a game and its culture by being able to develop a feeling for what the 
game is about, how gameplay is likely to proceed, and how they as players are 
brought into and intra·act within the game and gameplay. Structures of feeling 
are most prominent in the early development of a cultural assembly, or in times 
of cultural change, when new structures of feeling are developed. In computer 
games this can be seen in a player's initial gameplay. This can also go further to a 
potential player's initial contact with a game: browsing game boxes in a shop, 
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reading a review, or discussions with other players. For James Wallis, the ability 
of players to be able to create a feeling or a 'story structure' for a game comes 
from "the game's seting and the assumptions that people take from a game's 
components and packaging" (2007: 77). It is these initial contacts with the game 
in which structures of feeling are most pronounced, or when a game's culture 
makes a radical shift in which new structures of feeling are formed. It is the lived 
experience of becoming part of a computer game's culture: 
It refers to how social events, encounters and relations in solution, in a 
'lived' experience of the present, are met, and how meanings begin to be 
made of them ... [C]onceptually it is directed to the ways in which 
experiences are culturally experienced and responded to by a particular 
social or distinctively generational group. (Pickering, 1997: 34) 
This 'lived' aspects of structures of feeling forefronts the experiential 
characteristic of computer games. When examining computer games as sites of 
production of play through the intra·actions of an assembly of agents, the first 
step is to understand how a computer game produces common experiences of 
gameplay amongst players and members of its assembly. Structures of feeling 
provide a means in which to investigate how such common experiences are 
developed, by exploring how a common feel for the game is created. It is this 
development of a common feel for a game that moves to the creation of a game's 
culture, developing further the production of common meanings of play through 
the development of common sense. Structures of feeling within games and 
gameplay lead players to come to common understandings and experiences of a 
game and gameplay. 
In computer games, there are a number of sources we can look to in order to find 
structures of feeling at the player level. Primary sources such as game packaging, 
the instruction booklet, any pre·game video vignettes, the ways in which the game 
presents itself and official websites all aid in the presentation of a feel for the 
game, conveying to the player the type of game and what to expect. This provides 
the beginnings of the development of the game's common sense. Here, indicators 
reflect most closely the intent of the producers of the game, as it is here that the 
producers have the most direct control over material. These important sources of 
information are often also the first contact (potential) players will have with a 
game and its culture. Secondary sources can also play an important part in the 
development of structures of feeling for a game. These include press articles 
about the game (such as game reviews), discussion forum boards and other 
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sources of discussion for gamers on the Internet, and, as the game's culture 
develops, player led websites. Secondary sources also indicate how much a 
game's culture reflects the feel initially developed by the producers of the game. 
As the thesis will return to later, in an exploration of hegemony in a game's 
culture, these secondary sources reflect negotiated positions within a game's 
culture and can reflect changes such negotiations have made in the structures of 
feeling. An investigation into the structures of feeling that these present reflects 
how a game has been taken up by those who play it, review it, or otherwise 
interact within the culture. 
Structures of feeling are generated in the first place to make sense of the process 
of everyday social life (Pickering 1997), or when applied to computer games, to 
make sense of a game, gameplay, and a game's culture. Pickering places 
structures of feeling within the ideological, coming before (or after) the formation 
of an ideological position. Aligning structures of feeling to the positioning of the 
thesis, it is preferable to place structures of feeling within the discourses and 
grand narratives of a culture. They draw from and are accommodated by cultural 
grand narratives, aligning to the stories that can be told and statements that can 
be taken away about or within a cultural assemblage. This is an important bridge 
between a game's culture and other cultural assemblages with which it 
associates. The structures of feeling for a game can be traced through the cultural 
assemblages that produce the game and those in which the game is played and 
discussed. For evolutionary computer games we can look to our converging 
cultural strands of artificial life (the technoscience of the life sciences), computer 
game media (the culture of computer games), and present Western society. A 
movement from structures of feeling to grand narratives furthers a game's 
cultural development. It is through developing cultural narratives in gameplay that 
games resonate with other cultural assemblages, aiding in the creation of effective 
gameplay and production of meaning from play. 
Structures of feeling align new players and other agents with a game's culture. 
Through gameplay, these move towards a production of common sense within the 
game and its culture. Through intuition these begin the translation to become 
'natural,' how gameplay becomes second nature or intuitive. Within gameplay, 
intuition orientates the player, through positioning, interface and gameplay. 
Intuition - natural ising play 
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In the building of common sense within the assembly of a game's culture, and 
especially for the player, intuition develops from structures of feeling. Intuition 
signals the manner in which the player is positioned and intra·acts within a 
computer game, aiding in the naturalisation of gameplay. Specifically, intuition 
examines how the player is brought into the game through positioning and 
interface. The ability to create intuition is an aspect of game design; poor design 
often leaves players frustrated as 'the controls don't make sense' when there is no 
intuitive correlation to how the player uses input devices, the interface with what 
occurs on the screen in gameplay and the underlying rules of the game. 
Therefore, intuition is not a given in gameplay, and poor design in this area often 
equates to a game's early demise (due to lack of playability). It is in these poorly 
designed games where intuition (or the lack of) is most prominent, as it is this 
highlights when it is not working. When Wallis finds that "too great a denSity of 
rules or a single rule in the wrong place can destroy the cohesion or effect of the 
story" within gameplay (2007: 79) this has a great deal to do with the failure in 
playability and development of intuition. On the other hand, Newman finds that 
"there are few good games with bad controls. Few good games feel bad" (2002). 
Intuitive gameplay naturalises the translation from player input and interface to 
intra·action in gameplay. The player is positioned within the gamespace and 
operates game controls in such a manner that the physical manipulations of input 
and translated gamespace actions are aligned so that interface is not noticed as 
friction in play. It is the ease in which the player becomes a part of the game, and 
his/her actions become habitual, that develop a game's intuitive characteristic. 
Intuition incorporates the creation of habit (Wise 1997: 76), but is also more 
general. 
Intuition is important in the study of computer games as it formalises and 
naturalises the player's positioning(s) and role(s) within the game. Intuitive items 
such as "knowledge of standard game mechanics, interface practices, and even 
genre conventions are powerful factors in computer game play", but Taylor finds 
that these "are equally overlooked by researchers" (Taylor 2008: 63). Such 
factors should form points of interest for gameplay analysis as intuition further 
builds and reinforces the developing common sense of the game. Creating an 
intuitive feel for gameplay further establishes and naturalises discourses and 
grand narratives played out through the game. As with structures of feeling, 
intuition moves gameplay to a feeling of 'as it should be: making the position(s) 
and role(s) of the player and his or her relationship with other agents in the game 
appear normal and mundane. Within the assembly, brought together in the 
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production of gameplay, intuition recognises the active productive role of the 
player in the production of gameplay. It also acknowledges how the game, as an 
agent within the assembly, effectively structures play by defining what roles, 
character positions and movements it allows the player. The player is largely 
limited in play to the position(s) made available by the game, as structured by the 
underlying programming, but it is through his or her intra-actions with the game's 
collected assembly that gameplay occurs, and these positions are negotiated. 
Intuition takes these defined (and negotiated) positions and makes them 'second 
nature'. In doing so it de-emphasises the limitations of the player's positioning, 
movements or possible intra-actions made available in the game. It hides the 
inherent structured and structuring nature of computer games and conceals the 
manner in which the game guides and directs play, defining the parameters in 
which gameplay can occur. Intuition can be traced through the player's position in 
the game and the interface of input into the game, and further investigates how 
these structure gameplay and reflect the common sense of a game's culture. 
Genre is also key to the development of intuition; games of a common genre will 
often produce an expected intuitive style of play. 
Player positioning within gamespace is an early indicator of the intuition of a 
game. A player's position incorporates both point of view (i.e. how the player is 
placed within the gamespace) and what roles are available in gameplay. Within 
evolutionary artificial life games, the point of view is universally positioned as a 
(participatory) observer of the world, looking from above down, into the 
gamespace, and is often characterised with roles such as caretaker, scientist, 
god, or parent. These become part of the repertoire of roles the player is offered, 
assumes and negotiates within the game. Roles can be many and varied and often 
different roles are played simultaneously or scrolled between. Torill Mortensen 
likens the variety of roles players can take in gameplay with those from everyday 
life, with more than a fleeting reference to Erving Goffman and The Presentation of 
Self in Everyday Life (2007: 300). She finds that what she celebrates as the 'role· 
playing high', the elated feeling of successfully adopting a role in gameplay "is 
balanced somewhere between believing in your own play and still being aware that 
you are controlling the act" (Mortensen 2007: 303). 
Intuition can be analysed not only in the position of the player within the 
games pace, but also by how the player (as an agent within the assembly) is 
positioned in relation to the other agents involved in gameplay, in proximity and 
power. For evolutionary computer games the position of the player within the 
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game is uniformly one of a god-like overseer, looking down onto the ecosystem 
and creatures_ This player positioning groups the family of evolutionary games 
together as a genre (usually referred to as a 'god-sim,' together with other 
simulation model games) and can be examined in how it relates to the physicality 
of the player in front of a monitor as window, effectively looking into the world (of 
a gamespace). A godlike position looking from outside, above and through the 
'window' of the monitor has obvious relations with both the scientific (as scientist 
looking through the microscope) and spiritual (as protector overlooking the flock) 
discourses of artificial life. How this godlike position relates to the positioning of 
the other agents in the game (artificial life creatures, game elements, 
manoeuvring the gamespace, etcetera) with regards to issues of power and 
control can also be examined. 
Intuition encompasses not only how the player is positioned within the game, but 
also how the player intra-acts within the game_ The player's movements, intra-
actions with other game agents and manipulation of the settings within the game 
are a combination of the player's physical manipulation of input devices and 
game interface (joystick, keyboard, mouse, monitor) and the corresponding 
actions within the game world. Intuition makes these two activities seamless; 
there is no friction between the physical input of the player and the corresponding 
digital actions in the gamespace_ The input device(s) become a cybernetic and 
cyborgian extension of the player, both physically in front of the monitor and 
virtually in the game. They interpret the player's game play from molecular to 
digital action. Intuition makes this input seem seamless, in that the player is not 
continually reminded of the process of input, but instead gameplay seems to flow 
seamlessly from input to action. The formation of habit is a key feature of 
intuition in input; learning new controls is much less intuitive than when mastery 
of the controls has become habitual. Genre finds an important role here. The 
establishment of standard input control across similar games increases the 
intuition of a game; there is less to learn and an expected style is created and 
appears normalised across different games. As with the positioning of the player, 
the creation of intuition in player and game intra-action should be examined in 
how it structures and guides game play, along with what does it allows or limits. 
The types and ways of input and their translated screen actions reinforce the 
positioning of the player and further this position through action. Taking 
evolutionary 'god-sims,' the position of god is reinforced and moved on by the 
types of actions the player can perform in the game (such as the ability to kill or 
remove unwanted creatures). 
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The intuition of the game strengthens its naturalisation and reinforces the 
development of a game's common sense. Moving on from the structures of feeling 
within the game, intuition incorporates the player into the game and gameplay, 
and decreases the friction between the physical and the digital so that the 
player's position and actions appear seamless. Intuition makes the underlying 
structure and programming of the game invisible, or at the very least does its best 
to conceal it. Through positioning and intra·action it creates naturalised game 
play through the formation of habit. The act and process of playing the game 
becomes part of the game's common sense. Whilst the game has a structuring 
and guiding effect on this position and the direction of play (which intuition at 
least partially veils), it is also through these guides that players can negotiate 
their own style, position and meaning in the game's culture and gameplay. 
Hegemony 
The members of a game's culture consist of an assembly comprised of a variety 
of agents and agent positions, including the producers of the game, players, game 
elements and characters. They can also include others who have involvement with 
the game through an extended game network. The evolutionary computer games 
of this thesis often have a high level of game community involvement in 
(extended) gameplay. This can range from the trading of creatures and other 
game items and the development of new game additions, through to the 
constitution and negotiation of what constitutes 'fair play' and game goals 
(moving paeida games to incorporating more ludus elements). Whilst the 
involvement of the extended game assembly initially takes from the common 
sense found within the game itself, it does not need stay there. Development of 
meaning, common sense, and positions of power is limited only by the need to 
make sense in consideration of the underlying programming of the game; that it is 
compatible with the range of possible gameplay. In negotiating positions within 
the game's culture, agents are in a position to negotiate and reconfigure the 
accepted common sense of the game. Examining this through the use of 
hegemony allows for the possibility of the movement and development of meaning 
within the culture, whilst acknowledging the dominant positions that key agents 
hold, such as the producers of the game. 
Hegemony is a concept originally developed by Antonio Gramsci to provide a 
means in which to describe the complex interlocking political, social and cultural 
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forces in which the dominant classes (for Gramsci - the bourgeoisie) maintain 
their dominant position. For Williams (1977), hegemony goes beyond concepts of 
'culture' as 'a whole social process' and 'ideology' and recognises the dominance 
and subordination in inequalities between classes: 
What is decisive is not only the conscious system of ideas and beliefs, but 
the whole lived social process as practically organised by specific and 
dominant meanings and values. (Williams 1977: 109) 
He continues: 
It is a lived system of meanings and values - constitutive and constituting-
which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally 
confirming. It thus constitutes a sense of reality for most people in the 
society, a sense of absolute because experienced reality beyond which it is 
very difficult for most members of the society to move, in most areas of 
their I ives. It is, that is to say, in the strongest sense a 'culture', but a 
culture which has also to be seen as the lived dominance and subordination 
of particular classes. (1977: 110) 
Hegemony is therefore the result of the process of lived experience: a realised 
complex of experiences, relationships, intra·actions and activities with specific 
and changing pressures and limits. Incorporating hegemony to the study of 
computer games, gameplay and a game's culture, two important aspects are 
highlighted. The first is the importance of experience in the production of 
meaning within gameplay. Through the experience of play (both in immediate and 
extended play), the player is implicated in the co·construction of the reality of the 
game. Critically, this reality is limited in scope by the parameters of the 
underlying computer programming, and developed and co·constructed by the 
assembly of the game coming together under the game's culture. This leads to 
the second aspect - the importance of a shared developed culture (and 
production of meaning) from gameplay - especially in consideration of the 
collaborative intra-actions found in the extended play of evolutionary computer 
games between players. 
Hegemony is also important in that it acknowledges the dominant position of 
certain members of the culture or assembly. In a game's culture, as with other 
areas of the 'digital economy' (Terranova 2000), we must take notions of 
domination and subordination out of their strictly Marxist framework of class or 
class formation. Elaborati ng on Maurio Lazzarato's concept of immaterial labour-
labour associated with an 'informational content' and 'cultural content' - Tiziana 
Terranova finds: 
William Gavin Mackie Loading World 99 
Immaterial labor ... is not completely confined to a specific class formation. 
Lazzarato insists that this form of labor power is not limited to highly 
skilled workers but is a form of activity of every productive subject within 
postindustrial societies ... [I]n the young worker, the "precarious worker," 
and the unemployed youth these capacities are "virtual," that is they are 
there but are still undetermined. This means that immaterial labor is a 
virtuality (an undetermined capacity) that belongs to the postindustrial 
productive subjectivity as a whole. (2000: 41) 
Terranova's account of 'Free Labor' in the 'digital economy' allows the 
problematisation and restructuring of not only the issue of class, but also of what 
is considered labour, both of which are fruitful in an investigation of hegemony 
within a game's culture. She stresses that the concepts of work and labour 
(typically associated with being paid) need to be separated out; the equivalence 
between labour and employment needs to be rejected and reworked. Terranova 
finds that there is much labour involved in the digital economy that is not 
considered as work or employment. Recognising the importance of (free) labour in 
the production of culture (and especially digital culture) and without taking away 
from the fact that playing a computer game is just that - play, a game's culture 
becomes associated with a great deal of labour. Game websites, new additions to 
games, newsgroups, reviews (paid and unpaid), magazine write-ups, and even 
gameplay (in both its immediate and extended sense) all entail labour to produce 
and maintain, albeit intended and (hopefully) realised under the conditions of 
enjoyment and/or play_ In this collection of labour, it is the concept of 'general 
intellect,' the ensemble of knowledge constituting the epicentre of social 
production, that Terranova borrows from the Italian autonomists, which comes to 
form the dominant position within a game's culture's hegemonic order. Whilst 
recognising the collective nature of knowledge labour that goes into the general 
intellect, recognising the (non-class bound) hegemonic nature of a game's culture 
allows the privileged position of key actors to be acknowledged. Without denying 
the diversity of play styles, goals and so on that are found within a game's culture, 
the dominant position of the game itself and the game producers must be 
recognised at the epicentre of production. This is especially the case with the 
open paeida style of evolutionary computer games. Cultural production within 
gameplay and its associated labour takes from and returns to the game. It 
realises a central and dominant position within its culture. As with the digital 
economy that Terranova examines, computer game culture relies on its players 
and the collective assembly as productive subjects in the creation of culture. 
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Bringing in the concept of hegemony allows a way of examining this production. 
Barry Smart (1986) moves hegemony away from Gramsci's theorisation of 
ideology to focus on relations of 'truth' and 'power.' For Smart: 
Hegemony contributes to or constitutes a form of social cohesion not 
through force or coercion, nor necessarily through consent, but most 
effectively by ways of practices, techniques, and methods which infiltrate 
minds and bodies, cultural practices which cultivate behaviours and beliefs, 
tastes, desires, and needs as seemingly naturally occurring qualities and 
properties embodied in the psychic and physical reality (or 'truth') of the 
human subject. (1986: 160) 
The dominant position of the game can be examined through the types of labour 
that it invokes, how it naturalises a specific statements formed within a game's 
culture, and how it supports specific dynamics of power in play. This can also be 
extrapolated back and connected to the general culture(s) within which the 
game's culture is located - to techoscience, media and popular culture. Bringing 
in a hegemonic component to the study of a computer game allows the lived 
experience of play to be acknowledged, while realising the dominant position of 
the game in the production of (immediate and extended) play. Gameplay and the 
maintenance of a game's culture involve a vast amount of labour (both paid and 
unpaid) in a variety of guises. 
The challenge of alternative and oppositional play? can also be examined within 
the exploration of hegemony. Williams (1977) suggests that nearly all initiatives 
and contributions, even when they take on manifestly alternative or oppositional 
forms, are in practice tied to the hegemonic. He suggests "the dominant culture ... 
at once produces and limits its own forms of counter·culture" (1977: 114). 
Gameplay can be examined in such light - investigating if oppositional 
(independent) game play can exist and what forms this might take. Within 
evolutionary computer games, alternative and oppositional styles of play 
challenge the claimed life status the artificial life entities assert within the game. 
Narrative(s) of Play 
Gameplay is experiential, built from the multitude of intra·actions between the 
various agents that come together within the assembly of the computer game. 
This chapter so far has examined how agents are brought together as an 
7 Williams distinguishes between alternative (contributions made within or against an hegemony) and 
oppositional (contributions that are irreducible to the hegemony and are independent of it). 
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assembly within a game's culture and how this culture is defined and negotiated, 
through the development of common sense and hegemonic structures. These 
have been developed through lived experience. The thesis now turns to look at 
how this experience can be viewed within narrative and how narrative becomes an 
important ingredient to the construction of coherent gameplay. Through the 
production of gameplay, there is the paired production of meaning, making sense 
of both the game and gameplay. The production of meaning is at least partially 
structured through the production of narrative, giving the statements formed 
through gameplay a story. Mortensen finds the development of 'story creation' 
within gameplay important as it is here that "all players present their characters' 
motivation, decisions, and desires" (2007: 299). Developing narrative within 
gameplay, and story creation thesis turns to personal narrative and work on the 
self as narrative by Kim Worthington (1996). As with Worthington's desire for a 
coherent (if not fixed) conceptualisation of self, bringing a narrative aspect to 
gameplay provides a coherent framework for both gameplay and the production of 
meaning. Incorporating narrative at this stage is to recognise the creation of 
stories in the construction of games, as with the self (Worthington 1996:8). As the 
self is a narrative project, playing a computer game is similar - the user 
effectively plays out a 'life' through play. Games involve a player through intra· 
actions over space and time, especially those such as paieda evolutionary games 
that have no defined goal or end point and continue over many sessions. It is 
narrative structure that brings events together as coherent gameplay that would 
otherwise be random. A player realises game identity(-ies) through such 
coherency, realising roles and purpose to his/her actions. Being able to 
conceptualise gameplay as narrative and story allows players to be able to create 
a coherent sense of character-self and a coherent sense of history (play). Taking 
from Worthington: 
... the construction of a subject's sense of selfhood should be understood 
as a creative narrative process achieved within a plurality of intersubjective 
communicative protocols. In the act of conceptualizing one's selfhood, one 
writes a narrative of personal continuity through time ... [I]t recognizes that 
a narrative of self provides the human subject with a sense of self-continuity 
and coherence that enables the projection of desire and intention towards 
an imagined future. In short, it allows the subject to function as a 
purposive, morally responsible agent. (1996: 13) 
It is important to stress that the terms 'narrative'and 'story creation' in no way 
suggest a set story (either already written, waiting to be read, or once written not 
open to revision). Narratives of play are provisional and are open to revision, 
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change, and reinterpretation. They are (re)written to reflect the changing focus of 
play throughout a game; as strategies change, as new play styles emerge, as new 
game events alter the meaning of prior events and as gameplay is produced. 
Narrative brings continuity to gameplay, in that past actions reflect upon and help 
define the present course of action. They give history to play. 
One of the characteristics of narration is temporal and spatial emplotment: 
narratives are concerned not with isolated moments or particular acts, but 
with sequences of acts and events. They are orderings and interconnections 
of phenomenological perceptions, or of the memories of these perceptions, 
in time and space. In the process of narration, discrete moments and acts 
are contextualized: they are enmeshed in a history. (Worthington 1996: 14) 
Narrative gives meaning to past events and actions (Worthington's 
'phenomenological perceptions') in the context of current intra·actions. This is a 
vital aspect of gameplay; in the production of coherent gameplay there needs to 
be a connection between events and meaning over time and space. That is, the 
framework of play, tactics, strategy, game advancement and intra·actions can 
only make sense within narrative structures in which present actions are 
connected to (current definitions of) prior events. 
As structured and structuring spaces, computer games can be examined in how 
they limit, shape and develop possible narratives of play. Again, it is possible to 
look to the underlying programming of the game and the game's culture to 
determine how play is defined and shaped within narrative structures. The thesis 
divides game elements that provide a sense of narrativity into two groups: mythic 
possibilities and narrative scaffolding. Each aid in the production of coherent 
gameplay, relate the game within similar assemblages and the culture of which it 
is apart, and are intimately linked to the production of meanings from gameplay. 
Mythic possibilities are game elements that shape play so that the player and 
other agents in the game play through and act out cultural mythologies and grand 
narratives. They tie the game back into the culture(s) in which it was developed 
and used. Similarly, narrative scaffolding is the game elements that provide tools 
for history making within the game. Here, how the game evokes memory·work on 
the part of the player (and other agents) is examined in the production of 
narrative. Together mythic possibilities and narrative scaffolding give insight into 
how the game allows and shapes narratives of play. 
Mythic Possibilities 
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Examining the narrative possibilities of a game at the level of myth links the 
game('s culture) with the cultures in which the game is produced and played. In 
using the term myth, this thesis incorporates Roland Barthes and his 
development of myth as a semiological system. For Barthes, myth forms a 
second·order semiological system; a metalanguage for a culture (1972). Marina 
Warner offers a definition of Barthesian myth: 
A myth is a kind of story told in public ... it pretends to present the matter 
as it is and always must be, [and] at its heart lies the principle, in the 
famous formula of Roland Barthes, that history is turned into nature ... 
Myths offer a lens which can be used to see human identity in its social and 
cultural context... Myths convey values and expectations which are always 
evolving, in the process of being formed, but... never set so hard they 
cannot be changed again, and newly told stories can be more helpful than 
repeating old ones. (1994: 13/14) 
As a story telling metalanguage, myth transforms history into nature, creating an 
inductive and a factual system instead of a semiological one (Barthes 1972: 131). 
In myth, how stories are naturalised is important; making things seem natural, 
reflecting and forming the grand narratives of a culture. For Barthes, myth does 
this through its formation as depoliticised speech through its offering of history as 
nature; the production of myths naturalises and normalises its content: 
In passing from history to nature, myth acts economically: it abolishes the 
complexity of human acts, it gives them the simplicity of essences, it does 
away with all dialectics, with any going back beyond what is immediately 
visible, it organizes a world which is without contradictions because it is 
without depth, a world wide open and wallowing in the evident, it 
establishes a blissful clarity: things appear to mean something by 
themselves. (1972: 143) 
Bringing myth to a formation of narrative through gameplay must recognise the 
experiential nature of gameplay; instead of being presented with mythological 
representations as image8 , the player acts out myth through gameplay. Instead of 
'reading' myth, the player is involved in its re·enactment; s/he 'lives' the myth 
through the development of gameplay. The game, therefore, presents myth as a 
possibility - myth is presented in game play through game elements and the 
player realises myth through involvement with these elements. These are typically 
game events or styles of play that the player must adopt or play through in 
gameplay. By realising the mythic possibilities of a game players shape their 
8 Barthes examines the photographic image in his exploration of myth. 
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game narrative within the metalanguage of myth and grand narratives. Along with 
the other techniques this thesis explores in the development of a game's culture, 
mythic possibilities formulate the naturalisation and normalisation of gameplay. 
As with the other devices incorporated within a game and gameplay, it makes 
game play seem natural, or rather 'as it should be'. 
Further to the development of a game's own culture, mythic possibilities tie such 
a culture back to the culture(s) in which the game has been developed and used, 
and with other assemblages. A game's culture can generate its own set of myths, 
but how computer games incorporate and make use of the existing myths and 
grand narratives of a culture is of interest in the production of meanings from 
gameplay. Mythic possibilities link evolutionary computer games back to the 
cultures that constitute them and engage with other similar assemblages. 
Especially evident within evolutionary artificial life computer games are the 
twinned and entwined discourses of cybernetic and neo·Darwinian definitions of 
life itself, in its spiritual and (techno)scientific grand narratives of 
interconnectivity, emergence and informatics. 
Narrative Scaffolding 
Mythic possibilities tie computer gameplay to the stories of the culture(s) and 
shared assemblages that surround it, and of which it is a part. Narrative 
scaffolding adds to the production of meaning within computer games in two 
ways. The first, how it frames gameplay and narrative through game elements 
that structure and guide how the game must be played (i.e. specific rules such as 
the amount and availability of food for creatures incorporated into the 
programming of the game engine), explores how these aid in the making of 
coherent events through time and space. Narrative scaffolding structures what is 
possible in gameplay and attempts to frame and hide the limitations of play 
through techniques to guide the unfolding of gameplay. It supports the procedural 
rule-based programming of the game, aiding in the production of intuition in the 
game by providing the parameters of the game in a manner the makes sense in 
gameplay. 
The second is the manner in which it incorporates history to the development of 
narrative. Of concern is how game elements aid in the production of narrative, 
through the use of prompts, to create and record game events and elements that 
give a sense of life history. In short, narrative scaffolding aids the production of 
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narrative through developing memory work in gameplay. Celia Lury has mapped 
how memory is a critical aspect in the construction of an individual: 
Questions of memory have always been entwined with the construct of the 
individual. .. One of the most important ways in which memory has come to 
have this role is through the creation of narratives of self- and collective 
identity. Indeed, narrative is perhaps the principle trope that has enabled a 
continuity of consciousness organised on the basis of a concrete-qualitative 
sense of time and its manifestations: experience, subjective recollection 
and the individual. .. However, so it has been suggested here, the creation 
and pervasiveness of images has also had a profound - if often 
unrecognised - significance in modern self-understandings. (Lury 1998: 
105) 
Lury ties memory with the construction of not only the modern possessive 
individual, but also of the contemporary self, whose self-identity she finds to be 
"continually being reconstituted in novel - technologically mediated - ways" in the 
development of "prosthetic (auto)biographies" (1998: 106). Adopting Lury's 
terminology in our analysis of narrative in games, in game play the constitution of 
a (game) self-identity is constantly mediated through the technology of the game 
in the production of a prosthetic (auto)biography. Game elements aid and 
mediate memory-work throughout gameplay. These provide the player tools in 
which to create plausible self-identiy(-ies) through self and game narratives_ Lury 
terms this as prosthetic, taking from Strathern, whose postplural individual is an 
aggregate of many parts: 
For Strathern, the postplural individual is no longer imagined merologically, 
but is instead a constellation of implanted elements, parts without social or 
natural depth. 
In this scenario, the individual in postplural society is made up not of parts 
of other domains, but of parts accreting with other parts, strategic 
assemblages adjacent, coeval parts within the frame of a single form: 
memories substituted for one another, organs transplanted form one body 
to work alongside those of another's, hues of cloth juxtaposed with colours 
of skin, hair and eyes. This is no longer a culture of synthesis, but one of 
prosthesis. (Lury 1998: 16) 
The computer game acts in a prosthetic manner, as a memory theatre holding the 
entire knowledge of the (game) world, and as a tool for memory in the creation of 
history and the self-identity of the player (and other game agents). These game 
elements are considered in this thesis as narrative scaffolding, which act as both 
a structuring tool - guiding and framing gameplay - and as a device that 
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structures how play is interpreted into narrative history. Gameplay is constantly 
intra·acted through narrative scaffolding. Alison Landsberg (1995) finds with her 
own conceptualisation of prosthetic memory9 a generative force: 
Memory ... is not a means for closure - is not a strategy for closing or 
finishing the past - but on the contrary, memory emerges as a generative 
force, a force which propels us not backwards but forwards. (176) 
Here, narrative scaffolding acts not only as a device that frames gameplay and 
aids in the creation of history, but also as a device that affects current gameplay. 
Its prosthetic nature, in that it acts as an experiential and memory device 
interchangeably with those of the player and other agents, means we must 
examine it critically. Alongside mythic possibilities, we must question and 
examine what experiences are created or encouraged by these devices, how these 
devices accredit or deny certain experiences, how (and where) these experiences 
are stored and prompted as memory, and how these game devices shape possible 
narratives. Neither mythic possibilities nor narrative scaffolding can be 
considered as innocent; both return to the naturalisation and normalisation found 
within a game's culture. 
A Game's Culture 
Evolutionary computer games (re)create nature and life through gameplay and 
bring together our converging cultural strands of artificial life, media and culture. 
This chapter has developed a conceptualisation of evolutionary computer games 
and gameplay as an active productive practice. Computer games are considered 
here as emplacements in which the intra·action gameplay occurs. In the 
production of gameplay, computer games create cultures where various agents 
(game producers, game characters and objects, the player and game 
communities) come together in the production of immediate and extended play. 
In its continued co·production by the assembly brought together in play, 
gameplay has been explored as an experiential practice. A return to cultural 
concepts of structures of feeling and hegemony help investigate the formation and 
project of a game's culture, and have also introduced intuition in the positioning 
9 Landsberg examines prosthetic memory as "the power of the mass media to create experiences and 
to implant memories, the experience of which we have never lived" (1995: 176). In the use of 
prosthetic memory, this thesis is concerned with the first of these assertions, the power to create 
experiences, as well as exploring how 'memories' are considered worthy of being memories, where 
these memories are stored and how they are used. I am not using 'prosthetic' in her sense of 'implant' 
as the player lives through the experiences of the game and these are not foreign to them. 
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of the player within the game and assembly, and in the creation of common 
meanings and common sense in gameplay. In investigating the game's culture 
this chapter has looked at how computer games naturalise and normalise a 
game's culture and the player's position, role and power within the game. In 
introducing a sense of narrativity and story generation to computer games it has 
investigated the game elements that guide and allow for the production of 
narrative within gameplay, highlighting the importance of narrative in the ability 
to produce coherent stories from play, and influence over current play. The 
chapter has drawn from similarities between game narrative, self as narrative and 
identity work. It has specifically highlighted two areas of narrative - mythic 
possibilities and narrative scaffolding. Mythic possibilities tie computer games to 
the cultural meta·language(s) that surround them. Narrative scaffolding reflects 
the limitations and assumptions of the game's programming and invoke memory 
work on the part of the player. 
The mythic possibilities of evolutionary computer games structure gameplay 
through the production of narratives that follow the journey of construction, 
creation and change. This structure has entwined scientific and spiritual 
narratives that shape gameplay and the production of meaning. Scientifically, the 
discourses of artificial life, and the rhetoric this technoscience employs in 
claiming the life status of silicon entities with shared essences with carbon life, 
makes connections between silicon and carbon, digital and material. Chapter five 
traces scientific models of connectionism and emergence within cybernetic 
systems of feedback and control within artificial life and the specific definitions of 
life these processes support. Such definitions and artificial life emplacements go 
beyond definitions of life to implicate the operations of nature and the universe, 
within conceptualisations of computational regimes. Within such cosmological 
models of closed space and discrete time and space, a deterministic model of 
reality is formed. Chapter six continues the analysis of the mythic possibilities 
evolutionary computer games hold, through an analysis of the spiritual dimension 
of artificial life and computational regimes. Intimately connected with the 
scientific discourses traced in chapter five, postmodern spiritualities find a divine 
presence within the emergent properties of connected systems. Reflecting 
scientific/spiritual models such as Gaia, the spiritual within the cosmology of 
computational regimes finds divine forces with the interconnectedness of all 
things and the emergent forces of evolution. Both spiritually and scientifically, the 
emplacements of evolutionary computer games and artificial life emplacements 
become perfected instances of model definitions of life, nature and cosmos. 
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Chapter 5 
Artificial Life: The Technoscience of Life Itself 
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This chapter investigates the technoscience of artificial life, the discourses and 
narrative the field constructs and the statements it produces about life itself. 
Artificial life binds biological and computer sciences together and has close 
relations to molecular biology and genetics. In its most general sense, artificial 
life has been proposed to both model life·as·we·know·it, and can also investigate 
life·as·it·could·be (Langton 1996: 8). By doing so, artificial life makes a shift in 
ontological underpinnings, involving a movement from investigating artificial life 
phenomena as simulational models of living things to considering artificial life 
phenomena as living things in themselves. It does so through the importation of 
biological metaphors into the rhetoric of computer programming, allowing 
artificial systems to be comparable to other living systems. It is this jump 
between simulation and synthesis that such a proposition creates interest in the 
stories that artificial life relates about life itself, our natures and cosmology. This 
reterritorialisation has social and political implications and aligns itself with other 
similar movements that have occured in the life sciences, most notably within 
evolutionary genetics. Elizabeth Grotz highlights life's political aspect in that "life 
is always politics: it is always about the perserverance of one or many groups at 
the cost of others" (2004: 256). In the translation and communication of 
narratives made about life especially, from and between a 'scientific' sphere to a 
'cultural' one, the political and social implications of the rhetoric of artificial life 
and the life sciences is pronounced. Kember suggests that for cyberfeminists, and 
cultural theorists more generally, to truly relate with science and technology they 
"must engage with current trends in science and technology with a critical 
awareness of how they are naturalised culturally and with strategic investment in 
dialogue rather than dismissal" (2003: 51). This chapter provides an overview of 
the field of artificial life, how artificial life is aiding a (re)definition of life itself, 
along with mapping the conceptual field surrounding artificial life practice. 
While examining the scientific discipline of artificial life, specific statements about 
what it means to be alive and the definition of life itself become apparent. 
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Artificial life aligns with both scientific and spiritual discourses that produce a 
specific rhetoric surrounding life. Doyle has investigated "the rhetoric of secrets, 
codes, and programs" that life finds itself in and that artificial life has connected 
with (1997: 113). Doyle outlines a rhetoric of artificial life steeped in genesis 
stories of re-birth, exploration (especially outside of life 'as we know it') and 
alliegence with a scientific discourse of information and code (1997: 110-23). 
Kember and Helmreich have outlined the development of the scientific disocourse 
of artificial life, from a dual heritage within the computer sciences and a life 
sciences i ncreasi ngly centred on informatics and code (Kember 2003: 63-67, 
2000; Helmreich 1997, 1998). Most notably, in her development of the 
posthuman, Hayles has traced a development of a discourse of artificial life that 
"as a second instance of life ... affect[s] the definition of biological life as well" 
(1999: 235). She traces levels of narrative that develops the science of artificial 
life, naturalises this and creates relationships between humans and silicon 
creatures (1999: 223-39). Paired with chapter six, investigating the spiritual 
discourse artificial life connects with, this chapter builds upon this academic 
heritage and details the scientific discourse that surrounds artificial life. 
Historical Developments 
The study of artificial life takes three directions: wetware (artificial biological life), 
hardware (robotics and other embodied 'life' forms), and software (computer 
programs instantiating emergent or evolutionary processes) (Hayles 1996: 147). 
The focus here is on software artificial life, the variety utilised within evolutionary 
computer games. Software artificial life has developed from a historical 
foundation in cybernetics, informatics and molecular biology, finding intellectual 
ancestors in Alan Turing and John von Neumann (Boden 1996). The origins of 
computer science can be traced to Turing in the 1930s, and in the 1950s he 
published a mathematical paper on morphogenesis, which proved to be important 
to analytical biology. Von Neumann was a pioneer of artificial science, whose work 
on the digital computer in the 1940s prefigures AI experiments of the 1950s_ His 
theoretical research on cellular automata, including self-reproducing systems, laid 
both the foundation for artificial life and was seen as a key development in the life 
sciences (Kember 2003: 69). He recognised quickly the growing importance of 
cellular automata within the natural sciences (1961: 288). Cellular automata 
operate within a computational 'space' consisting of an x-y grid of many cells. The 
state of the cell (either as empty or filled, or as differentiated colours) changes 
according to a defined rule set that is determined by the state of neighbouring 
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cells. In this way, the system moves in discrete time·steps, with all cells of the 
grid advancing to their newly defined state together. After each global change over 
the computational space, the rules are applied again for the next time·step. One 
of the founding computational biologists, John Holland describes the discrete 
deterministic nature of cellular automata: 
The basic "physics" of each model is specified by a cellular automaton ... In 
effect, the underlying physical space is treated as a regular tessellation of 
the cells (the "geometry"), so that each cell has its neighbors arrayed in the 
same way - they all fit the same "neighborhood template". In this 
tessellation, each cell is in one of a finite number of states at any given 
instant t, the set of possible states being the same for all cells. The cell's 
state at time t+1 is completely determined ... by its state and that of a 
specified set of neighboring cells at time t. moreover, the algorithm for 
determining the next state, the transition function, is the same for all cells. 
The result is a uniform (discrete) geometry and a set of laws which hold at 
each point in that geometry. (1976: 386) 
Von Neumann was interested in the spontaneously generated order of cellular 
automata following simple rules; the regular patterns and behaviours the grids 
would display through generations. It is these cellular automata that importantly 
form the basic units of life within new (posthuman) models of life itself (Kember 
2003: 70). As early as the 1950s, Von Neumann was creating links and 
crossovers between cellular automata and 'natural' organisms that foreshadow 
the recent work and claims of artificial life: 
Natural organisms are, as a rule, much more complicated and subtle, and 
therefore much less well understood in detail, than are artificial automata. 
Nevertheless, some regularities which we observe in the organization of the 
former may be quite instructive in our thinking and planning of the latter; 
and conversely, a good deal of our experiences and difficulties with out 
artificial automata can be to some extent projected on our interpretations 
of natural organisms. (1961: 288·289) 
In the 1970s, Holland further developed cellular automata by describing model 
'universes' for the study of comparable "abstract counterparts of basic kinetic 
and biological operators" (1976: 385). This lays further strong foundations for the 
development of a computational model of life and the universe. Still viewed as 
simulational models, computational universes find increasingly similarity and 
equivalence to natural systems: 
The model universes are unabashedly artificial, but they have been selected 
with a careful eye to established properties of natural systems. Progressive 
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elaborations of the basic model should yield fair approximations, and 
simulations, of natural systems without altering the basic points proved for 
the original model. (Holland 1976: 385) 
It is these properties, of discrete spatial cells and discrete units of time, that have 
been elaborated into complex models of computational regimes that not only 
model our own natures and universe, but have come to define them. As will be 
elaborated later in the chaper, contemporary practitioners and theorists including 
Grand, Hayles and physicist Edward Fredkin have developed computational 
regimes that encompass models of life within greater cosmological models. 
Whilst cellular automata had built strong references with life, the development of 
evolution within these computational spaces took some time to unfold. John 
Holland made a formal definition of genetic algorithms (GAs) as early as the 
1960s, but it was not until the 1980s that GAs were implemented. At that time, 
the term 'artificial life' was coined and the first artificial life conference held in 
1987, with American artificial life researcher Christopher Langton defining 
artificial life as 'pursuing the discovery of what life is, as well as how life is 
possible' (1996: 8). Langton's own definition of life views it as abstract 
phenomena centred on the concepts of self·organisation, self·replication, 
emergence, evolution, and the unpredictable gap between genotype and 
phenotype. Within such a definition, it is information processing that is 
considered fundamental to life itself, and informational (intentional) concepts 
from theoretical biology were incorporated into the dictum of artificial life, 
including genetic 'code,' with its accompanying 'reading,' 'interpreting,' and 
'transcription.' It is this emphasis on information, informatics and code that has 
been the key defining feature connecting silicon and carbon life, pairing 
replicating strings of computer code as the digital equivalent of DNA and genes. 
Defining biological processes at the informational level (independent of their 
underlying biochemistry) was seen as useful, as the same process may be 
instantiated by different mechanisms in different species. As a framework for life, 
it has been claimed that artificial life is both reductionist and anti·reductionist by 
its practitioners; reductionist as it finds high·level phenomena dependent on the 
simple interactions between lower·level processes, and anti·reductionist, because 
higher·level phenomena are treated as real properties - they are seen as neither 
extractable nor predictable from the attributes of lower level agents. 
In the early 1990s, Thomas Ray developed the simulation of evolution and co· 
evolution of 'digital organisms,' or GA sequences of machine code, running on his 
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now infamous program Tierra. Tierra is prototypical of many evolutionary artificial 
life programs and also forms an excellent example of artificial life operations 
(chapter seven investigates Tierra in more detail). In Tierra digital organisms 
(variable length GAs) 'compete' for CPU time and memory space within a virtual 
computer or 'soup,' mimicking terrestrial organisms competing for energy (food) 
and geographical space. With purposely programmed imperfect execution, 
maintenance and copying of the organisms' codes, Tierra develops a model of 
biological mutation, and with the memory allocation prevented from reaching 
capacity through the removal of the old and defective, a computerised model of 
death (the 'reaper function') is also modelled. When mutations do occur most will 
be 'sterile' (as they will show fatal program errors or be unable to copy 
themselves), but others may reproduce successfully, which incorporates an 
evolutionary process. Evolution is grounded in complex probability distributions 
that can be varied precisely in Tierra, providing an experimental medium for the 
quantitative study of evolution. The occurrence of evolutionary leaps within Tierra 
is notable, where a sudden change in species ratios after many generations of 
relative order can lead to new equilibriums. In the late 1990s Tierra expanded to a 
global 'biodiversity reserve' consisting of linked computers over the Internet. 
Ray's ultimate aim is the production of new life, which is reflected in his preferred 
term for artificial life, 'Synthetic Biology' (1993). Unlike some artificial lifers such 
as Grand, for Ray metabolism is inessential to define a being as alive and a living 
system needs only to display self·replication and be capable of open·ended 
evolution to qualify as life. In this sense, Ray claims the creatures of Tierra are in 
fact alive. 
Across the field as a whole, various artificial life projects explore the effects of 
various mutation rates and population sizes, and differing degrees of interaction 
between populations, in a similar vein to Tierra. Other projects in artificial life have 
focused on problems studied in ethology, in the modelling of actual neurophysical 
mechanisms and the construction of mobile or simulated artificial animals or 
'ani mats.' Some artificial life projects consider the specific behaviours of 
identified species, whilst others address cross·species behaviours such as flocking 
(the most famous being Craig Reynolds' Boids (Langton 1996: 66·67», fighting, 
pursuit/evasion, or communicative strategies. This is not to imply or give an 
overall congruence or shape to artificial life. To the contrary, even the scientific 
status of the field has been questioned. Jason Noble (1997) separates two things 
from what is generally brought together under the artificial life banner. One, that 
artificial life is a particular style of simulation technique, and two, the use of such 
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techniques to address certain questions in biology. By revisiting an admittedly 
'disreputable' model of analytic versus synthetic structure, Noble suggests that 
artificial life creates methodological sloppiness in its confusion between analytical 
and synthetic modes. Whilst recognising the continuum between analytical and 
synthetic, Noble returns to the definition postulated by the logical positivists-
analytical statements being 'true' by virtue of the meanings of the terms within 
the statements, and synthetic statements finding 'truth' in the examination of the 
world. Under such a definition Noble finds artificial life to be analytic, in that "it 
involves using a computer simulation to see what logically follows from a certain 
set of assumptions" (1997: 6); artificial life instantiations find truth within the 
terms of the programs themselves; the program runs as it does and shows the 
results that it does solely as a result of its programming. Simply, artificial life 
systems behave as they do because that is how they were programmed to. This 
becomes problematic when artificial life presents complex emergent phenomena 
as being of interest in its own right (as postulated by Langton), even though the 
simulation that gives rise to it is arbitrary and theory·free. Noble finds that an 
artificial life result, taken on its own, constitutes an analytical finding that only 
shows that a certain set of assumptions imply a certain outcome. He disagrees 
with artificial life practitioners such as Langton and Ray who would 'have their 
cake and eat it too' by considering artificial life as creating empirical data and 
evidence, without considerations of its relationship to terrestrial biology. 
Artificial Life and Life Itself 
This thesis focuses on the metaphors and assumptions artificial life makes, in 
order to make sense of and val idate itself as worthy of study. It traces how these 
are connected to similar stories within the life sciences and how these are being 
translated into specific narratives and discourses about what it means to be alive, 
our natures and cosmologies. Specifically this chapter examines the 
reterritorialising movement these metaphors and assumptions are having within 
the life, biological and computer sciences, as seen in Langton's infamous 
summation that artificial life models 'Iife·as·we·know·it' and creates 'Iife·as·it· 
could·be' (1996: 8). Langton envisages artificial life to model and show insight 
into the inner workings of carbon· based life forms, and to also take life itself to 
new previously unavailable and unimaginable possibilities in the synthesis of 
completely new living beings. For Kember, it is this type of modelling that artificial 
life performs that "revisits and awakens the question of life left hanging within 
both philosophy and biology" (2003: 63). Langton, in his overview, displays the 
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movement of artificial life as simulation to synthesis that suggests new responses 
to such a question of life. He takes artificial life from being a model of life to 
constituting life: 
The 'artificial' in Artificial Life refers to the component parts, not the 
emergent processes. If the component parts are implemented correctly, the 
processes they support are genuine - every bit as genuine as the natural 
processes they imitate. The big claim is that a properly organized set of 
artificial primitives carrying out the same functional roles as biomolecules 
in natural living systems will support a process that will be 'alive' in the 
same way that natural organisms are alive. Artificial Life will therefore be 
genuine life - it will simply be made of different stuff than the life that has 
evolved here on Earth. (1996: 68·69) 
As with the other bolder claims from within the strong artificial life component of 
the field, the artificial of artificial life is reducible to merely 'man-made' or in 
silica, rather than as a referent to artificial life being an imitation, simulation or 
mere model of life. The definition of life itself finds an ontological shift with such a 
redefinition of artificial, to find itself structured within the parameters of form, 
rather than of substance (Kember 2003: 3)_ Here life can be made of 'different 
stuff,' the contitutuing referent for the different forms of life is 'emergent 
processes.' This desire to take life outside of its carbon confines supports and is 
necessitated by a definition of life itself, unattached and denying of any material 
basis for life_ 
Moving from the simulational modelling of life to the synthesis of life is a critical 
movement as it at once both deterritorialises and reterritorialises what is meant 
to be alive, while producing new definitions of life itself and restructuring the 
gamut of things that are allowed to constitute life. It is an ontological movement 
from a previous mechanical metaphoric essentialisation of the body and life itself 
to an informational or computational one. This move is both expansive and 
reductive. It expands what can be considered as alive as it reduces (and modifies) 
the criteria needed to qualify as life. This double movement allies itself with a 
similar transformation that has occurred within the main body of the life sciences 
and reflects the timeframe of historical developments within artificial life. 
Reading Life Itself 
As introduced in chapter one, during the post-World War II period molecular 
biology underwent a discursive and ontological shift, movi ng to represent itself as 
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a communication science aligned to cybernetics, information theory and 
computer science. Lilly Kay (1997) has mapped a genealogy of this shift and the 
metaphors it has created, tracing to the 1950s. Then, molecular biology 
embraced the view that organisms and molecules could be considered 
information storage and retrieval systems, and heredity became a system of 
communication, guidance and control. Kay notes how the ideas and terminology 
of information theory became pervasive in the 1950s and 1960s, and cites the 
examples of Robert Sinsheimer's 'Book of Life' (which considered the genome as 
being able to be read and the information in the chromosome as the written word) 
and Fran<;:ois Jacob's description of heredity in terms of information, messages 
and code as typical of this new discourse. The history of informatics within 
biology can also be traced back through Erwin SchrOdinger and his 1943 lecture 
series at Trinity College, Dublin and accompanying book What is Life? (Murphy & 
O'Neill 1995). Schrodinger proposed two elements vital to the subjects of heredity 
and thermodynamics in the study of life. He viewed heredity as the passing of 
information or order from order between generations. The maintenance of a 
metabolism was the ability of organisms to create their highly improbable ordered 
structure against the second law of thermodynamics. This was thought of as order 
from disorder. Schrodinger viewed by order from order and order from disorder with 
equal weight, with subsequent work within molecular biology on the discovery and 
structure of DNA supporting Schrodinger's views on order from order. It is this 
aspect of his work that has dominated the life sciences over the last half a 
century. 
Informational representations of heredity had preceded study of the DNA 
structure and were not solely the outcome of DNA genetics or the discovery of the 
architecture of the double helix in 1953. Instead, lines of communication between 
molecular biology and the then new technosciences of cybernetics, information 
theory and the nascent computer sciences had been open since at least 1950. 
These new sciences shared a common alignment with the study of information. 
For Kay, the move to an informational metaphor within the life sciences is actually 
a double metaphor as information theory also works on a metaphorical level: 
With few exceptions, the information concept has been developed loosely in 
biology, in its nontechnical sense, and thus as a double metaphor ... [I]t was 
only in the decade following World War II that information became for the 
first time a physical parameter and a mathematically defined concept 
amenable to study ... But contrary to its earlier use, information in the 
mathematical theory of communication implied that information did not 
inform, that it had to be thought of in a manner entirely divorced from 
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content, subject matter, and meaning: it had no semantic value ... Indeed, 
the transportation of the information·theoretical idioms into heredity 
presents an enormous cognitive complication for it then functions as a 
metaphor of a metaphor, thus leading to a deconstruction. (1997: 27·29) 
It is this double metaphor - considering information as content and treating 
heredity and DNA as information - on which contemporary molecular biology is 
based and in which artificial life is firmly entrenched. Kay finds that the 
informational tropes and scriptural representations present in molecular biology 
since the 1950s have provided powerful models and analogies in the 
interpretation of data and in experimental design. She suggests that the double 
metaphor of information has "linked the biosemiotics of molecular biology to 
communication technosciences, and through cultural semiotics it [has] 
constituted the imaginaries of postwar technoculture, of the Missile Age and the 
Computer Age" (Kay 1997: 30·31). It is within this framework that artificial life 
has flourished and is able to fortify itself as a part of the life (techno)sciences 
(Kember 2003: 34). As this thesis will return to, the movement of this double 
metaphor has been developed through cybernetics into new computational 
models of the universe itself, conceptualised as computational regimes. Here, the 
universe is understood to operate as one (extremely) large computer program, 
offering a deterministic model of life and the cosmos, and, as we shall see, 
mirrors Steve Grand's theorising behind the artificial life programming 
constituting Creatures and his other Artificial life research (Grand 2000, Kember 
2003). 
Defining (Artificial) Life Itself 
As with the life sciences more generally, artificial life can be mapped in numerous 
directions. While self-organisation forms a key concept to all, there are three 
broad definitions of life that can be traced, and find resonance within artificial life: 
evolutionary, autopoietic and cybernetic. All three form varying relationships with 
information, self-organisation, embodiment, and evolution. From the evolutionary 
perspective, it is reduced to information processing systems that follow a (neo-) 
Darwinian evolution pattern of 'natural' selection. Here, the body is put to one 
side, allowing dynamic information processing to form the primary area of study. 
Focus within the evolutionary definition is placed on the code or program of life; 
bodies form a necessary but unimportant part of life's equation. Against this, 
from the autopoietic standpoint following Manturana and Varela, life is seen as a 
self·sustaining system, and as such must be definable from its surrounding 
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environment (Boden 2000). A key focus of this standpoint is the differentiation of 
an organism from its environment and is therefore a concern with embodiment. 
The third definition of life is the cybernetic, from which life is a collection of 
negative feedback loops coordinated towards the realisation of a larger positive 
feedback loop (that of reproduction). On its surface, a cybernetic definition of life 
appears as a development of evolutionary and autopoietic definitions, as both 
evolution and metabolism are implicated within its framework. A close 
examination, however, shows the cybernetic definition to be an original position of 
its own and non-reducible to either evolution or autopoiesis. It is within such a 
cybernetic definition that Grand places his artificial life creations as found in 
Creatures. 
Prior to an individual examination, there are a number of statements that form a 
standard set of assumptions common across all definitions_ Although firmly within 
the evolutionary perspective, Christopher Langton (1996) presents a broad 
overview of the artificial life field. For Langton, artificial life is key in the ability of 
biology to provide generalised principles of life. Traditional biology, the study of 
life on earth, is limited in its reliance on carbon-based chemistry_ Langton 
questions the top-down mechanistic approach of biology, against this he suggests 
artificial life, as a dynamic and synthetic approach, illuminates the principle of 
dynamic self-organisation on which life depends. Artificial life's foundational 
assumption is its openness to the possibility of the study of life in other-than 
carbon instantiations. Langton proposes three assumptions for the study of life 
that allow for different chemistries, and therefore artificial life (as digital 
informational silicon-based chemistry). These three principles figure the ontology 
and essence of life itself as form, positing the abstract nature of information and 
the reducibility of life systems to information processing. 
The first is that the goal of synthesis takes a broad scope and includes any 
biological phenomena; from viral self-assembly to the evolution of an entire 
biosphere; the second is that there is no reason for attempts of artificial life to be 
limited to carbon chain chemistry. The third is that the synthetic approach leads 
beyond known biological phenomena to display life-as-it-could-be. Artificial life 
can and should move from modelling carbon-based life forms to developing and 
evolving new life forms with no direct correlation in carbon chemistry_ For 
Langton, the practice of artificial life is attempting to synthesise evolution in 
computers, irrespective of the results mirroring analogues in the 'natural' world. 
Underlying these three principles is an informational formulation of life itself and 
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an assumed transcendental and fractal view of information; information is not 
bound to, and is separate from, the size and form in which it takes. Life patterns, 
as information, find commonality regardless of size or material construct. This 
awards Langton the ability to postulate that life processes are mirrored in 
different sizes and scope, and they need not be limited to carbon chemistry. Life 
can be translated into chemical/digital substrates other than its historic carbon 
based biochemistry as found on Earth. For Langton, artificial life is a new 
computational paradigm based on the natural processes of 
transcription/translation and replication of DNA that support living organisms 
(1996). Life itself is information: 
Computers should be thought of as an important laboratory tool for the 
study of life, ... one simple·to·master piece of experimental equipment 
devoted exclusively to the incubation of information structures. (Langton 
1996: 50) 
In this way, computers support 'informational universes', within which dynamic 
populations of 'informational 'molecules' engage in 'informational 'biochemistry.' 
What is considered the logical form of organisms is abstracted from its 
biochemical wetware, becoming the foundation of life itself: "Life is a property of 
form, not matter, a result of the organisation of matter rather than something that 
inheres in the matter itself" (Langton 1996: 53). This is arguably the dominant 
paradigm within artificial life as a technoscientific program, along with the claim 
that life is a type of self·organising phenomena. 
Claus Emmeche, in structuring a move from information to artificial life, has 
postulated the following seven central points: (1) artificial life deals with life as it 
could be and so is the biology of the possible; (2) artificial life follows the synthetic 
model as it attempts to synthesise life·resembling processes or behaviour 
exhibited by real life organisms; (3) the behaviour and generalised processes are 
just as genuine in artificial life instances as the behaviour exhibited by real life 
organism, so it exhibits real (artificial) life; (4) As the matter of which it is 
constructed determines neither actual nor possible life, all life is form; (5) many 
units and simple rules at the bottom form bottom up construction which gives rise 
to coherent 'global' behaviour at the general level; (6) artificial life uses parallel 
processing as many processing units working along side each other; (7) artificial 
life gives allowance for emergence, the whole that is created when many 
semisimple units interact with each other in a complex (nonlinear) fashion 
(Emmeche 1994: 17·20). As with Langton, Emmeche provides a window into the 
underlying assumptions and metaphors within artificial life. Although his 
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description exemplifies how a range of metaphors borrowed from the technology 
of the time are often employed to describe the nature of organisms, Emmeche 
posits that the relationship of living systems, theoretical biology and artificial life 
is one of analogy, rather than simulation or metaphor. This important movement 
gives force for viewing artificial life as actual life in an artificial construct. Artificial 
and carbon life under such a vantage are interchangeable. The informational 
forms are the identical; it is only the building blocks that differ (and are often 
ignored or reformulated as different forms of information themselves). This is 
made allowable by postulating the same assumptions underlie both silicon and 
carbon life (based in the deep assumption of a common essence to all life), and 
through forgetting and mistaking the metaphors that make such 
conceptualisations possible. 
Artificial life phenomena appear to have been given the status of life through 
association. Computer programmers, (heralding from computer science, the life 
sciences, or elsewhere) borrowing metaphors and terminology from molecular 
biology and genetics, have attempted and succeeded in producing programs that 
generate life·like behaviours in a computer environment. Following from this, the 
emerging posthuman sensibilities found within computational regimes turn this 
association on its head to define carbon life through our resemblance to our new 
digital silicon kin. The digital universes and other ecosystems and emplacements 
hosting silicon life become heterotopias for this new essentialisation of life itself. 
They become idealised emplacements where definitions of life and life systems 
operate perfectly. 
The next section explores three definitions of life itself and how these are being 
made use of within artificial life. Each of the evolutionary, autopoeitic and 
cybernetic definitions of life produce specific statements regarding life and how it 
relates to the non·living world. In aligning with definitions that structure life 
around allegiances with code, information, emergence and evolution, artificial life 
not only validates itself as a scientific discipline, it also reinforces and becomes 
exemplars of these definitions in action. 
Evolutionary Definition of Life 
The evolutionary definition of life is structured within abstract informational 
theory (or informatics) and is arguably the most common working definition 
within strong artificial life, especially from the 'American perspective.' Also 
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termed the genetic defintion of life, the evolutionary view can be given this broad 
definition: 
The genetic definition, which is also an evolutionary one, views life at the 
level of the population: life exists when a system consists of certain units 
(organisms) that can reproduce and transmit their genes (the genetic 
instructions about the creation of the unit, the phenotype) to a successive 
generation. The system must also be capable of mutation, so that new 
information can arise and certain instructions can be altered. (Emmeche 
1994: 35) 
The evolutionary definition is strongly linked to biologists who in varying degrees 
rally to the standpoint of neo-Darwinism. Richard Dawkins is a major proponent of 
this standpoint, made (in)famous by his 1976 seminal work The Selfish Gene_ For 
Dawkins and others who prescribe to this, Darwinian evolution should be analysed 
correctly at the level of the DNA structures of living systems. It is the code of DNA 
that evolves over successive generations the bodies that the DNA inhabits are 
necessary but additional parts of the equation. In this genetic fetishism, 
describing the 'survival machine' (the fleshy part of us - our bodies - that protects 
the genes inside), Dawkins prefers "to think of the body as a colony of genes, and 
of the cell as a convenient working unit for the chemical industries of the gene" 
(1989: 46). Dawkins reduces bodies to carriers and industrial sites of the 
maintenance and reproduction of genes_ It is the (DNA) code (or more specifically 
the genes - the bits of DNA that code for genotypic attributes) that is the qualifier 
of carbon life, as it is the (computer) code that qualifies strong artificial life as 
silicon life. We see the parallel rhetoric of both strands of strong artificial life and 
neo-Darwinian theory. Strong artificial life not only seems to support the neo-
Darwinian perspective, but also proves it in an act of suppletion and s(ed)uction. 
Artificial life has become the litmus test of neo-Darwinian life. 
"In the beginning there was information" (Emmeche 1994: 14). For artificial life 
phenomena to be counted as instances of life, there needs to be the acceptance 
that life is fundamentally information processing and that information is an 
abstract concept, independent of material structure. From the evolutionary 
standpoint, life is a logical set of informational systems transcending physical 
embodiment. It is the information contained within the organism's carbon DNA or 
silicon algorithms that life itself is reduced to. These attributes allow many strong 
artificial life practitioners to claim that artificial life produces actual instances of 
life. Coupled with Emmeche's seven central points to the vision of strong artificial 
life, the evolutionary definition highlights its (ultimately) reductionist program. 
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From this standpoint, those who stress that reproduction and evolution are the 
strong measures in the qualification of life find that denying certain artificial life 
phenomena the status of life because of their silicon base is unsustainable. This 
follows from the ontological premise that life itself is defined by its abstract 
formation rather than material structure, and that the basic foundation of life is 
informational systems. It is this informational ontological structure that has found 
resonance within the contemporary life sciences. 
Autopoietic Definition of Life 
Similar to Schrodinger's second focus on thermodynamics and the concept of 
order from disorder, autopoiesis focuses on the self·organisation of the organism 
(order), and its ability to define itself from the surrounding environment (disorder). 
In her overview of the life sciences field, Boden (2000) finds no universally agreed 
definition of life, but does find typical features, including self·organisation, 
emergence, autonomy, growth, development, reproduction, adaptation, 
responsiveness, evolution and metabolism, with a general agreement of the core 
role of self·organisation, "the emergence (and maintenance) of order, out of an 
origin that is ordered to a lesser degree, by means of fundamental, and 
autonomous, structural development" (2000: 117). Self·organisation is a key 
construct, necessarily involving some of the other defining items from her list 
(emergence, autonomy, development) and finding the remainder as special cases 
of it (growth, reproduction, adaptation, responsiveness, evolution, metabolism). 
Boden looks to Humbert Maturana and Francisco Varela, who consider that life is 
a specific type of self·organisation termed autopoiesis in the physical sense, which 
defines an essential role for metabolism. 
Autopoiesis is a neologism introduced by Maturana and Varela in 1971 to 
designate the organisation of a minimal living system, and became emblematic of 
a view of the relation between an organism and its medium (Varela 1994). Derived 
from the Greek for 'self producing,' the ability for an organism to define itself 
against its environment and create an 'identity' is key within the autopoietic 
framework: 
An autopoietic system - the minimal living organization - is one that 
continuously produces the components that specify it, while at the same 
time realizing it (the system) as a concrete unity in space and time, which 
makes the network of production of components possible. More precisely 
defined: An autopoietic system is organized (defined as unity) as a network 
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of processes of production (synthesis and destruction) of components such 
that these components: 
i. continuously regenerate and realize the network that produces 
them, and 
ii. constitute the system as a distinguishable unity in the domain in 
which they exist. 
Thus autopoiesis attempts to capture the mechanism or process that 
generates identity of the living, and thus to serve as a categorical distinction 
of living from non-living. (Varela 1994: 5) 
In autopoiesis, identity amounts to a self-produced coherence; an autopoeitic 
mechanism will maintain itself as a distinct unity as long as its basic structure of 
processes is kept intact in the face of perturbations. As with the evolutionary neo-
Darwinian definition of life, life is considered to be processual and is not bound to 
the particular material substances we are currently familiar with on Earth. In 
other words, life does not necessarily need to be made of a carbon-based 
chemistry; the process of life could theoretically occur in other mediums. 
Autopoiesis differs from the evolutionary definition, however, as even while it is 
not dependent on a particular materiality, autopoiesis concerns itself with bodies. 
Unlike evolutionary definitions, where the body is negated to an abstracted 
definition of information, autopoiesis situates itself within a material structure, as 
it is an entity's ability to define itself from its environment that constitutes its life 
status_ Varela finds that an actively constructed identity is essential- what is 
meaningful for an organism is precisely given by its constitution as a distributed 
process (1994). From the viewpoint of the organism, it is this constructed identity 
that defines the entity against its exterior world. Varela finds that this gives "rise 
to the handling of its environment without the need to resort to a central agent 
that turns the handle from outside - like an elan vital- or a pre-existing order at a 
particular localization -like a genetic program waiting to be expressed" (1994: 
8). The autopoietic definition is positioned against that of evolutionary definitions 
and standpoints, where life is reduced to the expression of such a genetic 
program. 
Autopoiesis denies as philosophically fundamental or empirically universal, the 
roles of reproduction and evolution within life, foundational features of the 
evolutionary neo-Darwinian definition. Evolutionary defined artificial life gives little 
emphasis on metabolism, if not ignored entirely. Yet metabolism helps explain 
one of the fundamental questions in biology: how living bodies organise and 
maintain themselves as integral physical systems. Boden (2000) finds that there 
are three senses of the term metabolism, of which the strongest third sense is 
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found in biology, but not in artificial life. Metabolism, in this third sense, is the 
use of energy budgeting for autonomous bodily construction and self· 
maintenance. Maturana and Varela define metabolic self·organisation (as a type 
of autopoiesis) as the essence of life, as it is logically and biologically prior to the 
properties in the 'typical' criteria for life. 
Within Maturana and Varela's autopoietic theory is an emphasis on the self· 
production of the organism's boundary as a unitary system. As autopoiesis (in 
terms of life) occurs in material space, life requires both embodiment and the 
self-creation of a unitary physical system through the spontaneous formation of a 
physical boundary. The basic phenomena considered here is the formation of a 
cell membrane that both bounds and constitutes the cell as an autonomous vital 
entity, distinguishable from its environment (Varela). For virtual creatures, its 
boundary is neither created nor maintained by itself, but by computer engineers. 
Boden finds that the term 'boundary' is even inappropriate given the nature of 
"the host of electronic processes scattered across an ever-changi ng set of 
memory locations" (2000: 128) that constitute such creatures. The coding that 
makes up a digital creature, therefore, may be, at any given time, separated in a 
number of different locations in a computer's memory; there is no necessity for a 
digital creature to be a unitary bounded memory block, separated apart from 
other memory. Therefore, the requirement of a boundary in a strict autopoietic 
framework rules out strong artificial life; artificial life 'creatures' do not have 
defined bodies. Additionally, as reproduction within this viewpoint is not core to 
the definition of life and is a secondary (and not necessary) property of 
autopoiesis, evolution - as it requires both reproduction and inheritance - is also 
secondary and not a key feature of autopoiesis. Maturana and Varela do not deny 
the universality of reproduction and evolution in practice, but deny its 
philosophical necessity. 
Cybernetic Definition of Life 
The study of cybernetics developed during the post-war period as a collaboration 
between mathematician Norman Wiener and physiologist Arturo Rosenblueth, 
emerging from a wartime project on fire-control apparatus for anti-aircraft artillery 
(Wiener 1948: 14). Its initial focus was on communication and control through 
systems of feedback, and was originally seen as a novel view of human mechanics 
that aligned the biological body closely with informational computing machines. 
Hayles finds that after the Macy conferences from 1946-53, the study of 
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cybernetics moved in two different directions (1996a: 16). The first of these, 
centred on reflexivity, found focus in enforcing cybernetic systems' rules back 
onto themselves in order to produce and engage in ever increasing complex 
behaviour. This viewpoint privileged "change over consistency, evolution over 
equilibrium, complexity over predictability" (Hayles 1996a: 16). Within more 
recent cybernetic research she also finds that reflexivity has been developed 
further by the concept of emergence, proposing that cybernetic systems can 
create a self·organised "world unto itself, independent of the larger reality in 
which it is embedded" (1996a: 17). It is from such grounding that a cybernetic 
definition of life is construed. Biologist Bernard Koreniewski has presented a 
formulation of the cybernetic definition of life that, as with the previous 
definitions, has the aim "to formulate possibly a minimal definition of life (a living 
individual), which would apply not only to the life presently existing on our planet, 
but also to the first living organisms of the Earth, as well as to life·like phenomena 
existing presumably on other planets in the universe" (2001: 275). It is a 
definition of life of the possible, not (just) the actual. 
Koreniewski begins with three underlying assumptions or properties of living 
systems; life is composed of individuals who reproduce and evolve generation to 
generation. Reminiscent of the evolutionary definition as it examines life at the 
group level- negating the individual body - the cybernetic view incorporates the 
body and bases its viewpoint on the individual, as "a living individual is defined 
within the cybernetic paradigm, as a system of inferior negative feedbacks 
subordinated to ... a superior positive feedback" (Koreniewski 2001: 277). The 
superior positive feedback loop is specifically the act of reproduction. Koreniewski 
offers a functional definition of life in the cybernetic, where the purpose of an 
individual is set out in its replication or reproduction: 
The full set of negative feedbacks (regulatory mechanisms), working on 
different hierarchical levels and representing the cybernetic aspect of the 
function of a living individual, has the "purpose" of sustaining the identity of 
the individual. In turn, the only "purpose" of this identity is to reproduce 
itself in as many copies as possible. Furthermore, from the cybernetic point 
of view, the identity of a given individual is nothing but such·and·not· 
another unique complex of negative feedbacks. (2001:278) 
Unlike the autopoeitic view, where an individual is defined through its 
maintenance of a boundary with its environment through the self·organisation of 
metabolism, within the cybernetic definition, the individual is defined as a full set 
of feedback systems within itself and between itself and its environment that can 
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achieve the positive feedback of replication. As the cybernetic definition does not 
define the individual apart from its environment, cybernetic feedback loops can be 
internal and/or external to the organism, incorporating the individual and its 
surrounding environment. This definition means that Koreniewski does not 
necessarily view an individual entity as the basic unit of life; it is a single system, 
which means that in some cases (such as an ant colony) Koreniewksi finds 
cybernetic life occurring at different levels. 
Artificial Life and Cyberbiology 
The cybernetic definition of life returns us to the exploration of the artificial life 
programming and philosophy of Steve Grand, British artificial life researcher and 
the programmer behind Creatures. Sarah Kember has engaged with Grand in a 
dialogue between scientific practice and cyber·feminism, creating a conversation 
that involves critical engagement with the goal of shared understanding and 
communication (Kember 2003). At first, Grand's position reminds of the 
autopoietic defnition in locating how his vision of artificial life operates; the 
artificial life programming is 'inspired by animal biology' where: 
Each creature has a neural network responsible for sensory· motor 
coordination and behavior selection, and a "artificial biochemistry" that 
models a simple energy metabolism along with a "hormonal" system that 
interacts with the neural network to model diffuse modulation of neuronal 
activity and staged ontogenetic development. (Grand, Cliff, & Malhotra, 
1996: 1) 
Unlike models such as Tierra following a strictly evolutionary definition, this 
incorporates a model of metabolism within its programming. Metabolism is a key 
feature within the autopoietic definition of life and Grand's artificial life research 
has been associated with an autopoietic framework (Kember 2003: 198·200). 
Grand himself credits the membrane as the "cell's most significant feature 
(perhaps even its defining characteristic)" (l998a: 5), echoing the self·definition 
focus of autopoiesis. Although Grand's artificial life creations can simulate 
metabolism, he also recognises the importance of the environment in the 
production of intelligence: 
Intelligence cannot be abstracted - we have to build a whole organism. 
Neither can intelligence exist in a vacuum - it has to be embedded in a self· 
consistent environment. Life is the sum total of all the feedback within the 
organism, and between the organism and its environment. (2000, 146) 
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For Grand, intelligence is a strong measure of life; the ability of an entity to react 
and adapt meaningfully in its environment. He believes, however, that there is no 
essential differentiation between the organism and its environment; the essential 
boundary making within autopoiesis is noticeably absent and even denied in 
Grand's work: 
The division between organism and environment is not a real boundary, but 
a convenience dreamt up by our own brains - the universe is really just a 
single jumble of interactions. (2000: 146) 
It is the self·production (and maintenance) of a boundary that Varela and 
Manturana view as one of the central definitive aspect of autopoiesis, and leads 
them to infer a cognition on all living things in the formation and maintenance of 
identity. Grand finds that intelligence arises from emergent processes that are not 
necessitated by a boundary forming essentialism. He does not base the cognition 
of an entity in its division between itself and its world, but sees the living and non· 
living joined in a continual process of flows and interactions in an overall 
continuous environment or living unitary beings. For Haraway, this has the result 
that "Organisms become components of a particular type (biotic components), 
often highly interesting, but not ontologically special, in cybernetic systems 
sciences" (1981·82: 252). There becomes no differentiator between the living and 
non-living; both are examples (although at varying degrees of complexity) of 
informational systems of communication and control. Although Grand places 
great importance on the role of metabolism within his artificial life creations and 
his definition of their alive-ness, distancing him from an evolutionary standpoint 
where bodies and bodily processes are forgotten, neither does he fully align with 
autopoiesis. It is this denial of differentiation between the interactions that form 
living processes and other interactions (chemical, and so on) that Grand relies 
upon to be able to claim that artificial life programming creates actual instances 
of life. Life is not found in the formation of, and separation from, the environment 
of an entity for Grand, but in the emergence of intelligent behaviour: 
A computer cannot be intelligent or alive. Nor can a computer program. But 
a computer can be used to create a cyberspace. Inside that cyberspace we 
can construct first·order objects and use algorithms to emulate their 
behaviour. These objects are not alive or intelligent either, but they can be 
pieced together to build a second·order assemblage that is. Our task is not 
to program in intelligent behaviour, but to enable such behaviour to emerge 
from simulated objects that embody the cybernetic properties from which 
life emerged in the natural world. (2000: 147) 
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Grand's cybernetic view finds life in its formation. It also maintains a broad 
evolutionary focus; it follows the view that it is the propagation of informational 
systems that provide this form and constitutes artificial life entities as actual life: 
To complete the picture, we must ensure that the recipe for this emergent 
phenomenon is not hard·wired but is able to be passed on from generation 
to generation and modify itself in order to persist on longer timescales, as 
the environment changes. Our creature will be fully alive and intelligent only 
if its future lies in its own hands, and to give it this autonomy we must 
relinquish direct control of its design. In short, the plans for how to 
assemble our creature should be coded in its genes. (2000:147) 
Here, we realise Grand's second key feature of life: it can reproduce. Aligning to 
Koreniewski's cybernetic definition of life, the essential features of life for Grand 
are: one, that the system reacts and adapts to and within its environment (shows 
intelligent behaviour) through a system of interaction between first and second· 
order feedback mechanisms; and two, that it reproduces. Grand has termed this 
approach 'cyberbiology' to move it away from evolutionary forms of artificial life 
(Grand 1998c: 72). Cyberbiology expands upon, and is not reducible to, an 
evolutionary view; as in evolutionary artificial life single entities do not react or 
adapt to the environment, only the 'species' does through evolving through 
generations. For Grand, this is key to be able to claim that the creatures he 
designs under such a model constitute life (at the second·order). His initial 
premise that both living and non·living entities are a flow of matter, and that the 
matter in a living entity is constantly changing, brings him to the conclusion that 
one cannot differentiate between the material mass that is termed living and that 
which is not. The matter in a living being was once not living and will at some 
point be discarded as waste and will be not living again. It is this continual 
transfer of matter between living and non·living that causes Grand to question the 
need to fundamentally distinguish between living and non·living systems. He 
considers both 'a jumble of interactions', even denying the existence of matter at 
all (Kember 2003: 112). His focus on cybernetic systems of informational 
processing, within this jumble, weights his framework firmly within abstract 
formation. This is non·reducible to the autopoietic viewpoint, which while not 
specific to any given materiality and also considerate of form, retains a 
materialistic viewpoint. In autopoiesis it is the manner in which matter forms itself 
(and separates itself) which forms the definition of life. 
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From Cyberbiology to Cybercosmology - A Responsible Determinstic View of the 
Universe 
Grand's cyberbiology offers a cybernetic model and framework for defining life. 
For Grand "real, living systems are heterogeneous complexes of feedback loops 
made from nerves, chemical reactions, and genes" (1997a: 24). Cybernetic 
intelligence is formed at the second·order of emergence, where systems of 
feedback are able to react and adapt to the environment. The creatures that 
Grand designs qualify as life in cyberbiology, as they are informational systems of 
cybernetic feedback and control, that show emergent second·order behaviour that 
adapt and reproduce. Additionally, as with the computational universe that Hayles 
(1999) outlines, these digital life forms are reflected back onto their carbon 
cousins in the posthuman: 
When we look at future artificial life forms, we shall be holding up a mirror 
to ourselves. If these creatures consistently behave like us and appear to 
feel things the way we do, then presumably they are like us, in essence at 
least. (Grand 2000: 205·206) 
From this, Grand offers a model of a computational regime, comparable to 
Hayles' computational universe. For Hayles (1999), artificial life is making a 
decisive move towards the posthuman by considering the relationship artificial life 
builds between humans and our silicon cousins, and the effect artificial life has on 
the definition of biological life. In the future Hayles envisages, distinguishing 
between natural and artificial life, between human and machine intelligence, will 
be difficult or impossible. In artificial life "the machine becomes the model for 
understanding the human. Thus the human is transfigured into the posthuman" 
(Hayles 1999: 239). This refashioning of the human to the posthuman amounts to 
a new worldview, one which Hayles terms a 'computational universe', where the 
essential function for intelligent machines, humans and the universe itself is 
processing information. Within such a computational regime the universe is a vast 
computer and we are the programs that it runs. In the computational universe the 
question is how higher·level computations can emerge spontaneously from the 
underlying structure of cellular automata. This correspondence, between the 
conditions under which life or computation are likely to emerge, is seen as a sign 
that computation and life are connected at a deep level. Within computational 
regimes everything is reducible, at some level, to information. If the name of the 
game is processing information, then Hayles considers that it is only a matter of 
time before intelligent machines replace us as our evolutionary heirs and the 
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problem of embodiment becomes trivial, an act of s(ed)uction of the digital over 
the material. She finds the problem of suppletion "when this mode of operation 
[simulation] is taken to be fully representative of a much more complex reality 
and when everything that is not in the simulation is declared to be trivial, 
unimportant, or not interesting" (1999: 245). 
Grand offers a deterministic model that proposes, as a computational regime, a 
universe as a system of first·order structures producing second·order emergent 
behaviour. It is deterministic because, as with programs such as Tierra, once the 
parameters of the first·order structures are set and run (which Grand finds 
analogous to the start of the universe - the Big Bang as it were), the outcome of 
the program is already determined. The feedback loops follow the course set by 
the initial settings and rules of the program/universe. Grand proposes a 
'responsible determinism' because, whilst in his model we all follow an emergent 
deterministic program making all of our actions inevitable, to recognise our lives 
as such would have drastic consequences. We must act as if our present were not 
inevitable; it is not forseeable due to the impossibility of knowing and computing 
all first·order structures of the universe. Even though Grand's universe is 
deterministic and inevitable, we cannot know how it is so. 
Grand's responsible determinism is made possible through the fundamental 
likeness he extrapolates, from the digital cyberspaces created in the computer to 
the physical material world (the universe). For Grand the twin nature of physical 
and cyber· spaces underlies his theorising: 
One of the key assertions I'm making ... is that everything is made from the 
same (non) stuff. At no point is there a clear break between hardware and 
software, between matter and form. Such a break is largely an illusion 
caused by the metalevel at which our own sensory organs exist. (l997b: 16) 
It is because Grand is able to transpose the operations of the cyberspace artificial 
life instantiations that he (and others) design to the workings of 'hardware' 
(physical space) that the same logical determinism by which the computer 
operates is transferred to the physical world and to 'life as we know it.' "[A] 
metaphenomenon built from such simulated building blocks is fundamentally 
indistinguishable from the same metaphenomenon built from so·called 'real' 
building blocks - they occupy different universes, but are equivalent" (Grand 
1997b: 17). The closed system of the computer (closed as it has finite memory 
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and CPU power) equates to the universe, which is also considered a closed 
system (of finite space and energy). 
Edward Fredkin's Finite Nature 
The idea of the universe as a computational regime is neither original nor 
confined within the study of artificial life. Digital physicist Edward Fredkin has, for 
some time, argued for a new vision for physics: one that views the universe as a 
cellular automata universal computing machine. His concepts of Finite Nature and 
Digital Mechanics, whilst yet to find mainstream appeal beyond the fringes of 
physics, have nonetheless opened physics to new conceptual directions and 
Fredkin himself has been referred to as 'Einstein·like' by notable researchers such 
as Marvin Minsky (Wright 1988: 5). His theory of Finite Nature meets the 
computational universe and the responsible deterministic model head on, finding 
the same model of computational regimes within the material molecular universe. 
His basic premise is to view the workings of the universe as a computer, "Finite 
Nature means that what underlies physics is essentially a computer ... a cellular 
automata" (Fredkin 1992b: 7). This starts with a common assumption of the 
discreteness of both time and space. For Fredkin: 
Finite Nature is the assumption that, at some scale, space and time are 
discrete and that the number of possible states of every finite volume of 
space·time is finite. In other words Finite Nature assumes that there is no 
thing that is smooth or continuous and there are no infinitesimals. (Fredkin 
1992a: 1) 
Finite Nature, as with artificial life, has at its roots in automata theory; space is 
discretely divisible into cells that must be in one of a number of states. These 
cells change states through space·time (time, as we have come to understand in 
cellular automata theory is also discrete) through simple rules, or what Fredkin 
has termed 'the Rule' (Chandler 2003: 32) - the simple universal rule of the 
universe and the ultimate goal of his research. The Rule is applied at the grid's 
cell level, which Fredkin, as with our other computational models, stresses the 
importance of information as key. He proposes a new informational model for 
physics, one in which physics is described though the cellular automata - the 
universal computing machine found in Finite Nature. This informational model he 
terms Digital Mechanics (Fredkin 1992a: 3), and, as an example of cellular 
automata, has the same underlying base on which artificial life programming is 
made. Also, with our other digital models, Finite Nature has the same conclusions 
when taken through to its logical end. The most noticeable of these is its 
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deterministic nature, where the universe operates as a logical computer program 
when following the Rule. This recalls Noble's reminder of the analytical base of 
artificial life; artificial life programs, and cellular automata, and (now) the 
universe itself happen as they do because of how they have been programmed-
their programming and initial state has pre·determined all futures states. All that 
remains is for the program to be run to realise its potential. Just as in Grand's 
responsible deterministic model, we cannot know how it is deterministic; "The 
deterministic nature of finite digital processes is different in that it is unknowable 
determinism" (Fredkin 1992). As we are situated within the program itself, there 
is no way for us to be able to view the universe's grid state in its entirety. We 
cannot see outside of the grid we are within. 
Formulated within the physical sciences, Fredkin's Finite Nature model ultimately 
encompasses life within its theory as a computational regime. With Fredkin's 
overriding belief in the fundamental basis of all things in cellular automata, life is 
viewed in terms of informational computing machines, "life itself is a kind of 
computer. DNA works very much like a cellular automaton, and pretty much 
everything between DNA and the computer also runs on information" (Wright 
1988: 79). As with Grand's cybernetic emergent second·order intelligence from 
first·order simple structures, Fredkin builds informational systems as cybernetic 
systems of feedback built upon one another: 
Now, the nervous system of an animal is another information·processing 
thing, just the nervous system that sends messages back and forth for 
simple kinds of sensations and so on. That's the second level. And then the 
intellectual level is yet another level. (Fredkin qtd. in Wright 1988: 79) 
As with his universe·as·computer, Fredkin's model of life finds a compatriot in the 
responsible deterministic model as computational regimes. These are steeped in 
an underlying structure of informational processing, to a set of simple rules within 
the grid of cellular automata, and leading to emergent cybernetic processes of 
feedback and control. The universe is considered a closed system, pre·determined 
by its programmed rules (or for Fredkin - 'the Rule') and its initial state from 
which history unfolds, in sequential space·time steps. As a closed system, it is 
discrete; both space and time are packaged into set minimal units upon which all 
interaction is based. These informational interactions build upon each other in 
increasing complexity to produce, at higher levels, intelligence and reality as we 
know it. As discrete informational processing systems, all three models are 
digital, cybernetic and closed. 
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Making Statements About Life Itself 
Within an informational formulation, and a cosmology of a universal 
computational regime, the conceptualisation of life itself makes specific 
statements about the ontological foundations of the real- what life itself is and 
how our natures operate. At the heart of computational regimes is the discrete 
packaging of both time and space, the reduction of all things to information: an 
inherent connectivity between all units within the system and the adherence to 
simple rules creating emergent complexity, all occurring within a closed and 
neatly defined system. Life itself involves the progressive movement to increased 
complexity by self·organising units within this system; either reduced to evolution 
on its own or by a combination of evolution and the workings of cybernetic 
feedback loops. Such conceptualisations and statements are neither innocent nor 
without politics. We are reminded that: 
The on Iy propositions that can be verified - that is, proved true - are those 
concerning "closed" systems, based on pure mathematics and logic. 
Natural systems are open; our knowledge of them is always partial, 
approximate, at best. (Horgan, 1995) 
Against this, emerging statements regarding computational regimes propose 
exactly the opposite. They suggest that natural systems are similarly closed as 
our digital universes, and the reason that our knowledge of our nature is 
incomplete is not due to its open character, but because of our inability to see all, 
due to our own implication within the universe's structure. The ability to make 
such statements about the world, life and the universe are realised through the 
equivalent foundational structure that the material molecular universe is 
perceived as having with the electronic digital universes we are creating in our 
computers. Fundamentally, both space and time within digital and material space 
are compartmentalised, as separate but discrete units. Within cyberspace, both 
space and time are both formulised as discrete and divisible units: space through 
pixelisation and time through CPU ticking. This recalls the structure of Conway's 
Game of Life, with its grid mapping and CPU tick timing. It is this basic framework 
on which all artificial life programming is based, regardless of its complexity. It is 
the application of rules upon first·order structures (discrete units) in each time 
slot (discrete tick) on which artificial life instantiations are based and run upon 
the application of rules on first order structures (discrete units) in each time slot 
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(discrete tick). It is the transference of this same space·time conceptualisation to 
the physical universe that Hayles' computational universe and Grand's 
responsible deterministic model make, in order to subscribe to the idea that our 
cyberspace artificial life instantiations reflect the very manner of our existence. It 
is this same transference that allows Fredkin's Finite Nature to make the identical 
claims that the physical universe is essentially a large computer program. In this 
mutuality of universal construction, where the physical universe is made up of 
discrete physical units and divided into discrete time slots, the universe mirrors 
the similar constitution of cyberspace. Without this fundamental underlying 
assumption of basic discrete units, neither computation nor determinism would 
operate or make sense. 
Contradicting the abstraction of information that occurs within computational 
regimes, Hayles reminds us that for information must always be instantiated in a 
medium to exist. She highlights that not only is abstracting information from a 
material base an imaginary act, but more fundamentally that "conceiving of 
information as a thing separate from the medium that instantiates it is a prior 
imaginary act that constructs a holistic phenomena as a matter/ information 
duality" (1999: 75). Specifically, it is the abstraction of time and space into 
discrete units, independent of their material or digital substrate, which unifies 
computational regimes and allows the further abstraction of life itself as 
propagating informational and coded units. The division of space and time into 
discrete units is not originatory within computational regimes. We are reminded 
of Macgregor Wise's (1997) mapping of space, time and technology through the 
epistemes of the modern, amodern, and Deluezian. He describes the modern 
standpoint on space·time in such a discrete manner, finding that in the modern, 
technology transforms duree ('natural' human time) into abstract time. We see 
the disenchantment of time: the progression from duree to technology to abstract 
time. Technology is a result of the desire to master time, bringing it under control 
through systems of measurement and standardisation. From the disenchantment 
of time comes the disenchantment of space, and, therefore, the disenchantment 
of the external (noumena) and the disenchantment of nature. The world (our 
space·time) becomes, from Heidegger, Bestand: the standing reserve, objectified 
and commodified for our use. Computational regimes thus become the 
technologisation of nature, abstracting nature out of its own duree, in an attempt 
to objectify and control it. 
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Computational regimes offer a specific molar and unitary story on the nature of 
space-time, the structure of the universe, and the nature of life-as-we-know-it (and 
as-it-could-be)_ We must be wary of what such stories and statements tell us, and 
the 'god-trick' they provide of a "direct devouring, generative, and unrestricted 
vision, whose technological mediations are simultaneously celebrated as utterly 
transparent" (Haraway 1991: 189)_ These conceptualisations of life itself hold the 
promise of providing a window into the inner workings of life (as propagating 
informational forms - with or without the addition of cybernetic feedback loops) 
and reflecting these back to us in our cyberspace creations_ Through the denial 
and mistaking of metaphors and assumptions within the technoscience of 
artificial life, the marriage of genetic fetishism and cybernetic informatics, and the 
extrapolation of a very modernist notion of discrete space-time, a unitary story of 
life itself, as abstract propagating informational units, is found repeatedly in the 
computational regimes of the computational universe, the responsible 
deterministic model and Finite Nature_ It is these stories this thesis looks for in its 
travels through artificial life evolutionary computer games and cultures_ Not only 
do these emplacements offer simulations and models of life, they reflect and 
come to define our own life, nature and cosmology, through acts of suppletion 
and s(ed)uction_ Conceptually, the movement of artificial life, as a mere model 
life through to defining life itself as the exemplar of life, can be traced through 
artificial life and the stories it weaves in association with humans in an emerging 
sensibility of the posthuman_ 
Modelling Life as an Abstraction of the Real 
When considered as an abstraction of the 'real,' artificial life is viewed as an 
always-incomplete model of life_ In an abstract conceptualisation, artificial life 
becomes an extension of the rational philosopher's thought experiments as a 
reductive model, expected to uncover life's essential truths rather than provide its 
detail. As a simulatory model of the 'real,' there remains a separation between 
'artificial' and 'real,' with artificial life as an imaginary 'other' place as extension 
of virtual mind thought experiments_ Mark Bedau (1998) has partnered artificial 
life with contemporary philosophy, as a tool for what he considers an empirical 
turn, especially within biology and psychology_ For Bedau, "artificial life shares 
philosophy's characteristic concern with broad essences rather than narrow 
contingencies" (Bedau 1998)_ Bedau's rationalist philosophy sidelines the body, 
offering instead a transcendence of the mind over the physicality and historicality 
of the body_ Offering the essentialism and reductionism of artificial life as keys to 
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finding a philosophical universality, Bedau finds that, "In the attempt to capture 
the si mple essence of vital processes, artificial life models abstract away most 
details of natural living systems without pretending to be accurate models of 
particular features of particular material systems" (1998). 
Whilst Bedau follows a modernist Enlightenment model and turns to artificial life 
to fulfil a rationalist and transcendental universal philosophy, he also highlights 
the character of artificial life as simulation. For Bedau, simulation performs the 
role of extending the rational thought process, but for other writers simulation has 
been developed as being one of the key features forming the movement away from 
a modernist standpoint of Enlightenment progress. These writers highlight how 
artificial life, whilst retaining structures of transcendence and rationality, also 
destabilise other key features of the Enlightenment project. These are the binary 
dichotomy created between culture and nature, a centralised position of power, 
and a focus on realism. Such a destabilisation points the way for a movement and 
reterritorialisation to new definitions and essences for life itself, of which artificial 
life forms a major contributor. 
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Chapter 6 
(re)Creating Nature, Worlds and Life: Considering 
Myth and Spirituality 
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The discovery of the New World induced an impatience with the Old. In 
vastly extending the range of the Renaissance imagination, it made Europe 
appear ever more despoiled, damned, and doomed, and prompted 
millenarian dreams of taking flight from this waning world in quest of new 
beginnings. In the New World, eschatological expectations of renewed 
perfection came into earthly focus. (Noble 1997: 38) 
It only takes the replacement of 'Europe' with 'the material' or 'molecular' and a 
digital understanding of the New World to make David Noble's statement ring true 
for our digital heterotopian emplacements, striving to create perfected neo-
Darwinian and cybernetic life itself. Artificial life and evolutionary computer 
games are creating new worlds and new natures hosting silicon life that, as has 
been discussed, are coming to supplant and define their carbon cousins, their 
world and universe. In this story, as code, it is the relationship between the silicon 
creatures and ourselves that we are creating that feeds our transcendental 
desires, in a grand narrative of informational evolutionism. This has become 
possible through reducing all things to information, which forms a double 
abstraction that first declares a distinction between information and the material 
it is formed within. It then moves to a second abstraction, determining that 
information can then be extracted from and independent of its material formation 
(Kay 1997: 27-29)_ In the discourse of artificial life, a 'virtual computer' thought 
of as a new world is created within the computer which is ready to host silicon life 
- neo-Darwinian and cybernetic life itself perfected, a pattern we see repeated in 
evolutionary computer games. This allotment of computer space and processing 
power is thought of as a digital ecosystem: a new nature (re)created in bits and 
bytes. As heterotopian emplacements of compensation, these digital worlds 
provide a flawless neo-Darwinian and cybernetic existence against our own 
complicated and muddled one. Structured within the programming of games and 
research projects, the story of the (re)created natural worlds, and the life they 
support, provide mythic possibilities that tie digital nature and life within greater 
scientific and spiritual mythic discourses of Western technoscientific culture. 
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This chapter aims to explore the spiritual, within a technoscientific discourse of 
artificial life. Computer games are a potent ground for myth, with "digital 
imaginary [that] is chock·full of images drawn from the depths of myth, cult, and 
popular religion" (Davis 1998: 205). Also, artificial life has a rich spiritual 
dimension. Kember (2003), Helmreich (1997, 1998) and Boden (1996) have all 
developed a spiritual element that permeates artificial life, highlighting spiritual 
discourses that connect both with Judeo·Christian and Eastern religious 
discourses. This chapter investigates this discourse in greater detail. Within the 
scientific discourse of artificial life, a connecting equivalent common 
informational structure has developed between the 'real world' and the digital 
universes we are constructing in our computers. This has generated an intimate 
union between physical and digital, and silicon and carbon life forms. The first 
step of this chapter is to explore the (re)creation of nature that is occurring within 
artificial life digital emplacements. Recognising the crucial role that humans have 
in the co·construction of these new culturally produced natures, the (re)creation 
of nature in a digital medium asks us to weed out the cultural narratives and 
rhetoric that come together in the creation of its meaning and purpose. As an 
exemplar of the posthuman, the computational regimes of artificial life 
emplacements are tied to discourses of cybernetic determinism, seen in both the 
computational universe and responsible deterministic model. The key signifiers of 
nature within a cybernetic standpoint, mapped throughout this chapter, are: the 
universe, the world and the individual. The chapter will highlight tropic ideals of 
the network, feedback loops, and code within and between these signifiers. These 
cybernetic and informational ideals associate themselves with cultural and 
spiritual discourses, finding mythic partners with new Western 'postmodern' 
spiritualities - combinations of Eastern and Western thought. These include 
Gaian, Buddhist, Gnostic, Taoist, and New Age beliefs, packaged within an 
overriding and overarching Western Judeo·Christian structure. From David Noble 
we are reminded "the present enchantment with things technological- the very 
measure of modern enlightenment - is rooted in religious myths and ancient 
imaginings" (1997: 3). With this in mind, the chapter highlights ties between 
digital artificial life emplacements and a formulation of the holistic universe, 
formed around the interconnectedness of all things. 
The second section of the chapter moves forward from the (re)creation of nature 
and new worlds to the story of the life that populates them. Within the 
(techno)scientific discourse that contains artificial life, there is the central concept 
of life itself as propagating code following a neo·Darwinian evolutionary story of 
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ever increasing complexity enmeshed within informational structures of 
cybernetics, feedback and emergence. As with the (re)creation of nature, the story 
of life creates mythic possibilities within our emplacements that go beyond a 
strictly technoscientific discourse. Again, these tie in with a framework of 
'postmodern' spiritualities, finding a grand narrative for life itself and tying it in 
the interconnectedness of all things. Birthed within a Genesis story, our silicon 
creatures live within structures of emergence and feedback that place them within 
discourses of a holistic living universe, the Cosmic Christ and Mother Earth. 
Examining the story of life itself also highlights the user or player's relationship 
with the artificial life emplacement and the life it holds. Readily acknowledged as 
a god-like position, the character of this role can be examined within our mythic 
discourses. 'New' notions of God, Goddess, and Godhead permeate the role of the 
player/user, highlighting the relations of power and structure within our digital 
emplacements. An emergent God figure is also considered, looking at assertions 
such as Bj0rn Grinde's "God is in our genes" (1998: 20). 
The (re)Creation of Nature and the Building of Worlds 
The initial step when running any artificial life program is the allotment of a 
section of computer memory and processor time to the creation of a digital 
ecosystem or 'virtual universe,' within which artificial life creatures are inoculated. 
Within the discourse of artificial life and the posthuman, these emplacements 
become spaces and places that not only model and simulate carbon life, but 
supplant and come to define it. They become new digital natures and new worlds 
that inform us about our own - their creators and programmers are co-creating 
new natures and recreating our own. Mythically, the creation of new worlds 
highlights both Zen Buddhist notions of a subject's place and relationship within 
the world and new posthuman spiritualities centred on an unsurprising Judeo-
Chritian genesis creation story_ These mythic possibilities are given power 
through their designations as new worlds and new natures of an equivalent 
underlying structure as our own. Digital artificial life emplacements confuse and 
displace modernist boundaries between nature and culture; they are both cultural 
constructions and constructing nature. In her contemplation of the genome as 
cultural icon, Donna Haraway considers such conundrums as constitutive of a 
'category crisis': 
... a generic conundrum in which proliferating ambiguities and chimeras 
animate the action in science, entertainment, domestic life, fashion, 
religion, and business. Of course, the pollution works both ways; culture is 
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as much mouse-eaten as nature by the gnawings of the mixed and 
matched, edited and engineered, programmed and debugged genome_ 
Borderlands are often especially heavily polluted and policed; they are also 
especially full of interesting traffic and powerful hopes_ (1997: 149) 
Writing against the postmodern notion that "global technology appears to 
denature everything" (1992: 297), she prefers to think of particular productions of 
nature, revealing a position reflecting her own materialist standpoint, "In its 
scientific embodiments as well as in other forms, nature is made, but not entirely 
by humans; it is a co-construction among humans and non-humans" (1992: 297)_ 
She continues: 
___ "nature" cannot pre-exist as such, but neither is it existence ideological. 
Nature is commonplace and powerful discursive construction, effected in 
the interactions among material-semiotic actors, human and not (1992: 
298) 
Sarah Franklin, Celia Lury and Jackie Stacey take a similar view in their analysis 
of nature and culture: 
Countering the view that nature has been displaced by culture, or simply 
the commodity, is the view explored here that nature is being put to work in 
new ways that signal not so much its disappearance as its 
transmogrification_ Nature, in a sense, has been remade_ (2000: 19) 
Franklin, Lury and Stacey offer a processual model for understanding the cultural 
fluidity of the constitution of nature, comprising of threefold process of 
naturalisation, denaturalisation, and renaturalisation, similar to the Deleuzian 
concepts of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation seen to be occurring within 
definitions of life itself, and aided by assemblages such as artificial life_ Especially 
apparent when turning to our digital emplacements and the creatures they host, 
the writing and co-construction of the digital ecosystems and virtual universes, 
given the status of nature, occurs in "the implosion of the technical, textual, 
organic, mythic, and political in the gravity wells of science in action" (Haraway 
1992: 300)_ 
Recognising the co-construction of space and the real questions the duality 
between nature and culture and nature and stimulation, in both the physical co-
construction of nature and digital co-construction of virtual universes within a 
materialist framework_ Katherine Hayles finds that "the distinction between 
simulation and nature ___ is a crumbling dike, springing leaks everywhere we press 
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on it" (1996c: 411). What is of interest here is not the continual co·construction 
that is endeared to all spaces - physical or digital - but the manner in which they 
are constructed: the agents that come together in co·construction and the 
relationships of power and politics within these assemblies, how these connect to 
other assemblies and assemblages, and the stories, narratives and meanings that 
are produced through them. Simulations are just as real as the physical molecular 
systems and spaces they 'model,' but there is a different composition and make-
up of agents with new relationships of power that distinguish our 'simulated' 
natures from our 'real' ones. Taking the assembly brought together in artificial life 
emplacements and evolutionary computer games as hegemonic orders, it is 
important to realise the unequal distribution of power amongst agents. Not all 
voices have the same strength, and not all intra·actions are on equal footing. 
Hayles reminds us that in the co-construction of space, nature and reality, even at 
the individual's point of view, all is not equal: 
... the most we can say about what is "out there" prior to perception is that 
it is an unmediated, a stream of potential experiences that will happen 
differently for differently situated observers. As these actors, human and 
nonhuman, interact with the unmediated flux, their worlds come into being. 
(Hayles 1996c: 413) 
Hayles terms this 'Maturana's world' after the work of Humberto Maturana, which 
provided radical ideas on how species and individuals know their world. Within 
Maturana's world there is no pre-given world to perceive as such; the idea of a 
world implies an entity that pre·exists its construction by an observer. Here, on an 
individual level and sympathetic to a materialist position, it is the intra-action 
between the individual and its environment (as the world out there, the 
un mediated flux), and the individual's full sensory perception and translation of 
this unmediated flux into a coherent reality, that is the manner in which each 
individual knows and realises the world. Against this, Hayles positions artificial 
life, with its claims of producing actual incidents of life. Within artificial life 
worlds, far from the inability to come to any conclusion about the 'out there,' 
(defined informational patterns form our underlying reality) we are given 
knowledge of the foundation of the world within discrete mappings of space and 
time adhering to simple rules. Finding equivalence between the emergent 
behaviours derived from first order simple rules involved in the construction of the 
paired physical world, and artificial life instantiations, artificial life researchers 
feel justified in the naming of artificial life phenomena and emplacements 
'worlds.' Claiming a common ontological foundation of (abstracted) information in 
William Gavin Mackie Loading World 143 
both the physical and digital, artificial life researchers find a common structure to 
the world. In artificial life, the world of phenomenological experience is an illusion 
covering an underlying reality of simple forms and rules. It is here that the two 
standpoints - Manturana's world and artificial life - come together: 
Here Tierra [as a strong artificial life emplacement] eerily touches 
Maturana's world, for its interpreters believe they are justified in calling the 
simulation a world because they have already conceptualised the world as a 
simulation. (Hayles 1996c: 424) 
Taking from Tierra and artificial life more generally, the simulational nature of the 
world comes because our perceived reality hides an actual deeper first order 
reality of simple rules and forms, rather than because we cannot know the out 
there. The underlying basic structures and rules are there, so it is up to us to find 
and illuminate them. It is this claimed common ontological construction between 
our own world and that of artificial life emplacements that artificial life 
practitioners look to in order to claim their identical structures. Both artificial life 
and a materialist standpoint, therefore, arrive at similar conclusions regarding a 
common realist construction of the physical and digital worlds, but the reasoning 
of each comes from opposing tangentials. From a materialist standpoint, the 
simulation becomes real due to the acknowledgement of a common co· 
construction between assemblies of agents in the creation of the real, regardless 
of its physical or digital embodiment. Within artificial life, on the other hand, the 
real gains the attributes of the simulation; it hides the true character of a deeper 
and theoretically knowable reality in higher order phenomena. 
A common reference in visualising our digital emplacements is that they are 
forming new worlds within our computers: a conceptualisation that has more than 
fleeting Zen undertones. Within the practice of artificial life, there is a recognition 
that the world outside, and the worlds that programmers are creating within 
computers, are 'cut from the same cloth'; our world takes on the qualities of the 
digital universes they are programming and vice versa. Stefan Helmreich has 
traced how an understanding of Zen, transcending the dualisms between the 
knowing subject and knowing object, has informed artificial life researchers 
bringing "computer worlds and programs to life" (1997: 370). Zen meditation 
strives to dissolve distinctions between the subject and the world. It is this refusal 
to form distinctions between material and digital emplacements that caused 
many of Helmreich's informants to confront "their computational realities": 
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'Zen' was used by many Artificial Life scientists to refer to an experience of 
oneness achieved when the researcher had an immersed yet detached 
engagement with a simulation. The viewing, meditating researcher would 
recognize the simulation as well as the world outside the simulation were 
both perceived through the same sensory apparati, so that our experience 
of the world might be seen as a kind of virtual reality experience, a 
simulation, and simulations themselves might be themselves understood as 
potential worlds. (1997: 371) 
In the version of Zen used within the artificial life circles that Helmreich has 
studied, the beholder and the world(s) that he or she surveys are considered as 
being made of emergent first order structures, giving rise to a phenomenological 
second order (simulational) reality. Steve Grand has also found a similar 
grounding in Buddhism in his own conceptualisations of space and matter (Grand 
2000: 30). Derived from the same underlying ingredients, the 'reality' of the lived 
world and those within the computer find an equality of form. It is this congruence 
that artificial lifer Tom Ray picks up on in 'An Evolutionary Approach to Synthetic 
Biology: Zen and the Art of Creating Life' when he proposes that "The object of an 
AL instantiation is to introduce the natural form and process of life into an 
artificial medium" (1995: 180). For Ray, reality is found in form and process, and 
specifically life as the process of evolution by natural selection. Artificial life, or 
his preferred designation of synthetic biology, finds its accreditation as a thing to 
study in its 'own right' (1995: 180) from this understanding. 
Constructed within computer programming, artificial life instantiations (re)create 
new natures and new worlds, inhabiting the borderlands of nature and culture 
(Kember 2003). Returning to Haraway's conjunction of nature as a co· 
construction of the technical, textual, organic, mythic, and political, this chapter 
turns to examining the spiritual constitution of the worlds of our digital 
emplacements. Close ties can be found between the emergent structure of 
artificial life instantiations and Gaian theory that considers the Earth as a living 
organism. Gaian philosophy finds a foothold in both the science and spirituality of 
artificial life, linking itself with environmental and cybernetic theory, while finding 
close connections and a place within a spirituality of the Mother Earth, Cosmic 
Christ and living universe. From such a foundation we find new points of reference 
for life itself. In their exploration of the icons of life in panhumanism, Franklin, 
Lury and Stacey (2000) offer the spherical images of the blue Earth, the foetus 
and the cell. In the movement from panhumanism to the posthuman, new tropic 
points of identification are found. Heralding an ontological shift from material 
structure to processual formations, in the posthuman it is not the material but 
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formations that form key imageries: those of emergent properties (the whole is 
greater than the parts), the system or network (the hive), and algorithmic codes 
(the book of life - either genetic or computer). These tropes permeate posthuman 
constructions of the universe, the earth and the individual. 
Gaia and (Artificial) Life 
The basic premise of Gaian theory is that the planet earth operates and should be 
considered as an organism; the planet (in its mutual organic and inorganic 
processes) is alive. It is a theory drawn from the concept of Mother Earth (termed 
Gaia by the ancient Greeks) and inspired by the images of the blue planet brought 
back from outer space: 
Journeys into space did more than present Earth in a new perspective. They 
also sent back information about its atmosphere and its surface which 
provided a new insight into the interactions between the living and the 
inorganic parts of the planet. From this has arisen the hypothesis, the 
model, in which the Earth's living matter, air oceans, and land surface form 
a complex system which can be seen as a single organism and which has the 
capacity to keep our planet a fit place for life. (Lovelock 1987: x, italics 
added) 
The blue planet has been a potent icon of late twentieth century Western culture 
(Franklin, Lury and Stacey 2000; Haraway 1991) and even forms the cover image 
for J.E. Lovelock's introductory book on Gaian theory, Gaia: A New Look at Life on 
Earth (1987). This chapter moves away from the image(ry) of the blue planet to its 
conceptualisation and formulation as the 'whole earth.' This follows a posthuman 
disconnection with the material and allegiance instead with form. 
Conceptualisations of the whole earth and Gaia centre on a key concept of the 
interconnectedness of all things on earth (living and non·living, organic and non· 
organic) as a single complex informational system or network. It is through the 
interconnectedness of all things that life, and the conditions necessary for life, 
emerged on earth and are continually maintained. Within Gaia, life on earth is 
possible because the earth itself, as a complex interrelated and interconnected 
system is also considered a living being. For Lovelock (and his collaborator, 
biologist Lynn Margulis) Gaia is defined as "a complex entity involving the Earth's 
biosphere, atmosphere, oceans, and soil - the totality constituting a feedback or 
cybernetic system which seeks an optimal physical and chemical environment for 
life on this planet" (Lovelock 1987: 11). The interconnectedness of all things is 
theorised as occurring in Gaia through a cybernetic network of feedback loops 
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connecting all things as a cybernetic whole. These cybernetic underpinnings of 
Gaia are so strong that Lovelock devotes an entire chapter in Gaia to an 
explanation of cybernetic theory, including examples of where one can encounter 
feedback loops on a global scale on earth. 
The links between the posthuman, Gaia, cybernetics, artificial life, and new senses 
of 'postmodern' Western spirituality are intimately connected. Artificial life, as the 
exemplar of the posthuman, encapsulates and ties together the discourses that 
permeate the posthuman. For Thomas Ray, the equal footing of carbon and 
silicon life is found in their common cybernetic formation and process, and is 
described in a manner in which Gaia resonates. The first description below could 
be read for carbon life and the second for silicon, but in the posthuman it is 
process and form which is paramount, demonstrated by the interchangeability of 
carbon and silicon life forms between the two statements. In such a posthuman 
framework, the two passages can be read on top of each other, the first passage 
as a description of living systems, the second illuminating the underlying 
structure of the system, organic or digital: 
Life is an auto·catalytic process that builds upon itself. Ecological 
communities are complex webs of species, each living off of others and 
being lived off of by others. The system is self·constructing, self· 
perpetuating, and feeds on itself. Living organisms interface with the non· 
living physical environment, exchanging materials with it, such as oxygen, 
carbon dioxide, nitrogen, and various minerals. (Ray 1995: 194) 
The new bottom·up approach creates a population of data structures, with 
each instance of the data structure corresponding to a single entity. These 
structures contain variables defining the state of an individual. Rules are 
defined as to how the individuals interact with one another and with the 
environment. As the simulation runs, populations of these data structures 
interact according to local rules, and the global behavior of the system 
emerges from those interactions. (Ray 1995: 180) 
Although Ray does not extrapolate the entire ecosystem (as in earth or digital 
universe) as being alive as a single entity, the holistic philosophy of Gaia can be 
seen in the interconnectedness of all things in the processes of life - namely in the 
cybernetic processes of emergence and feedback. It is the view of life as a 
cybernetic system and process that begins to form statements regarding life 
itself, and its relationship with the rest of the world. In the posthuman, life has 
been intimately associated with discourses and rhetoric of holistic 
interconnectedness, process and form, forming statements of the 
interconnectedness of all things, cybernetic feedback and emergence. To this, 
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neo-Darwinists - such as are found in strong artificial life - tie emergence and 
feedback to evolution within the holistic system of life: 
Evolution is predominantly concerned with creating and maintaining 
adaptations to living organisms that are themselves evolving. This 
generates evolutionary races among groups of species that interact 
ecologically. These races can catalyze the evolution of upwardly spiralling 
complexity as each species evolves to overcome the adaptations of the 
others. (Ray 1995: 195) 
Life throughout Gaia and the neo-Darwinian cybernetics of strong artificial life 
finds truth in statements of the interconnectedness of all things and cybernetic 
systems and processes. In the posthuman movement away from material 
embodiment, to an allegiance with form and process, discourses of the 'whole 
earth' take central stage and create bonds between the scientific discourse of 
artificial life and a spirituality of Gaian philosophy_ Moving this a step further, 
within computational regimes in both their digital and physical guises, it is not 
only the planet seen as the 'whole earth' that is treated as a singular entity. 
Within computational regimes, the universe itself is regarded in a holistic manner_ 
Returning to the scientific discourse of artificial life and computational regimes, 
this informational and cybernetic interconnectedness is tied to discourses of 
connectionism and emergence. Within the spiritual, Gaian philosophy finds 
universal compatriots in the Cosmic Christ and new postmodern formations of 
God and Goddess. It is through the interconnectedness of all things at a universal 
level that cybernetic processes form the determi nistic discourses of the 
posthuman_ 
A 'Postmodern' Spirituality of a Living Cosmology 
The scientific discourse of cybernetics, emergence, evolution and the 
interconnectedness of all things connects the technoscience of artificial life; the 
theory of Gaia and discourses of the posthuman. It forms statements about what 
life is and how spiritual philosophy of life itself is structured. These same 
discourses and statements tie both Gaia and artificial life (and the posthuman) to 
a set of spiritual discourses centred on the living universe, the Cosmic Christ, and, 
as we shall return to new images of God, the Goddess and the Godhead. These 
new 'postmodern' spiritualities bring together philosophies of the 
interconnectedness of all things and a holistic living system to a cosmology in the 
development of a 'living spirituality' (Fox 1990: 18) informed "by both modern 
science and by insights from the world's diverse spiritual traditions" (Elgin 2000: 
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17). They support a spirituality that considers emergence, connectionism and 
evolution as divine creative processes. Central to this new spirituality is the 
familiar conceptualisation, echoing the scientific philosophy of Gaia (on a new 
meta·level) that "our cosmos is not a fragmented and lifeless machine but is 
instead a unified and living organism" (Elgin 2000: 17). On a planetary scale, as 
with Gaia, the cosmos develops a discourse of singular holism that imbues it with 
the quality of life. This living cosmology forms the base of a new living spirituality 
that finds, in this life force, the Cosmic Christ; a figure born but not tied to (nor 
completely divorced from) Judeo·Christian discourses. For Matthew Fox, the 
Cosmic Christ is a figure of divine creativity that finds a role in both Christian and 
non·Christian traditions (1990: 20). True to the posthuman preference for form, 
the Cosmic Christ emerges as a divine pattern: 
The Cosmic Christ names the pattern that connects as justice, as loving, 
and as essentially friendly toward the universe and all things, humans 
included. The Cosmic Christ, then, being the Divine image in every atom 
and every galaxy, grounds a global morality in reverence for being ... The 
tradition of the Cosmic Christ also represents the Goddess and Gaia 
tradition in the West. The Goddess is about Divinity's immanence in all 
things and in the celebration of creation. So, too, is the tradition of the 
Cosmic Christ. (Fox 1990: 24) 
The Cosmic Christ within the living universe is described as the "pattern that 
connects" (Fox 1990: 24); the glue that bonds the interconnectedness of all 
things as the living universe; an "unbroken flow through of energy" that creates an 
image of a "vortex of a tornado or a whirlpool, as a completely dynamic structure" 
(Elgin 2000: 20) in the cosmos. In finding inspiration from both scientists and 
poets, including Norman Weiner, the founder of cybernetics, Duane Elgin's 
description of the living universe places it firmly within our developing discourse 
of the interconnectedness of all things, Gaia and cybernetics: 
No one part of the cosmos determines the functioning of the whole; rather, 
everything seems to be connected with everything else, weaving the cosmos 
into one vast interacting system. Everything that exists contributes to the 
cosmic web of life at each moment. (2000: 21) 
Within the spiritual discourse of the living universe and the Cosmic Christ, it is 
this connecting life force or energy that is the source of divine inspiration. As a 
generative power, repeating the maternal connotations found in the Mother Earth 
of Gaia and the whole earth, the cybernetic energy system of the cosmos has also 
been termed the Mother Universe, "that is the creator, sustainer, and womb of all 
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cosmic systems" (Elgin 2000: 27). Elgin finds roots of the Mother Universe not 
only in theoretical physics, as a superspace that contains the building blocks of 
realitylO, but within the meditative traditions of various spiritual and religious 
doctrines, including Taoism, Christianity, Gnosticism, Greek philosophy, 
Buddhism, and Hinduism (2000: 25, 27·28). Within these, Elgin finds a repeated 
discourse of the interconnectedness of all things and the divinity of the power that 
connects them and gives them life. While the discourse of the Mother Universe 
and Cosmic Christ draws from a number of different spiritual, philosophical, and 
scientific doctrines, its narrative is decidedly millennial Judeo·Christian in order, 
as we find in the discourses surrounding the (re)creation of new digital worlds 
and, as this thesis will return to, in the investigation of the divinity of evolution. 
New Digital Heavens: Digital Nature and the Spiritual 
In the posthuman, within models of computational regimes exemplified by the 
computational universe and the responsible deterministic model, the world and 
the universe are not only reflected but supplanted by the digital natures we are 
(re)creating in our computers. The same appears to be occurring in the discourse 
of spirituality that considers the interconnectedness of all things and cybernetic 
energy flows as divine powers. In the same way that the Mother Universe and the 
Cosmic Christ imbue the cosmos with a divine connective life force, the 
cyberspaces of artificial life emplacements and evolutionary computer games 
find, in process philosophy, a recurrent discourse that finds "divine creativity" in 
the "vast, nonlinear reality wherein each node connects to every other node in an 
endless, recursive web" (Cobb 1998: 52). For Jennifer Cobb the parallel between 
'reality' and 'cyberspace' is striking: 
When a set of algorithms that we call software runs in a computer, 
something remarkable begins to happen. The abstraction becomes a field 
of experience that we call cyberspace. It is this moment that the emergent 
quality of cyberspace makes itself known. The essential motor of this 
process, the spiritual center of cyberspace, is the fundamental sacred force 
that infuses all reality: divine creativity in action. The emergent dynamic 
found between the hardware and software in cyberspace is an aspect of 
divinity itself. In other words, the cosmic force that drives the movement and 
unfolding of reality is the same force as that which drives the continual, moment· 
by· moment emergence of the world of cyberspace. (1998: 51, italics added) 
10 Here Elgin finds inspiration from the Princeton astrophysicist, John Wheeler, who describes space 
as the basic building blocks of reality. (2000: 25) 
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In emergence, Cobb finds a creativity that is divine in nature - a generative force 
that connects all things together in the creation of both reality and cyberspace. 
Here, the discourse of the new 'postmodern' spirituality of the living universe 
extends itself to both digital and physical natures. In the processes of emergence, 
connectionism and cybernetic feedback, the artificial life worlds that we are 
creating are spiritually connected with the physical living universe. As it is 
throughout the posthuman, it is not materiality that is of importance, but rather 
form and process - the digital and physical find equivalence of form within a 
spiritual discourse of the interconnectedness of all things irrelevant of their 
materiality (or lack of). 
The digital worlds we are creating within our computers do more than connect the 
digital with the physical in a common spiritual discourse; they seem to fulfil the 
millennial Christian desire to create heaven on earth, in the building of a New 
Jerusalem that reflects the glory and divinity of creation. The quest for a New 
Jerusalem ties the pursuit of science and spirituality in a discourse of 
transcendence and salvation: 
With these utopian visions we witness the emergence of the idea that man, 
through his own efforts, can create a New Jerusalem here on earth. All these 
visions were profoundly Christian in intent, inspired, as one commentator 
has put it, by a "yearning to bring heaven down to earth." Rather than 
having to wait until the Last Judgement for the advent of a perfect 
community, Renaissance visionaries suggested that men could create 
heavenly cities themselves, by the application of science and technology. 
Technology would thus become a medium for salvation. Again and again in 
the age of science, technology has been viewed as a salvific force, a key to a 
better, brighter, more just world. (Wertheim 1999: 284) 
Within the Christian tradition there is a millennial fervour that strives to regain a 
sense of immanence, lost in the fall from grace and expulsion from the Garden of 
Eden. In tracing the connected histories of Western Christian tradition and the 
development of the arts of science and technology, David Noble (1997) reo 
establishes the close bond between technological development and the struggle 
and pursuit of Christian spiritual salvation. Beginning in the Middle Ages, the 
West has looked to technology as a tool to fulfil the transcendental salvation 
narrative of renewed perfection on earth. 
In the early Middle Ages ... the relationship between technology and 
transcendence began to change. Over time, technology came to be 
identified more closely with both lost perfection and the possibility of 
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renewed perfection, and the advance of the arts took on new significance, 
not only as evidence of grace, but as a means of preparation for, and a sure 
sign of, imminent salvation. (Noble 1997: 12) 
With the advent of new cyberspaces created within our computers, technology 
seems to have created this possibility of new spiritual perfection. Cyberspace has 
held connotations of the spiritual and the mystic utopian spaces in which the 
perfect is achievable, unhindered by the materiality of physical existence. It has 
been perceived as a place of salvation, a more just and perfect place, and a new 
heaven on earth. It is not a place of formal theology, but still retains a spiritual 
appeal. For Wertheim, this creates a paradox in the spirituality of cyberspace: "It 
is a repackaging of the old idea of Heaven but in a secular, technologically 
sanctioned format. The perfect realm awaits us, we are told, not behind the pearly 
gates, but beyond the network gates" (1999: 21). Cyberspace is spiritual space 
perfected on earth. 
As digital heterotropic emplacements of compensation, our artificial life 
emplacements and evolutionary computer games are creating cyberspaces of 
perfected neo·Darwinian and cybernetic life. Through the technoscience of 
artificial life, practitioners claim to have (re)created new digital natures and life, 
which operate precisely within neo·Darwinian informational structures of 
propagating computer algorithms and cybernetic processes. From the neo· 
Darwinian and cybernetic technoscientific perspectives, and the spiritual 
discourse of the interconnectedness of all things, artificial life emplacements form 
a new heaven on earth; life is perfected and materiality is transcended by 
idealisations of form and process. As 'realised utopias,' digital computational 
regimes of artificial life attain attributes of heterotopias, but as spiritual spaces 
they retain aspects of 'other' spaces, apart and separate from the 'reaL' It is this 
spiritual disconnection between the 'real' space of the physical world and spiritual 
space of cyberspace that takes them beyond being 'just as real' to a hyperreality 
of suppletion, or 'new heavens on earth'. The cyberspaces of artificial life become 
sacred spaces, set apart and distinguishable from the 'real' through their 
perfection. It would appear that the creators of artificial life emplacements have 
realised millennial goals of not only knowing creation, but of actual involvement 
its making. They have realised dreams in existence since Boyle and Newton, and 
retained in the goals of modern technoscience: 
Henceforth nature was to be understood by the way it was made, which 
required of the scientist a God·like posture and perspective. But divine 
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knowledge of creation was not all. Some aimed even higher, seeking not 
merely to know creation as it was made but also to make it themselves, 
actually to participate in creation and hence know it firsthand. (Noble 1997: 
67) 
Within the mythic discourse of the interconnectedness of all things, digital 
artificial life emplacements become constructed spaces of new earthly perfection 
- a New Jerusalem of neo·Darwinian and cybernetic life. They are spaces in which 
the cybernetic ideals of feedback, connection and emergence and informational 
evolutionism wholly structure and define the life within them. They are new mythic 
living universes co· created by humans by and within our own technologies. In the 
posthuman's ontological levelling of the material and the digital as informational 
structures, artificial life emplacements resonate with the discourse of the living 
universe and the spiritual imagery of the Cosmic Christ and Mother Universe. 
Within the discourses of the posthuman, we not only know that creation is 
processual, following the informational processes of cybernetic feedback, 
emergence and the interconnectedness of all things; but in artificial life, we have 
made it for ourselves, creation (post)humanly perfected. 
Gods of Evolution or God as Evolution: The Story of (Artificial) Life and Our 
Place in It 
Yet, at the end of [Francis Bacon's] life, in his New Atlantis, he predicted 
that men would one day create new species and become as gods - "the 
undeclared ultimate goal" of modern science, as Lewis Mumford put it. 
(Noble 1997: 65) 
The digital artificial life emplacements that are being created as virtual worlds 
within computer systems have, within the scientific and spiritual discourse of the 
posthuman, achieved this 'undeclared ultimate goal' of modern science - the 
creation of new species and the attainment of god-like status for the programmers 
and users of the programs. The new digital ecosystems we are creating as virtual 
worlds and universes realise the mythic discourse of the interconnectedness of all 
things as informational systems and networks of cybernetic feedback loops and 
emergence. Once a digital ecosystem has been created, the defining step of any 
artificial life emplacement is the inoculation of the virtual world with digital life-
the first creatures of our new perfected worlds. This necessary step takes place 
every time a new artificial life program is initiated. In a Christian genesis birth 
narrative, users - in a godly position - bring life to the digital ecosystem of the 
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virtual world through the introduction of the first silicon creatures. Digital life is 
humanly created, and made in our own neo·Darwinian cybernetic image, as 
propagating informational structures enmeshed within a cybernetic system of 
connectivity, feedback, emergence and evolution. As the drama of life unfolds, the 
key neo·Darwinian definition of life, as evolving informational structures finds, ties 
to the mythic and spiritual cosmos: 
Life as a sacred, cosmic force is a rich and complex notion, filled with far· 
reaching implications. First and fundamental is the understanding that the 
very essence of life is process. When life ceases its becoming, its never· 
ending evolution, it is no longer life. Life can be identified with the moment· 
by· moment unfolding of creativity. (Cobb 1998: 55) 
Within informational evolutionism, it is the replication and evolution of 
informational structures that form the core definition of life, either in its organic 
or silicon context; life is the process of evolution. Within the spiritual configuration 
of the posthuman, the process of evolution becomes the mythic grand narrative of 
life: a divinely creative force that both moves life forward and is its essential 
quality. The story of life is the story of evolution. 
In the struggle for immanence, evolution gains direction and purpose within the 
mythic discourse of the posthuman. It is evolution that ultimately fulfils millennial 
Christian transcendental salvation narratives, as the dead weight of bodies and 
flesh give way to new digital stages of evolution within the digital emplacements 
that have come to supplant and define us. In a posthuman spiritual discourse, 
evolution is divine and will delivery our own immanence. Drawing from the work of 
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, a Jesuit priest and popular spiritual figure within 
digital circles, evolution finds its holy place: 
The concept of evolution allowed Teilhard to frame his mystical vision of 
matter imbued with a divine force in the fundamental truth that all things 
are in process. For Teilhard, this meant that matter was not antithetical to 
the divine, but essentially vitalized by it. He saw that the "All" was in fact 
ultraliving. This was a radical turning point that led Teilhard to formulate a 
vision of evolution as led, ultimately, by divinity. For him, evolution was 
both a scientific and holy process. (Cobb 1998: 81) 
Within a mythic discourse of cybernetics and emergence, evolution becomes a 
forward driving force, continually striving towards the ultimate Christian millennial 
goal of perfected earthly immanence. As a scientific and holy process, we are 
reminded "the machines we create, our technologies, are leading factors in the 
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evolutionary process" (Cobb 1998: 88). The technoscience of artificial life takes 
centre stage in such a grand narrative of life and evolution. It provides not only 
the definition of life itself in the posthuman, but also becomes the next stage of 
life in the evolutionary process. According to a set of artificial life practitioners, 
the grand narrative of evolution includes artificial life as its next stage (Helmreich 
1997: 376), a masculine birth of salvation and transcendence: 
In providing this grand story of evolution as unfolding toward a more 
perfect future, a future in which the flesh of humanity falls away to birth the 
butterfly of Artificial Life, Artificial Life practitioners repeat a very millennial, 
very Christian kind of salvation story - and one underwritten by a very 
masculine faith in technology. (Helmreich 1997:378) 
In such a story we are the creator gods of the worlds we give birth to and find 
salvation in. Within the discourse of 'postmodern' spirituality, however, the 
position and nature of God is being questioned and challenged. The patriarchal 
omnipotent God is being usurped by a figuration of God found within the system, 
and as a bottom·up phenomenon. In the spiritual narrative of life itself, God is 
found as emergence and evolution itself, rather than outside of these. Artificial life 
emplacements and evolutionary computer games reflect this duality of a God as 
top·down (patriarch) and bottom·up (emergence). The dual nature of God 
becomes entwined within the mythic drama of the story of life as evolution, 
contrasting the position and power of the player or user and that of the process of 
emergence and the system. In our digital emplacements, we take on the role of an 
omniscient patriarchal God, positioned outside and above the digital world, 
looking back into it, and able to see the workings of the world we have created 
and manipulate (Hayles 1999: 233; Kember 2003: 75; Helmreich 1998; Adam 
1998). In contrast, the bottom·up God of emergence is found within the system 
itself, as emergent behaviour and evolution. These both contribute to the 
development of myth and grand narrative surrounding artificial life, and within 
posthuman spirituality both are necessary. 
Seeing the God-Trick: Humans as God 
The most obvious role that humans take on in artificial life emplacements and 
evolutionary computer games is that of a patriarchal God, overseeing the 
creatures they have created. In the discourse of the posthuman, where we have 
gained the knowledge of nature and life itself as propagating informational 
structures, we have attained the privileged position of the god·trick, "seeing 
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everything from nowhere" (Haraway 1991:189, Kember 2003: 75). Positioned 
outside of the worlds created, the player or user looks in from above, overseeing 
the world and the life it holds, a panoptical view that allows vision into both the 
ongoing occurences of the world and a privileged view of its inner most workings. 
Describing the play of the game SimLife, artificial life guru Christopher Langton 
takes us through the mythic story of life and our role within it. He uncovers the 
mythic possibilities of SimLife within a discourse of a creator God and the 
interconnectedness of all things, starting with the player's role in the creation of 
the planet: 
On entering the game, the user, a la "Genesis," must first define a physical 
world by creating mountains, lakes, and river; establishing a climate, 
complete with regional and seasonal variation in temperature and 
moisture ... As the world is created, the user is able to view his "creation" 
developing in a "Map" window, which provides a synoptic view of the 
dynamics of the world throughout the simulation. (Langton 1991: 4·5) 
It is this association with a Genesis narrative and the player's obvious patriarchal 
God placement within the play of this mythic possibility of construction that forms 
the initial and most apparent god position, within evolutionary computer games. 
It is also this player positioning that gives simulation games their genre definition 
of 'god·sims.' Kember considers this placement of player as God as one 
ultimately of power: 
Power, as it currently configured is monolithic. It passes from the creator to 
the creations of ALife worlds but is neither shared nor contested. The power 
of the creator is embodied in the creation through narratives which closely 
model those of monotheistic Judeo·Christian religion. It is clear that ALife 
represents [Haraway's] 'god·trick' par excellence. (2003: 75) 
Taking evolutionary computer games out of a strictly Judeo·Christian Genesis 
narrative and placing them instead within a structure of postmodern spiritualities, 
a patriarchal god becomes a necessary, if shared, divine position, and is therefore 
both shared and contested. Also finding a divinity in emergent processes, the god 
position is shared with the system within postmodern spiritual narratives. A 
patriarchal god figure remains necessary, because without this external influence 
computational regimes would not be able to run, nor would they even exist. It 
takes an external entity to fulfil both the construction of the universe and the 
creation of life within it, as well as conceptualising the makings of the universe 
(the grid of computational automata) and the rules by which it abides. It is this 
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'author-Iy' aspect of the patriarchal God position that the producers of the game 
take and fulfil; it is the development and programming of the game that places 
the game producers in a divine role, complimenting the player in the patriarchal 
God position_ Computational regimes cannot develop or initiate themselves; they 
require an exterior force or entity to do so_ Within evolutionary computer games 
this role is discharged through a combined effort from the game producers and 
player_ In their author-Iy role, the game producers also realise their dominant 
position within the hegemonic order of the assembly, brought together in 
gameplay_ It is the developmental and programming aspects of the game that 
structure the narrative scaffolding of gameplay, delineating the character of play 
and becoming a dominant force in the shaping of narratives and meanings 
produced through play. 
God is in Our Genes: Evolution as God 
In the discourse of the interconnectedness of all things, the power of the patriarch 
God - the God who governs from above - is being usurped by the system. A new 
figuration of God as emergence has come to vie for the power of the world and 
universe. In the discourse of neo-Darwinism and the spirituality of the Cosmic 
Christ and Mother Universe, where all things are connected in process, the system 
and process find divine power in evolution. Evolution, as both the director of the 
process life and the process itself, is the God from withi n the system, the ghost in 
the machine. When Bj0rn Grinde states "God is in our genes" (1998: 20) his 
purpose is to suggest that humans are genetically programmed to search out a 
religious existence. This chapter takes his declaration out of context and offers 
instead that within the posthuman, God is in our genes in a more apparent sense. 
It is our genes, as informational propagating structures, that are the purpose and 
force of evolution. It is within our genes, and the corresponding computer 
algorithms of our silicon cousins, that the emergent power of evolution comes 
forth - here God is quite literally in our genes. In the mythic discourse of the 
interconnectedness of all things, artificial life displays and defines the creative 
power of evolution: 
Creativity as a divine force that animates and drives evolution forward is the 
theological Trojan horse hiding deep inside the scientific disciplines of 
artificial life and artificial evolution. If one accepts the theological premise 
that life is sacred, then A-life and artificial evolution serve as potent 
examples of how the divine is coming to inhabit cyberspace. (Cobb 1998: 
159) 
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The emergence of evolution is the divine creativity that guides life forward. It is a 
God that draws itself from the process of the system - from within nature as the 
interconnectedness of all things - connecting to images of the living Godhead and 
the Goddess. Matthew Fox asserts that in a 'postmodern' spirituality of the living 
universe, God is re·imagined as below and not above: "To relocate Divinity in the 
depths of nature and of the self is again to reencourage an entire civilization to 
listen to its creative powers and to allow those powers to emerge once again" 
(1990: 22). As we have been continually reminded of throughout, the most divine 
creative process is the emergence of evolution itself. Within artificial life, 
emergence and evolution garnish a level of respect and awe, appropriate for their 
divine status. In investigating the God·like status of artificial life practitioners, 
Stefan Helmreich finds that while artificial lifers might play at being Gods, 
evolution holds the title properly: 
While Artificial Life researchers speak playfully of being gods, their tones 
become much more serious when they speak of evolution, the force they 
see as responsible for organ ic life and for the rise of the practice of Artificia I 
Life ... In many ways, of course, evolution has become for these scientists a 
simple replacement for God, and so it's not surprizing that 'evolution' and 
'god' are often treated as synonyms in their everyday speech, this easy 
interchangability allows researchers to rotate in and out of being evolved 
products of evolution and being evolution itself. (Helmreich 1997: 379·380) 
In the spiritual discourse of the living universe, where the posthuman looks to the 
processes of digital cyberspace emplacements for the definition of the 'real,' the 
processes of artificial life form the common sense of the divinity of life and the 
living universe, in mutual processes of connectivity, emergence and evolution. As 
we have seen throughout the posthuman, form and process are given privileged 
standing, with the key emergent process of evolution taking the divine position of 
the God of the system, guiding life forward in a process of divine creativity (see 
also Kember 2005: 153). Jennifer Cobb encapsulates the partnering of science, 
technology and spirituality, and the conflation of the physical and the digital in 
the posthuman, in her description of the emergence of nonlinear systems in 
cyberspace. For Cobb, similar processes also seen occurring in the physical living 
universe match what is seen to be occurring in cyberspace: 
With computational emergence and self·organization, we find divinity 
present in the digital. In this medium, it makes sense that the divine 
expresses itself in the form of digital strings. What is remarkable, and truly 
awesome, is that when numbers of these small, simple digital strings are 
thrown together and left to run, lifelike properties emerge entirely 
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independently. Nonlinear systems are born - networks, populations, 
swarms, and colonies. It can be no accident that these baby systems reflect 
the same processes that we see in the organic world. There is a through· 
line between carbon and silicon, between the digital and the analog. Both 
realms are born of the same confluence of physics, chemistry, and divine 
creativity. (Cobb 1998: 172) 
Treating an emergent God·figure as a replacement for a patriarchal God, however, 
is unattainable. Within posthuman spirituality, a patriarchal God and emergent 
God are intimately entwined and co·dependent. Despite the desire to have done 
with a God that is outside and removed from the system to allow an emergent 
God figure the sole propriety over process and system, such a removed figure is a 
necessary part of the equation. Without this overseeing force separated and 
above, the system's critical questions remain unanswered: Who wrote the rules 
and program of the computational regime? Who constructed the universe? Who 
initiated the regime (started time)? Finding an inner connective force that guides 
and creates in emergence does not escape the requirement of an outside force 
that at least creates and initiates the computational regime in the first place. In 
the same manner, a patriarchal God figure is dependent on emergence for the 
continued development of the system within a computational regime. Without 
connectivity and emergence within a system of process philosophy, things would 
not run, nothing would happen, and the system would remain static. Therefore, 
despite the apparent power struggle between positioning a figuration of god either 
above or within the system, spiritually computational regimes realise a dual and 
co-dependent patriarchal and emergent god figurations. 
From Myth to Mythic Possibilities: 
Posthuman spirituality, implicated within computational regimes, tells a story of 
ineterconnectivity, emergence and holism through the declared divinely creative 
forces of emergent process, overseen by a second overseeing force outside and 
removed from the system. Intimately connected with the science and scientific 
discourse of artificial life, the spiritual within artificial life finds a divine process 
within the emergent qualities of connectionism and first order rules that show 
emergent higher order behaviour. Through interpreting the local dependency 
within cellular automaton on neighbouring cells, in determining cell state at each 
time interval or generation as a global or universal holism, the postmodern and 
posthuman spirituality, partnered with the spiritual discourse of artificial life, 
finds a universal connective force that treats the universe as a singular spiritual 
living entity. Reflected more locally at the planetary level as Gaia and Mother 
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Earth, this living universe of the cosmic Christ finds a spiritual path, through the 
creative evolution of emergence, which guides life forward. A more traditional 
patriarchal Godhead is also implicated within this spiritual discourse, without 
whom the system cannot be programmed or initiated. This dual mythic story of 
patriarchal and emergent gods creating systems of creative evolution is 
consistently played through within evolutionary artificial life computer games. 
Evolutionary artificial life computer games and projects (re)tell this mythic journey 
through the narratives created in gameplay, structured by the mythic possibilities 
presented within the game. Namely, through the mythic possibilities of 
construction, creation and change that structure and guide the player through 
gameplay, the scientific and spiritual discourses of artificial life are realised as 
they are played through. These three ever present configurations of gameplay 
structure and position the player and play, creating narrative possibilities aligning 
with the scientific discourse of computational regimes and the spiritual discourses 
of interconnectivity, holism and the dual nature of patriarchal and emergent god 
figures. The virtual world is made through construction, initiating a Judeo· 
Christian genesis narrative of a patriarchal god· player, forming a new world and 
universe ready to host life. Each time a new game is initiated the first task at hand 
is the construction of a virtual space, through the allotment of an amount of 
computer memory, in which to host the silicon life about to be created. 
Scientifically, the construction of space creates a virtual computer within the 
computer where the robust environment needed for the programming of cellular 
automata and genetic algorithms can occur. The construction of this 'virtual 
computer' and 'virtual universe' constructs space and defines the rules of the 
world. Spiritually, this translates to a very Judeo·Christian creation narrative, on 
the birth of the universe through divine intervention. In doing so, the patriarchal 
godhead sets the parameters, rules and structure for the emergent god within, 
and as, the system. With a digital ecosystem now constructed and ready to host 
new silicon life, the second mythic possibility that evolutionary artificial life 
computer games (and programs) structure play through is creation. This is the 
inoculation of digital environments with new life, the creation of life on these new 
worlds occurs by divine intervention, rather than through emergent intra·actions. 
The creation of life continues a Judeo·Christian genesis narrative structure and 
continues to reinforce the patriarchal god positioning of the player. While the 
construction of space usually signals the opening or loading of a game, the 
creation of life commences gameplay properly. 
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Spiritually, construction and creation focus on the intra·actions between the 
player as patriarchal god and the game, and set the stage for the possibility of the 
third spiritual and scientific mythic possibility of such games: change. Change 
incorporates emergent processes and evolution into narrative possibilities and the 
interconnectedness of all things, within a grand narrative of creative evolution. 
This has the goal of leading towards ever increasing complexity, and therefore 
intelligence. Scientifically, the narratives of change within artificial life systems 
are intimately entwined with biological formulations that have found common 
ground in informatics, connectionism, emergence and cybernetics. Spiritually, 
these have been translated into paired stories that find a figuration of the cosmic 
Christ within connectionism and emergence, a figure representing a living 
universe of interconnectedness. Within evolutionary artificial life computer games 
and programs, the possibility of change is the main thrust of gameplay. It is the 
intra·action between the player and the system, with the player learning how to 
manipUlate the system in order to produce meaningful and desired results, from 
the emergent processes of the system. Spiritually, this translates to the struggle 
and co·operation between the player as patriarchal god and the system as 
emergent god. Change within these computer games is the realisation of 
something better through the emergent processes of cybernetic systems and 
evolution. Change is progressive, non·predictable and negotiated. 
Tracing a genealogy of evolutionary artificial life computer games forms a history 
and development of the scientific and spiritual discourses of artificial life and the 
posthuman. Finding an ancestor in the Game of Life, evolutionary artificial life 
computer games have developed mythic possibilities that structure gameplay and 
position the player to realise narratives that produce meanings about life itself, 
that tie the spiritual and scientific discourses surrounding life itself, nature and 
the cosmos within the computational regimes of the posthuman. The development 
of the spiritual and scientific narratives that tie silicon and carbon together 
continues through popular scientific projects and evolutionary computer games. 
Similar to Sarah Kember's historic overview (2003), the next chapter traces this 
development through the Game of Life and on through the Blind Watchmaker, Tierra, 
SimEarth, and SimLife. These build a narrativity that comes to fruition within the 
mythic discourse in play within Creatures. 
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Chapter 7 
A Genealogy: The Evolution of Evolutionary 
Computer Games 
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The scientific and spiritual mythic discourses that pervade evolutionary artificial 
life computer games tie these games into a specific set of grand narratives that 
are associated with computational regimes, and a new ontological structure found 
in informational formations and process. A genealogy of the games and research 
projects that have found popularity as scientific projects, as well as with a general 
audience, traces the development of both the scientific and spiritual discourses 
that come together in the grand narratives of artificial life and computational 
regimes. Through increasingly complex games and popular scientific projects, the 
assumptions and narrative rhetoric that characterises evolutionary computer 
games, and artificial life more generally, develops in its scientific and spiritual 
depth. The genealogical journey presented in this chapter covers a set of games 
identified in my Masters dissertation (Mackie 1998) and follows a similar course 
set by Sarah Kember (2003), who traces the development of evolutionary 
computer games and popular programs through Tierra, SimEarth, SimLife and 
SimCity(85·91), finally examining Creatures (91·115)11. For this thesis, following 
participant engagement to investigate the genealogy of games, each has been 
played over the course of study. From this analysis of gameplay and further 
engagement with the various additional media surrounding the games available, 
this chapter looks to identify key statements and concepts taken from gameplay. 
It has been purposely written in the third person to emphasise the non· specificity 
of the results; what has been brought into discussion are general statements able 
to be made about each game. I begin with the Game of Life, a program not 
properly classified as artificial life, but laying the foundations for all 
computational regimes. Early artificial life demonstrations like Richard Dawkins' 
Blind Watchmaker or Biomorphs introduce narratives that develop tight links 
between digital and material, through highly anthropomorphised language and 
conceptualisations. The artificial life research project Tierra exemplifies programs 
of its type, and enjoyed a high degree of popularity amongst an interested lay 
11 Elsewhere Kember highlights the importance of the Game of Life in the development of artificial self· 
reproduction and evolution (2003: 70), as well as an overview and critique of Richard Dawkins and 
Biomorphs (2003: 54·56). 
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audience. SimEarth and SimLife go further and introduce artificial life to the 
general gaming audience. Connections between silicon and carbon life are actively 
made in these games, with objectives of maintaining viable ecosystems reflecting 
those found on earth. The spiritual aspect of evolutionary computer games is 
highlighted within these two examples, developing the interconnectedness of all 
things through a Gaian thematic that is central to gameplay. 
Kember builds her genealogy as examples where "simulations are seen to offer 
mirror rather than alternative worlds, reproducing hegemonic discourses of origin 
and evolution" (2003: 84). The genealogy offered here aligns to, and augments, 
Kember's overview, offering greater detail to Kember's "brief analysis" (2003: 84). 
This thesis sets itelf apart by tracing the development of gameplay and the 
position of the player within the assembly and system. The genealogy of games 
builds an increasingly complex set of scientific and spritual statements available. 
The chapter also further implicates the player, and how his or her position 
develops, especially in relations of power to each game system. It is a player· 
centric analysis of games, and aims to show how progressive games have built a 
repertoire of play within a 'sim' genre that has supported digital entities to be 
considered as living. Two areas are developed in the preparation for a fuller 
analysis of Creatures as the most advanced evolutionary computer game this 
thesis covers. The first is the development of narrative associated with artificial 
life emplacements, which is increasingly connected and involved with the cultures 
evolutionary computer games and projects. The spiritual and scientific narrative 
structure played through the mythic possibilities of construction, creation and 
change has been developed as an integral aspect of gameplay. The games and 
programs presented actively promote their spiritual and scientific features and 
make these a core element of gameplay. This is exemplified in SimEarth's 
unapologetic Gaian overtones and SimLife's scientific character, including 
experiment notebooks for the player to make use of. The scientific and spiritual 
narratives that these games and programs associate with are actively promoted 
within gameplay and through other structures and connect silicon and carbon, 
digital and material. The second connected area is the placement and positioning 
of the player within these games and programs. As with the development of 
narrative structure through the genealogy, the player's position within these 
digital emplacements finds a common and developing role. A player's ability to 
influence events and the occurrences of the gamespace increases through the 
genealogy, moving from a primarily observatory to participatory role. As the 
player's involvement becomes more active, the tension of power and control 
between the player and the system also becomes more apparent. This 
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relationship becomes a part of the narrative structure of the game, played 
through narrative scaffolding and mythic possibilities. Even in the earliest 
program analysed, the Game of Life, the dual balance of power between player and 
system is present. 
Game of Life (1940s - ): The rules of self-organisation 
Within computational regimes, Conway's Game of Life (Life) is more than aptly 
named. Although rarely classified as artificial life in its own right, the cellular 
automata of grids, rules and states that make up Life nonetheless form the 
conceptual backbone and core of all artificial life programs, as well as forming the 
prototypical model for computational regimes. As such, its importance within 
artificial life cannot be over emphasised. It is a game with a central focus on 
emergence; the application of simple rules across discrete time units on a simple 
two·dimensional grid can form regular and/or stable patterns that display such 
lifelike behaviours as predictable movement, coherence of form, stability over 
time and/or predictable diSintegration. For those who follow a computational 
regime, this type of emergence is the foundation of life itself, displaying the 
rudiments of self·organised behaviour. The Game of Life, therefore, plays with the 
essential core of reality and what it means to be alive. 
As has been previously detailed in chapter four, the Game of Life operates on a 
two·dimensional geometric grid where each grid space can either be open 
(unoccupied/empty) or closed (occupied/black). Originally played on an Oriental 
'Go' board with flat counters, predating modern electronic computational 
analysis, Life and other similar GA programs are still a major contemporary focus 
of computer research and interest. In Life the player arranges a pattern over the 
grid to initialise the game and then applies a set of simple rules to the game set. 
The rule set consists of: 
l. Survivals. Every counter with two or three neighbouring counters survives 
for the next generation. 
2. Deaths. Each counter with four or more neighbours dies (is removed) 
from overpopulation. Every counter with one neighbour or none dies from 
isolation. 
3. Births. Each empty cell adjacent to exactly three neighbours - no more, 
no fewer - is a birth cell. A counter is placed on it at the next move. 
(Gardner 1970) 
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These rules are the foundational programming of Life as a computational regime, 
through the manipulation of discrete informational bits over discrete time units, 
through the application of a set of simple rules. The application of the rules to the 
game set changes the pattern of the grid and qualifies as the progression of one 
unit of time, also classified as a generation. Playing Life over a number of time 
sequences or generations produces emergent patterns across the grid that appear 
remarkably lifelike. As Kember comments, "[t]he idea, of course, was that the 
process would continue and that the cellular automata would model not only self 
reproduction but also evolution, and indeed emergence" (2003: 70). The 
predictable behaviour of sets or clusters of closed spaces (shapes or objects), that 
through generations produce apparently coherent and al most purposeful 
movement (or absolute stability), has lead to a naming and classification system 
for Life objects. Typically objects are classified by their behaviour, size, movement 
speed, and direction. These are normally divided into three phyla - Stable Objects, 
Oscillating Objects, and Moving Objects - and then subdivided within each phyla. 
Stable Objects, for example, are objects that maintain shape, size and position 
and are subdivided into the classes of Inductors (objects with no death cells but 
containing one birth cell) and Eaters (objects that absorb or 'eat' other objects 
that collide with them, while maintaining their shape). Objects are further divided 
into orders, typically assigned by object size and genera, which in the case of 
Moving Objects are organised by the speed in which the object moves. The 
classification of Life objects generally reflect the Linnaean system used in the 
biological sciences to describe and categorise all living things. While the names 
given to Life objects are generally not highly biological (spaceships, gliders, and 
pumps are popular inspirations for names), the classification system in which 
they are hierarchically positioned reflects contemporary biology. 
From the progressive nature of individual cells 'dying' or coming 'alive' as the 
rules are sequentially applied to the grid, comes the emergence of recognisable 
patterns of cell activity that have been classified in the same manner as biological 
phenomena, creating narrative possibilities for Life that places it within the 
biological, computer and life sciences. While it is forgotten that 'movement' in Life 
is not the transfer of an occupied cell to a neighbouring empty cell, but the 
'death' of one cell and the 'birth' of a new (so no actual 'movement' takes place), 
the pattern of Life as it plays out on a computer screen looks remarkably lifelike. 
The inference that Life suggests, as a computational regime, is that to some 
degree our own existence mirrors the rule based emergent patterns found in 
discrete space and discrete time. Far from just a game, researchers interested in 
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Life take the emerging patterns within its two-dimensional grid very seriously, and 
postulate the rudimentary foundations of our own reality within Life. 
Interest in Life as a research tool has centred on the discovery of different objects, 
and the analysis of their behavioural patterns. This has led some researchers to 
make parallel inferences with the essence of carbon life and reality itself, found at 
the core of the computational regime argument. Mavericks of this standpoint, 
such as Fredkin, have taken the concept of Life and have wholeheartedly applied it 
to a conceptualisation of reality as a universal computational regime. The 
challenge for Fredkin and his peers is to ascertain how many dimensions that the 
grid of reality contains (Life is a simplistic two dimensional space - reality is 
considered to be far more complex) and what the underlying rules, or singular 
Rule as Fredkin is eager to postulate, are at its base. Others have seen the 
challenge in Life as the production of increasingly complex machines, with the 
ultimate goal of creating a Universal Turing Machine within the grid of Life. To this 
end, Paul Rendell presented plans in 2000 for a simple Turing Machine that could 
be theoretically expanded to fit the definition of a Universal Machine (see 
rendell_server.o rg. u kl go I/tm_ htm). 
Life is rule based, discrete, emergent and deterministic. Given a certain grid 
sequence at time 0, the appearance of the grid at any following time interval is 
set. Given the rules, grid size and original sequence, no other pattern is available 
at a given time slot and the system progresses in a logical defined manner. While 
it is deterministic, with each generation holey determined by the last, it is also 
unpredictable. The only way to realise what patterns will emerge is through the 
actual running of the program. Life is the common ancestor of this type of 
'unknowable' determinism, found repeatedly in the computational regimes of the 
universal computer, responsible determinism and Finite Nature and the 
inspiration for later games such as Sim Life , SimEarth and Creatures. All these 
share the common factor of the reducibility of all things to discrete units of 
information, changing over discrete time lapses. As a computer program, Life 
behaves in a logical manner just as any other program would. Extrapolating the 
operations of Life to the physical molecular world and universe, however, through 
the overlay of biological narratives and placing it within a theoretical framework of 
computational regimes, very modernist notions of space and time are recuperated 
and repackaged as the ontological underpinnings of reality. Here, space and time 
are postulated as discrete grid spaces and generational progressions, then re-
associated as definition and model of how the world is, as the informational basis 
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of reality. Although the patterns and shapes that Life produce are too primitive to 
be classified as (artificial) life or to count as a true model or simulation of the 
physical world and universe, it is within Life's programming that the foundational 
structure has been formed, of the complexity deemed necessary for intelligent 
behaviour to emerge. 
As the playing of Life is the logical emergence of grid patterns that appear through 
generations of game play, the skill for a player is not necessarily in the 
manipulation of emerging patterns, but in the setting of initial parameters that 
will provide interesting patterns once the game has started. The player is 
definitely externally placed to the Life environment, looking down and onto the 
world-grid in a patriarchal god positioning. The player, in this role of patriarchal 
god, decides the originating grid sequence, and through initiating the game brings 
'life' and 'time' to the world-grid. On most contemporary computer based Life 
systems the player regulates time by controlling its speed, even to a generation 
on generation level (i.e. manually progressing each time slot on the computer), 
allowing for different 'times' in the Life grid-world. The other most noticeable area 
of patriarchal godly control the user engages in is the determination of the grid at 
time O. The user is able to set the initial parameters of the game through the 
placing of the originating pattern of the grid. Even in the relatively simple grid-
world of Life, it is the patriarchal god-player who plants the seed of life in the 
world; a genesis mythology is played through, even in this 'proto' artificial life 
program. It is the player's responsibility to arrange the grid in such a manner that 
the unfolding generations provide a display of lifelike behaviour and emerging Life 
things of predictability and regularity. As soon as the player activates time within 
the system, however, control is relinquished from the patriarchal player-god to the 
system as emergent god, aligning to the new postmodern spiritualities. Once time 
has begun, the player is in a purely observatory role; his or her obligation to the 
system has been fulfilled and Life will run according to its rules along its 
deterministic emerging generations of patterns. Being a patriarchal god in Life is 
largely a passive role. It is the system that continues the good work in the role of 
an emergent god once the program is initiated. The player can 'interfere' with the 
emerging generations and alter the gamespace at any time interval, manipulating 
the patterns in the grid. Technically, this action, in a computational regime, is 
establishing a new regime. New parameters have been set with an associated new 
history. Time is reset to 0 and a new regime would be initiated, leaving the 
program to redefine its emerging patterns. 
William Gavin Mackie Loading World 168 
In the mythic possibilities played through in Life, the true power does not reside 
with the patriarchal player·god, but rather within the system itself as an emergent 
god, in the application of the rules that define the emergence of the changing 
grid·world. It is this application, across continuing discrete time frames, in which 
the emergence of lifelike behaviour takes place. The player's role is more 
removed, deciding on the originary grid·world state, triggering the passage of 
time and analysing the resulting patterns that emerge, dictated by the rules of the 
game. Spiritually, played through in the mythic possibilities it presents, Life 
foreshadows and lays the foundation for a belief in a central dogma, focused 
around the godly process of emergence itself, and the connected holism of the 
universe through informational ties of connectivity. The central dictate of simple 
rules forming the core of the emerging behaviour of the entire grid·world positions 
the player outside the true source of power within the system; the continuing 
action of the system determines the pattern of the grid·world in the adherence to 
the rule set over the course of time, while locating power within the system itself. 
It is impossible to locate control in anyone aspect of Life, as would be expected 
within a scientific and spiritual discourse of interconnectivity. It is only though the 
intra·action between a player and the game that the system works, as well as 
between the different components of the game with the demarcation of a given 
grid set of a defined size in evolution over generations in time of continually 
applied rules. 
The Game of Life contains all the ingredients for the development of computational 
regimes and increasingly complex artificial life emplacements: discrete 
informational units conforming to simple rules, an interconnected network of 
interdependence, and the emergence of recognisable and classifiable behaviour 
patterns that display lifelike behaviours. All that is missing in the progression to 
artificial life is the addition of self·organisation, evolution and cybernetic feedback 
loops to make the movement from lifelike to life itself. Within the scientific and 
spiritual discourses that surround artificial life and computational regimes, the 
Game of Life sets assumptions that are carried forward through future programs 
and games. Scientifically, and critical to the deterministic theoretical 
underpinnings of computational regimes, Life assumes the discrete nature of both 
time and space. It from this assumption that the concept of emergence develops 
and is defined as a deterministic force; it is only from the initial structuring 
element of the possibility to define each grid point at a time reference that future 
generations are knowable. Time and space have been made discrete, and the 
state of each is defined by the rules of the system; by knowing the rules and the 
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state of the system at any point in time, the state of the system at any other point 
in time can be calculated. Transferring notions of discrete space and time and 
deterministic emergence from logical computer programming to the material 
molecular world and universe has ontological and political effects. Spiritually, as 
the application of the rules of the system to one grid point depends on the states 
of the grid points that surround it, there gains the assumption of the 
interconnectedness of all things. Every grid point within Life is dependent on its 
neighbours for defining its state, supporting a developing spiritual discourse of 
interconnectivity, holism and the cosmic Christ. Additionally, Life establishes the 
position of the player within evolutionary artificial life computer games, exterior to 
the system looking in; a typical patriarchal god placement. Adhering to a 
postmodern spiritual discourse, play involves the release of power to the system, 
positioned as an emergent god. These competing and co·dependent god positions 
are present within Life. Within the Game of Life, the mythic possibilities of 
construction, creation and change are all present and accounted for, giving a 
narrative structure upon which subsequent projects and games have developed. 
Blind Watchmaker (Biomorphs) (1986 - ): Evolution itself 
If the Game of Life preconfigures computational regimes and forms the prototype 
upon which artificial life emplacements have been conceived, the Blind 
Watchmaker introduces the concept of digital neo·Darwinian evolution. 
Accompanying the book of the same name, the Blind Watchmaker game (more 
commonly known as Biomorphs- named after artist Desmond Morris' surreal 
animal like shapes) is an early artificial life tool, developed by iconic neo· 
Darwinian biologist Richard Dawkins, as a means of demonstrating his theory of 
evolutionary process and evolutionary space in action. Biomorphs diverges from 
most games and programs that make up this genealogy. It does not conform to 
the same programming structure introduced in the Game of Life. Similar spiritual 
and scientific discourses, however, are played through in the mythic possibilities 
offered by the game. 
In Biomorphs, the user is presented with a three·by·three grid of nine line figures, 
or biomorphs, each varying slightly from one another. It is the player's 
responsibility to choose the biomorph that will continue to successfully breed the 
next set of figures. Upon confirming his or her chosen individual, that figure is 
taken through to the next generation and is used as the parent for the next set of 
biomorphs, consisting of variations by one genetic movement each from the 
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parent. As a tool to demonstrate the concepts that Dawkins' elaborates on in the 
Blind Watchmaker, Biomorphs is steeped in anthropomorphised language and 
strong metaphoric overtones, the project produces a heavily biologised meaning 
for progressions of computer illustrated stick drawings, preparing and aligning 
the user within a framework in which Dawkins can make his evolutionary 
argument. The power of Biomorphs as an evolutionary descriptor is not in the 
program itself, but in (Dawkins') translation and mythologising of events. The 
program cannot be understood without the accompanying evolutionary biological 
narratives it associates with, and produces. It is only through the assembly of the 
intra·action of the player, the program and the biomorphs in the digital genetic 
space, and within the language used to make meaning from the game, in which 
Biomorphs comes to make sense as a biological tool. This seems to run contrary 
to Dawkins' own intent with the program, as he does not want to "prejudge the 
issue by building·in specific animal pictures to start with. We want them to 
emerge solely as a result of cumulative selection of random mutation" (1986: 62). 
Even here, however, Dawkins has already structured the biological into the 
production of meaning in the game - he builds 'random mutation' into the game, 
an event associated with biological phenomena. We are encouraged to expect 
'animal pictures' to emerge at some point through play, from figures that have 
been specifically designed to display anthropological similarities. Kember takes 
this further: 
In other words, [Dawkins] is selecting 'evidence' of evolution or creating an 
evolutionary pattern which he then uses as evidence of evolution. With this 
sleight of hand, Dawkins captures the paradox of creation which is at the 
heart of the ALife project: the God·like act of creating life is 'stolen' or 
appropriated by man and then credited to the computer. (2003: 55) 
The result is the production of narratives of computer evolution producing 
remarkably pseudo carbon· biological results (in at least their two·dimensional 
visual aesthetics). Through progressive generations, the complexity of the stick 
figures increases as the player selects for shapes of interest. Forgetting that the 
biomorphs visual appearance is not random, and instead already humanly created 
or formulated through the artistry of Desmond Morris; for Dawkins, the search for 
the biological within the computational brought startling results, with the finding 
and breeding of insect type shapes. At each generation, choosing the most insect· 
like while his "incredulity grew in parallel with the evolving resemblance" (Dawkins 
1986: 72), Dawkins determined the arthropod direction Biomorphs took. With 
excitement, Dawkins sourced a collection of animal shapes including a 
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'swallowtail', 'scorpion', 'jumping spider', and 'man in hat' amongst other familiar 
animals and shapes (1986: 75). It is through these anthropological visual 
associations between three-dimensional biological forms, and two-dimensional 
computer generated line drawings, that Dawkins structures a feeling for 
evolutionary processes within a computer program. By closely entwining the 
biological with(in) the computational, Dawkins creates an exploratory computer 
genetic space of human guided evolution. It incorporates human and computer 
intra-action, in the production and exploration of a collection of computer aided 
stick figures of related complex shapes. Nothing new is produced in Biomorphs; all 
of the possible shapes already theoretically exist in what Dawkins has termed the 
'genetic space' or 'Biomorph Land' (1986:81-82). By having a set number of 
genes with a set number of genetic permutations, there are a finite number of 
possible genotypic outcomes within the game. With no environmental pressures 
present to muddy the phenotypic expression of the biomorphs genetic make-up 
(and therefore creating a direct translation from genotype to phenotype), each 
genotypic expression holds one potential realisation, equal to one place on the 
map of genetic space. The genetic space of the program is the entire potentiality 
for the set of genes and variants that make up the biomorph genome_ It is 
deterministic, as it pre-determines and maps all possible genotypic/phenotypic 
outcomes within the game. Every genotype has a singular, mapped phenotypic 
potential in genetic space. The way that Biomorphs operates to move the player 
through the genetic space by the mutation of chosen biomorphs, however, differs 
from the other artificial life programs examined. 
Unlike games based in the genetic algorithms first developed in the Game of Life, 
Biomorphs' rules do not determine the state of the space in the progression of 
each time frame within the system. Instead, they guide the mutation from 
generation to generation of the player-selected figures. It is the intra-action here, 
between human, game and game elements that generates time, plots history, 
chooses direction, and decides on the route of evolution. The results of evolution 
are deterministic, as they are pre-expressed within the biomorphic genetic space 
and routed through the mutational rules of the game. The path of evolution, 
however, is not. Directing the path of evolution is the human player's contribution 
to Biomorphs; through continual choices they guide the development of 
generations of biomorphs. Dawkins gives this the term 'artificial selection,' as the 
selection process is determi ned by exterior criteria that are not related to the 
inherent fitness of the individual biomorph. With no environmental pressures to 
define fitness, no biomorph is inherently more or less 'fit' than any other. As 
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players, we are mythically placed in the role of patriarchal god, to choose the 
biomorph that takes our fancy for each generation, from outside and above the 
gamespace. Forgetting that even pedigree dogs have been bred to suit particular 
jobs and environments, Dawkins likens the purely subjective nature of selection 
within Biomorphs to human selection within animal husbandry: 
The human eye has an active role to play in the story. It is the selecting 
agent. It surveys the litter of progeny and chooses one for breeding. The 
chosen one then becomes the parent of the next generation, and a litter of 
its mutant children are displayed simultaneously on the screen. The human 
eye is doing exactly what it does in the breeding of pedigree dogs or prize 
roses. Our model, in other words, is strictly a model of artificial selection, 
not natural selection. (1986: 69· 70) 
As the selecting agent within Biomorphs, humans gain a patriarchal god·role, 
similarly positioned as in the Game of Life, above and outside of the game's digital 
environment. It is through this positioning and role within the game that humans 
gain a degree of power. Selecting each generation's successful biomorph gives the 
player the godly power of choice, deciding the criteria for selection and executing 
this choice and effectively exercising the power of life and death, extinction or 
reproduction. It is this execution of choice that drives the system forward, 
providing an engine and measurement of time, determining the navigation of the 
genetic space. In Biomorphs, time is reduced to the progression of generations; 
the creatures are static, only the potential ability to reproduce associates them 
with any lifelike attribute. This is life itself stripped back to its bare essential neo-
Darwinistic bones (or perhaps more aptly, genes) - there is no living in Biomorphs, 
only the act of mutation, reproduction, birth and death; all aspects that are not 
performed by the player or game rather than biomorphs themselves. There is no 
biomorphic intra-action and no real form of reproduction that occurs by the 
biomorphs, it is forgotten that these actions are operated computer programming 
outside of each individual's coding. The biomorphs do not intra-act between 
themselves and do not actively contribute to their intra-action with human users; 
they are frozen static entities. The only movement and measure of time is the 
extermination of a set of biomorphs with their replacement by a new set-
mutated adaptations of an individual from the prior generation. As befits 
Biomorphs' neo-Darwinian definition, life within the game is the evolution and 
progression of generations of code through each additional time unit, triggered 
through human-game intra-action. 
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With the dependence on the player for the progression of ti me and artificial 
selection in the evolution of the biomorph set through time, it appears that 
humans have a strong position of power in their patriarchal god standing within 
the game. Here it is only through human intra·action that the game progresses, 
unlike in Life, where the game progresses on its own once initiated and humans 
are largely relegated to the role of spectator. Fulfilling the role of a patriarchal god 
in Biomorphs is definitely participatory. In this sense, the human player holds the 
power of time progression and history creation. The player chooses when time 
occurs (moving forward on each choice of a biomorph) and the direction of history 
(the choice of each biomorph, leading to the story of biomorphic evolution 
through time). It is up to the player to decide that insect biomorphs will be 
developed rather than swallowtails, and it is their choices that decide the most 
insect·like shapes. At first glance, it appears that the mythic possibilities of the 
game structure the player, as a participatory patriarchal god that holds and 
retains the power to guide the system forward. Within this structure, the system 
does its best to understand, and provide the player with favourable biomorphs. 
Considering Biomorphs within such a scenario, it is the player that controls the 
system; the system is but a servant in the player's sovereignty. As with Life, 
however, this appearance of power is illusionary. Again the association between 
player and game finds a shared decentralised control that builds a relationship 
between the player as a patriarchal god, and the system as an emergent god. It is 
not the player who controls the physical attributes of the biomorphs. This is 
computed by the system adhering to the rules of mutation programmed into the 
game. Players choose what they believe to be the biomorph of the present 
generation that most closely resembles the desired biomorph in the next. The 
rules of mutation programmed in to the system's programming determine the 
aesthetics of the next generation, and it is the assembly brought together within 
the program as an integrated whole that shapes the outcome of biomorphic 
evolution. Spiritually, Biomorphs displays the same duality between patriarchal 
and emergent god found in Life and throughout artificial life emplacements and 
computational regimes. Scientifically, the player is incorporated within the 
assembly of agents, in a distributed network of control and power, that plays 
through the evolutionary story of digital life absolutely reduced to information. 
Dawkins' own adventures with Biomorphs highlights this struggle and co· 
dependency between player and system. Dawkins reports that his initial play with 
the game resulted in following an evolutionary path to an insect·like outcome. He 
was so excited that making a record of the final insect biomorph escaped him, 
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and he was forced to retrace his steps in a second attempt to achieve the same 
shape (1986:78). During this second time, Dawkins was unable to find the same 
path through the biomorphic genetic space, and spent extra time attempting to 
find his way back to similar shapes he found during his first go. While highlighting 
the enormity of the genetic space within Biomorphs with many close relatives 
giving diverging evolutionary results, it also exemplifies the player's lack of direct 
control over the system. In his search for his elusive insect biomorph, Dawkins 
must conform to the system and do his best to guide evolution in the direction 
that he hopes will bring him to the placeholder within the genetic space, which 
displays the biomorphic phenotypic attributes that we recognise as insect·like. He 
becomes a part of a system of intra·actions that together determine the results of 
gameplay. His actions neither directly control the course of events, nor are 
impotent without effect. They integrate within the larger system that, as a whole, 
moves the game forward. 
A second example of Dawkins demonstrating an at least partial relegation of 
control to the system can be found in the inability to evolve a true insect shape. In 
his search for an anthropoid biomorph, Dawkins is actually thwarted in his 
attempts; he is only able to produce a figure with eight legs rather than six legs 
normally associated with the insect shape (1986: 73). His inability to find a 
biomorph with the correct number of 'limbs' in its shape highlights the limitations 
of the system; no such shape exists within biomorphic genetic space. Given the 
genetic variability of the biomorph genome, there is no combination of genes that, 
when brought together as a biomorph genome, exhibit a phenotype with six legs. 
Dawkins' search will ultimately go unfulfilled, as is (pre·)determined by the 
system, and he will have to settle on a biomorph displaying an additional two 
limbs. For Dawkins to be able to have the potential of a true anthropoid, the core 
genetic make·up of the biomorphs and how their genes are expressed would need 
to be altered, an action outside of the remit of the player of the game. Such an 
alteration would need to occur within the programming of the game and would 
effectively change the game itself; Biomorphs with a potentiality of a six·legged 
figure within its genetic space would be a different game. Dawkins is left with only 
the ability to intra·act as part of the system, moving evolution towards an eight· 
legged figure. He lacks the power to move outside the genetic space of the game 
as it is. 
In presenting the concept of evolution with our historic travels, Biomorphs also 
highlights the importance of the anthropomorphised stories that are overlaid on 
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the digital activities of the program in order to make sense of the game. The 
scientific and mythic discourses played through in Biomorphs do not gain 
attention from what they demonstrate as computer programming, because there 
is little of interest in the navigation of the object set on its own. Within solely 
computing terms, Biomorphs is simply a manner of computer aided user 
movement through a predetermined code set. Meaning is created within a highly 
biologised narrative structure in which the game is immersed. Here, the game is 
understood through illuminating the fundamentals of life itself within a neo· 
Darwinian framework. Taking biomorph appearance for 'fitness,' player choice for 
'artificial selection,' programmed code redistribution for 'mutation,' and the 
movement of one selection set to the next as 'reproduction,' a grand narrative of 
neo·Darwiwian life and evolution is produced. It is only through the importation of 
these specific narratives of life itself, structured around the game and in play, that 
Biomorphs has interest. Dawkins uses Biomorphs as a tool to demonstrate, 
structure and align his audience to the conceptual arguments made in the Blind 
Watchmaker. Playing Biomorphs is largely an exercise in structures of feeling, 
introduced to the culture of neo·Darwinian evolutionism where life itself has 
effectively been reduced to reproducing strings of code. Dependence on a 
surrounding biological narrative structure continues through artificial life 
emplacements and games. 
Tierra (1989 - ): The primordial soup 
As previously highlighted (Hayles 1996b, Kember 2003, Helmreich 1998), Tierra is 
also highly dependent on the narratives that surround the program in order to 
make sense of play and to be able to produce meaning. Tierra brings the concepts 
of self·organisation (Life) and evolution (Biomorphs) together in a digital universe 
of competing, reproducing and evolving strings of computer programming code. 
In doing so, Tierra is the first computer program to make the claim that its 
inhabitants are truly alive; creator, biologist and leading American artificial life 
researcher Thomas Ray views Tierrans as actual instances of life. From the 
introductory declaration "information wants to be alive", Tierra goes forth to 
attempt to demonstrate not only this desire for life, but that information is the 
fundamental building block of life itself, silicon or carbon. Created as a research 
tool to explore life and evolution, Tierra has become popularised through the ease 
of use as a program for 'hobby' artificial lifers, and the prototype model for 
similar research based artificial life programs. 
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As with Life, Tierra operates as a computational regime: a self·contained digital 
universe of both discrete space and time that runs logically according to its rule· 
based programming. Its underlying conceptualisation and narrative is rather 
simple: to create a robust digital universe that can support computer algorithmic 
'creatures' that reproduce; add mechanisms of mutation, sex (to stimulate 
evolution) and death (so that the world does not just fill up); and see what 
emerges. I n other words, Tierra is the construction of a digital emplacement that 
caters for the necessary conditions for the creation of neo·Darwinian life that 
changes through evolution over time. Tierra follows the mythic journey of 
construction, creation and change that characterises evolutionary computer 
games and programs. As with Biomorphs before it, making sense and 
understanding the operations of the computer code within this mythic structure 
that shapes Tierra is only possible when attached to the heavily biologised and 
anthropomorphised narratives that accompany it. Ray's own preliminary 
computational description of the system is one of his only largely non·biological 
descriptions of Tierra (but even here, as we can see, evolution, mutation and 
natural selection still slips in): 
The C code creates a virtual computer and its operating system, whose 
architecture has been designed in such a way that the executable machine 
codes are evolvable. This means that the machine code can be mutated (by 
flipping bits at random) or recombined (by swapping segments of code 
between algorithms), and the resulting code remains functional enough of 
the time for natural (or presumably artificial) selection to be able to 
improve the code over time. (Ray & Virtual Life 1995) 
Ray quickly biologises the explanation of Tierra programming, where machine 
code becomes 'creatures,' the digital space within the virtual computer becomes 
the 'soup' and the talk includes evolution, mutation, births, deaths, genebanks, 
genomes and ecological analysis. Whilst Ray's use of biological terms and 
metaphors highlights his lack of distinction between natural and artificial 
organisms (Kember 2003: 85), it is difficult if not impossible to make sense of the 
programming of Tierra without its biological metaphoric overlay. It is only within 
the scientific and spiritual grand narratives of artificial life, and of a specific neo· 
Darwinian evolutionary definition of life, that meaning is produced within Tierra, 
because a narrative structure of species lines developing and competing for the 
scarce resources of CPU time and space in a digital microcosm of life itself is 
built. Tierrans are static creatures and, as with biomorphs, they have no activities 
of living associated with them, no active metabolism, no movement, and no true 
sociability with other Tierrans or with the user of the program. They are inert 
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creatures that are replicated by the system's programming as each allotted CPU 
time is divided; they are technically not even active for their own replication. The 
programming of the virtual computer's operating system reads and copies the 
code of the creatures; this is not an operation of the creatures themselves. 
Against this, Ray associates a degree of interaction and sociability to species of 
Tierrans within the narratives he produces from running the program, with 
species that steal other creatures CPU time allotments or make use of parts of 
code from other creatures, in order to successfully reproduce and regularly 
develop within the Tierran soup. This displays interesting developments within the 
evolution of the machine code that, if Tierrans were actually knowingly competing, 
show ingenious methods of gaining reproductive advantage over other Tierran 
creatures. There is no actual intra·action, however, between creatures occurring 
at this level. Any intra·action at this level is between each machine code 'creature' 
and the virtual computer's operating system. Tierrans do not replicate themselves 
or knowingly or unknowingly aid in their evolutionary paths, or have sociability 
with other Tierrans. It is only through the overlay of an associated story of life and 
evolution, paired with the continuing events of Tierra, that any of these meanings 
that Ray projects onto Tierrans are produced, forgetting the role of the virtual 
computer's operating system in reproduction. The story of Tierran life is the 
production of and running through the mythic possibilities of construction, 
creation and change within a neo·Darwinian framework. The associated grand 
narrative of informational evolutionism becomes a necessary part of the 
production of meaning in the running of Tierra. It is the intra·actions between 
Tierra, the user, and the mythology supporti ng Tierra that together produce 
meaning of digital Tierran life. Here, the evolutionary narrative that Ray associates 
with Tierra produces structures of feeling that align the user with the game, and 
an understanding of this associated narrative becomes critical in the production 
of meaning through play. 
As a research tool, Tierra is concerned with the observational measurements of 
the evolutionary narratives taking place. Although there is no visual display of 
creatures, because they are left within the digital universe with the user's 
imagination to give them physical attributes, the user is presented with numerous 
methods of gaining and interpreting data on all aspects of the ongoing 
developments within the Tierran digital universe. This panoptic system details all 
aspects of Tierran life, from the number of creatures present in the soup, an 
analysis of the genetic make·up of the different species present, locating 
dominant species, to tracking individual creatures and giving analysis over time 
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periods. The user is also able to adjust many of the variables within the program, 
giving a robust system in which to experiment. The user can determine the 
parameters under which the computational regime operates, deciding how the 
rules will work. Although the user can control the degree to which the rules are 
applied, they do not have the ability to fundamentally change the rules 
themselves. These are tightly determined by the programming, and the user can 
only adjust the extent to which the rules operate along a sliding scale for each 
parameter of a set minimum to maximum. While the degree to which mutation 
rates and haploid sex rate in developing evolution are within the user's control, 
the user has only these two variables in which to effect genetic change. They are 
unable to add new methods of genetic change to the program or to construct a 
system with no genetic change variable. The user can determine how the rules 
work, but not what they are. Therefore, while there are innumerable histories that 
can be created in the running of Tierra, the programming and system structure all 
of these along similar paths. 
As with the other examined programs, the user, with a degree of control on the 
system, initially realises a position of power within the assembly brought together 
in Tierra. Positioned outside the soup, the user retains the traditional patriarchal 
god positioning we are finding common within the genealogy of artificial life 
research programs and games. Scientifically within Tierra, this position takes the 
role of scientific researcher, observing and measuring the experimental ecology of 
the Tierran system. But the distinction between scientist and patriarchal god is 
unclear in Tierra; both share the same attributes of position and power. Despite 
the position the user takes, the monopoly over control and power, which the user 
actually achieves, is again limited by the system, reflecting the shared power 
between patriarchal and emergent gods. Although the user has access to all 
variables within Tierra and can adjust the degree to which these variables are 
actioned upon within the program, the user cannot change what the variables are 
or the basic rules by which they operate. This guarantees the technical operation 
of the computational regime; it is by protecting the fundamental programming 
that provides a shield against the creation of a system that would not work. More 
importantly, it limits the power of the user and the meanings that can be 
produced through use. Applying this in a spiritual sense, the realisation of the 
power of the system has not been lost on researchers in the field, and users 
balance their traditional god positioning with the power the system holds. 
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In the production of meaning, the similar paths along which narrative scaffolding 
and mythic possibilities shape the narratives that are produced in the running of 
Tierra structure specific meanings of life itself. Kember finds that Tierra highlights 
the apparent tension between the scientific and religious discourses at play: 
In fact it might even be said that Ray embodies the competing strains of 
religious and scientific (including science fictional) discourse, with genesis 
in one corner and natural selection in the other ... Ray not only creates life, 
but also creates the environment within which life evolves. (2003: 60) 
There is a tightly knit collection of familiar statements about life that can be 
produced through the playing of Tierra, structured around a neo·Darwinian 
evolutionary definition of life and the creation and determination of computational 
regimes. Independent of the direction or path that the system follows, the 
narratives that are formed, and the history that is created, the story produced 
through running Tierra remains consistent. Life itself is reduced to its bare neo· 
Darwinian essentials, as propagating strings of information that are tied into a 
larger narrative of connection, competition and progression. Through running the 
program, Tierra actively recuperates a story of capitalist enlightenment played out 
in an evolutionary story of life itself, where the overriding objective is gaining 
reproductive advantage against a succession of species with increasing 
complexity. Developing onwards from the narratives of life that have been 
produced in the games investigated so far, the narrative that emerges from Tierra 
equates information with life itself. It also equates reproduction and evolution as 
the purpose and defining characteristic of life, and equates competition for scarce 
resources as the driver for progression. It equates speciation, increased 
complexity and the development of reproductive advantages as the objective of 
competition. It places this equation for informational evolutionism within a 
computational regime, where the connectivity of the system and its decentralised 
nature of control and power are matched by a cosmology of universal 
interconnectedness. 
Scientifically, the user of Tierra typically approaches the program as a researcher 
interested in patterns of evolution impossible to map, monitor or produce in 
carbon biology, but where the results can be mapped back to the carbon biology 
it simulates and supplants. The Tierran ecosystem becomes a Petri dish - a 
microcosm of the world - with numerous measuring tools available for the user to 
realise a panoptic view of the ecosystem. Spiritually, this ecosystem becomes 
another world where there is a tension between the player as patriarchal god, 
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looking above and on to the Tierran world holding the power to control the 
parameters of the virtual universe, and the system as emergent god powering the 
process of change. The grand narrative of life itself that develops our story from 
the Game of Life, where the objective of emergence was continued emergence. In 
Tierra, emergence is associated with continued and forward moving progression: 
the increasing complexity of reproductive tactics and genetic composition over 
time. Tierra introduces a game of life itself on a grand narrative scale. It is this 
plot of ever increasing and progressive complexity, driven by the competition for 
scarce resources, that continues through commercially developed evolutionary 
artificial life computer games like SimEarth and SimLife. 
SimEarth (1990 - ): The Gaian scientific spirituality 
SimEarth is amongst the first generation of 'sim' computer games produced by 
games company Maxis specifically targeting the home computer games market. 
Sim games, or 'god·sims' as the genre has also been referred to, share a common 
simulation element with the player in a position that is recognisable to the more 
research orientated programs so far examined, outside and above the gamespace 
with a panoptic vantage of the events of the game and leading to the games' godly 
nomenclature. The challenge of SimEarth is to develop and manage a sustainable 
world ecosystem, maintaining the Earth as a holistic living system, balancing 
organic living systems with non·organic regulatory systems such as the 
atmosphere and geosphere. SimEarth boldly associates itself with the scientific 
and spiritual philosophy of Gaia, including an introductory section in the 
instruction book by James Lovelock, which further explains the scientific and 
spiritual claims of Gaia and acts to structure feeling into the game's culture. As 
with other artificial life programs surveyed, SimEarth, steeped in Gaian theory, is 
about the interconnectedness of all things: 
[Gaia] sees the evolution of the species of organisms by natural selection 
and the evolution of the rocks, air and oceans as a single tightly coupled 
process. In Gaia the organisms and their material environment together 
constitute a system which is able to self·regulate climate and atmospheric 
composition. (Lovelock 1990: 3) 
Within SimEarth, Lovelock not only connects the organic and non·organic within a 
holistic system, he also structures the regulation of self·organisation as a strong 
aspect of play within the game. For Lovelock, not only do the individual 
components that make up the worldly system evolve, but the Earth as a living 
system in itself also evolves. As a living system the Earth is self·regulating and 
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self-organised. Within this concept of self-regulation, SimEarth progresses our 
developing grand narrative of life itself, through the addition of self-organisation 
and regulation, through cybernetic feedback loops as fundamental aspects of 
living systems, and through the intra-action between living and non-living in the 
conflation of the interconnectedness of the system as a holistic entity. Unlike in 
Tierra where self-organisation was largely an imposed concept attributed to static 
strings of code, within SimEarth the different components of the worldly system 
are connected and regulated through interdependent cybernetic systems, which 
create a self-regulating and self-organised unit of Earth or living world on a global 
scale. The challenge for the player is to adjust the parameters of this system, in 
order to progress the complexity and evolution of the creatures that inhabit the 
planet and the success of the planet itself. 
Structured within this holistic approach and the interconnectedness of all things, 
gameplay in SimEarth focuses on the player being able to "develop, manage, and 
preserve his/her planet within allotted energy budgets" (Bremer 1990: 2). Moving 
on from Tierra, where the 'space' of the virtual universe or soup was considered 
only as a limiter to the number of creatures that could be present in the soup to 
drive competition, space in SimEarth is a component of gameplay. In SimEarth the 
management of the environment is as critical as the management of populations 
of beings (referred to as SimEarthlings). The player must effectively maintain the 
parameters of the sum of the planetary system within optimal equilibrium 
conditions, ripe for the maintenance of life and the emotional wellbeing of the 
planet. By introducing this focus, SimEarth takes the definition of life itself out of 
the strictly neo-Darwinian definition found in Biomorphs and Tierra, and introduces 
a cybernetic elements to the genealogy. In its Gaian pretence, SimEarth is a game 
about the management of cybernetic systems of feedback, control and 
equilibrium, treating a planetary system as a regulatory and cybernetic whole. It 
is by the adjustment of feedback mechanisms that the player maintains a system 
equilibrium that keeps the anthropomorphised and personified figure of the Earth, 
as displayed in the Gaia game window on the monitor, in 'bliss.' It is here, again, 
that the move to a cybernetic definition of life itself is fore fronted. Where Tierra 
and Biomorphs, within a neo-Darwinian framework, have been concerned with the 
evolution of static strings of code that otherwise have no meaningful intra-action 
with their reality, the concern with SimEarth is the intra-action between all aspects 
of the system. It introduces a system of interdependent feedback loops amongst 
the different elements of the game, developing the interconnectedness of the 
system to an increased complexity. The entities that make up the planetary 
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systems of SimEarth move beyond simple interconnections between code, 
programming and player, and form complex relationships between all the various 
agents and components of the system that come together as an assembly in 
gameplay. But even as the system increases in its complexity, a central theme 
recurs - an evolutionary grand narrative of ever increasing complexity through 
informational evolutionism and an underlying fundamental determinism of 
computational regimes. 
Whilst the challenge in SimEarth is the maintenance of cybernetic equilibrium 
balances, keeping the Earth 'happy' and life flourishing, this does not remove the 
game from following a directed evolutionary path that mirrors Tierra's decidedly 
modernist enlightenment narrative of increasing complexity and progressive 
evolution. Although acknowledged as both a limitation and bias of the game 
(Bremer 1990: 6), evolution in SimEarth closely resembles the historicity of Earth, 
and continues with an extrapolated trajectory that sees civilisation reach a 
technological end point of escaping in an exodus of the sentient SimEarthlings in 
city sized space ships. This common transcendence theme, also seen in 
SimEarth's gaming cousin SimCity, reflects modernist desires of transcendence 
and escape, a game end that sits in a strange irony considering the Gaian 
philosophy in play. Although intelligent mammals (humans) are not the sole form 
of intelligent SimEarthlings that can evolve sentience in SimEarth, it is assumed 
that "intelligence is an evolutionary advantage" (Bremer 1990: 6). Structured and 
plotted in game play through designated evolutionary jumps, the course of 
evolution is structured so that it always leads to an intelligent form of life, and a 
similar pattern of technological development that has been found in Earth's 
Western civilisations. There is an assumed directional nature to evolution, a 
progression of ever increasing complexity to a purposeful goal (of escape). The 
stories produced through SimEarth tie this progression of the evolution of the 
games four basic systems: the geosphere, atmosphere, biosphere and civilisation, 
within an interconnected cybernetic structure in which the path of development 
and transcendental end objective remain constant. When played successfully, 
gameplay in SimEarth always evolves intelligence of a certain kind (if not a certain 
life class), a certain developmental path of civilisation, and a common end 
scenario. The gameplay that can be produced, the narratives that can be 
produced through gameplay, and the meanings about the nature of life and 
evolution that can be produced are highly structured through the underlying 
assumptions and programming of the game. In the unfolding of history and the 
development of civilisation, the mythic possibilities of change within SimEarth are 
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highly structured, developi ng narratives structured around a si ngular narrative of 
life. 
As a key agent within the assembly brought together in the playing of SimEarth, 
the player affects the historical developments, and, as with Biamarphs, guides 
gameplay's direction. The player is responsible for determining the parameters of 
a host of features within the four planetary (sub·)systems of the worldly system 
that determine the cybernetic systems of feedback and control, as well as 
physical shaping the planet, populating SimEarthlings, creating technological 
advances, and triggering major events ('acts of God'). To achieve the 
(unacknowledged but implicit) ultimate evolutionary goal of exodus - "the closest 
thing in SimEarth to a 'win condition'" (Bremer 1990: 126) - it is necessary for 
the player to pay careful attention to the different measurement tools available to 
their disposal, effecting tweaks and changes to feedback parameters, pushing 
evolution and technology towards intelligence and advancement, and triggering 
events to change the course of history, all while keeping the Earth happy and 
healthy. Without player intra·action as an integral part of the game system, 
history in SimEarth stalls, the cybernetic systems that make up Gaia degrade and 
the Earth becomes 'unhappy' and 'unwell.' Unlike the Game af Ufe, where the 
player's role was primarily as observer, here the player maintains a participatory 
role in the continued success of the evolution of the planet and game. That is not 
to say, however, that SimEarth departs from computational regimes in a seeming 
lack of determination; SimEarth remains deterministic and retains its composition 
as a computational regime. SimEarth camouflages its deterministic nature, and 
creates interesting gameplay. If the game receives little or no player intervention 
it is unlikely that evolution will occur to such a degree to advance gameplay 
forward. It is the player's intra-action with the game that creates the conditions (if 
the player is skilful) that lead evolution along a path of increasing complexity. It is 
a measure of success within the game to how much the player's adjustments to 
the parameters of the rules determine successful historic paths_ If the player does 
nothing within the game while it runs, SimEarth maintains the deterministic 
framework of computational regimes, but the paths followed by the system will 
not promote the conditions necessary for the evolutionary advancement of the 
system. 
Spiritually, the player is placed in the role of a participatory patriarchal god as a 
divine figure in the game, immersed intimately in the day-to-day occurrences and 
happenings of his or her charges, ensuring the forward advancement of the game 
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and of evolutionary progress. Within the mythic possibility of change, the player's 
power within a participatory patriarchal god role arises from the ability to alter 
the state of the computational regime, either through changing the parameters of 
the system (adjusting variable rates) or by effecting a direct change to the state of 
the system (adding SimEarthlings, initiating an event, pushing evolutionary or 
technological advancement). It is such alterations that drives gameplay and 
challenges the player. The player's involvement with the game masks, but does 
not forfeit, the underlying deterministic nature and power of the system as a 
computational regime. SimEarth remains fundamentally deterministic, finding 
simple rules that produce emergent higher·level behaviour within a system of 
discrete time and space. As with Tierra, the player can only influence the scale 
and parameters of the elements that make up the programming, but not the 
underlying programming itself. As computer code, the game programming is 
inherently rule based and logical; as a cyberspace emplacement, it forms a 
computational regime. The joy of playing SimEarth comes from the challenge of reo 
adjusting the parameters of the mechanics of the game's programming to create 
working cybernetic systems of feedback and control, which allow for the evolution 
of the worldly system and its living and non·living components. It is the challenge 
of becoming part of the game's culture, learning the system, making the system 
intuitive and being able to integrate actions that will adjust the system in which 
desired futures can emerge. The player must conform to the programming and 
logic of the game. Attempting to create game actions that deviate from the 
evolutionary assumptions of the game gain no advantage to the player; injecting 
higher life forms into the world before evolution is ready for them will result in the 
population quickly dying out. Jump to an advanced civilisation and the player 
could jeopardise the population altogether. The development of the mythic 
possibilities of change must be adhered to in order to produce meaningful 
gameplay. 
SimEarth's challenge largely derives from the ability of players to adjust to the 
program and to understand how the multitude of tools work and being able to 
make predictive judgements about what courses of action will produce desired 
outcomes. For Kember: 
Each planet [within SimEarth] is a system, and it quickly becomes clear that 
where the tools are for playing with, the rules are to be learnt. Te challenge 
is to understand how the rules work and then apply them by using the tools. 
(2003: 86) 
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Gameplay can be seen as investigative, both in the player's testing of tools to gain 
an appreciation of how things work in the production of intuition, and in the 
player's ability to test different hypotheses through creating different scenarios in 
experimentation through gameplay. SimEarth boasts a number of different 
experimental modes and situations that the player can use precisely for this 
purpose. In 'Aquarium' the player is presented with a world without any land 
mass. As land is needed for the progression of technology, the player is given the 
challenge to "create continents on this planet so that civilisation can evolve" 
(Bremer 1990: 110). Other scenarios present the Earth at various stages of 
development (Cambrian, modern day) or even a Mars to 'terraform' and make "fit 
for human occupation, and colonise the planet" (Bremer 1990: 115). The game's 
culture is structured through experimenting with the game, and through forming 
intuition on how to manipulate scenarios through the use of game tools. This 
leads to a common sense understanding of how life and the (sim)Earth are 
considered as regulatory systems. SimEarth creates close ties between the game, 
its use as a simulation and its relationship with the physical world around us, 
especially with additional scenarios rooted in our own planetary history. The 
stated purpose of the game manual, to "teach you how to use SimEarth and to 
introduce you to the basics of Earth Science" (Bremer 1990: 8), is illustrative of 
the connections that the producers of SimEarth are attempti ng to create. I n this 
manner SimEarth refuses to remain as just a game, and makes active connections 
in the production of new meanings of life itself, the nature of reality as 
computational, and the living status of Earth itself. 
SimLife (1992 - ): The genetic playground 
Where SimEarth concerns itself with the macro·management of worldly systems, 
SimUfe immerses itself in the micro·management of an ecosystem and the 
creatures that inhabit it. It continues the development of the scientific and 
spiritual mythic grand narratives of artificial life and life itself, both in the 
complexity of the programming and the levels of adjustments available to the 
player, and in the connections the game makes with its carbon kin, all within a 
cybernetic definition and rhetoric of life itself. SimLife presents a digital ecology 
and ecosystem in which the player can manipulate a vast range of variables, to 
experiment, play with and support the growth of life on both an individual and 
population level. A complex simulation tool, and as with SimEarth, promoted and 
used as an educational aid, SimLife disrupts boundaries between entertainment 
and education. Such games present worlds that "are by no means alternative. 
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They are mirror worlds which reproduce - through simulation - hegemonic 
discourses of origin and of natural/socio-economic evolution" (Kember 2003: 91)_ 
As a game, SimUfe challenges players to create and manage successful digital 
ecosystems_ As an educational tool, SimLife forges ties with ecology, population 
studies and evolutionary biology_ As an artificial life emplacement, SimLife 
presents new relationships between carbon and silicon life-as-we-know-it and 
tempts the user to see new visions of life-as-it-could-be_ In other words, the 
creatures of SimUfe forge close ties of kinship with their carbon cousins, but also 
move away from the known, to new unusual combinations with no direct 
correlation in the carbon world_ Actively acknowledging its artificial life 
credentials, SimLife forges links between its digital cyberspace emplacements and 
the physical world: 
What can be considered the ultimate goal of SimLife is to look beyond the 
game, to understand the real world with its millions of species with their 
combined billions of genes are all interrelated and carefully balances in the 
food chain and the web of life, and this balance can be upset (Bremer 
1992: 3) 
The primary objective of SimUfe is the creation and maintenance of populations of 
creatures, attempting to create balanced ecosystems of various plant and animal 
species suitable to the varied environmental conditions within the gamespace_ 
While relatively simple, SimLife creatures display a genetic structure that when 
expressed translates to individual behaviour and intra-action with other creatures 
and the environment Unlike Biomorphs and Tierra where individual creatures had 
no true intra-action with each other, the creatures in SimLife intra-act with each 
other and their environment on an individual basis, moving forward from SimEarth 
where intra-action was primarily concerned at the population level. Each 
creature's actions are determi ned by its rules of engagement with its 
environment; the specifics of these rules are determined by the genetic make-up, 
or programming, of the creature_ This creates a gamespace system of individual 
intra-acting creatures (both 'plant' and 'animal') whose actions are determined by 
a 'genetic code' expressing simple cybernetic relationships relating to such things 
as proximity to others (either positive for members of the same species or 
negative for prey and predators), proximity, and the need for food and/or water, 
and the desire for sex. These determine behaviours such as speed and direction of 
movement, the seeking or avoidance of other creatures, eating, drinking and 
engaging in sexual intercourse. The result is a collection of creatures and an 
environment whose intra-actions establish a rich ecosystem of cybernetic 
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feedback and dependences that encapsulate a rudimentary cybernetic definition 
of life. Within this cybernetic composition, the experience of bodily engagement 
remains largely forgotten as behaviours remain a direct translation of 'genetic' 
programming instruction. The intricacies of a full metabolism are missing within 
SimLife; there remains a focus on gene action rather than gene activation. 
The player in SimLife assumes the now ubiquitous position as patriarchal god· 
head looking onto and into the digital ecosystem, above and outside the 
emplacement of cybernetic intra·actions. Recognising the varied identities the 
player can make within the game and forging connections between the digital and 
physical, SimLife attempts to show the breadth of the user experience in the 
number of 'hats' the player is able to wear: 
• A planetary game warden trying to protect and improve various 
ecosystems; 
• A behavioral ecologist exploring the different ways plants and animals 
interact in their ecosystems; 
• An evolutionary biologist trying to prove theories; 
• Charles Darwin (only in his dreams); 
• A being with amazing powers who creates worlds, populates them with 
plants and animals, and balances ecosystems for fun; 
• An Artificial Life experimenter; and 
• A normal human trying to play and win a pretty complex computer game. 
(Bremmer 1992: 12) 
The range of player roles both highlights the complexity of the game and 
structures the types of experiences playing SimLife produces, highlighting and 
acknowledging the variety of narratives that can be created from gameplay. In 
doing so, SimLife bonds itself with strong connections with ecology, biology and 
artificial life, as well as being a game played for enjoyment. All of these functions 
exist concurrently within the gameplay of SimLife; the player can co·inhabit and 
move between these roles (and others not so formally defined) throughout 
gameplay. They all overlap and co·exist, the player likely adopting and moving 
between a number of roles in the same game. The player is given a full range of 
the trappings that a patriarchal overseeing position heralds, from the Zeus·like 
'smite' button, complete with lightning bolt crisping the unlucky to charred 
remains, to the ability to manipulate the parameters of all the workings of the 
gamespace and the creatures that inhabit it, with the ability to create new species 
through genetic engineering. As has been the case throughout the games and 
programs covered by this genealogy, the player removed from the gamespace, is 
a necessary, if excluded, element of gameplay. Following the mythic journey of 
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construction, creation and change, the player's input is both necessary and 
exterior, reflecting the game's positioning as a heterotopian emplacement of 
compensation. Mythically paired with the system as emergent god, the player as 
patriarchal god is a necessary element of the production of successful gameplay 
and the development of a grand narrative of life itself that encapsulates the game. 
On a similar level to SimEarth, players participate in the day·to·day intra·actions of 
the gamespace, ensuring the continued success of their duties. Despite players' 
intimate intra·action within the assembly of creatures and enviro·spatial elements 
of SimLife, they are excluded as part of the system; they neither reside within the 
gamespace nor are determined by its rules. Unlike the ludic element of SimEarth 
with its escapist end goal, the structured direction of gameplay within SimLife is 
left much more open, with no established end state or completion of the game 
present. In its structuring of the element of change, SimLife offers an open 
paidean style of gameplay, with ludic scenarios available as additional play 
options. On the whole, SimEarth's open style gives much more freedom to the 
assembly brought together in the direction of play, reflected in the many player 
roles that the game suggests are available. 
Both SimLife and SimEarth display the necessary tension between a patriarchal 
god·as·player and an emergent god-as-system. The player as patriarchal god, 
positioned exterior to the gamespace but complicated within the system, is as 
necessary for productive play and the success of the system as is the emergent 
god within the system itself. Displayed throughout this genealogy, the two 
seemingly opposed positions find an uneasy relationship and co-dependence 
within these games. Players cannot achieve the omnipotent power promised from 
their privileged position and level of panoptic access to the system; it is the 
process of emergence of the computational regime that shares the power. The 
system, similarly, cannot function without input from outside itself, and lacks the 
ability to initiate its own being, or manipulate its cybernetic functions to optimum 
or desired states. It cannot construct its own 'universe' or create life. The player 
and system must co-exist for the game and world to operate, the system relies on 
the player for its very existence, and the player relies on the system for the 
emergence that produces meaningful gameplay. It is this intra·action between 
player and system that produces interesting and enjoyable game play. The system 
challenges the player to reach the objective of obtaining stable populations, and 
the player is challenged to make the system intuitive and second nature. 
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The dual nature of god·as·player and god·as·system is highlighted in the mythic 
possibilities the game plays through. The mythic narratives produced and enacted 
through play combine a post·modern genesis narrative within the sensibility of a 
spiritual and scientific philosophy of Gaian interconnectedness, producing a 
spiritual grand narrative about life itself and a matching cosmology. It is a story of 
the construction of worlds and ecosystems, the seeding and creation of life, and 
the development of this life into viable living ecosystems that change and evolve 
over time. It is also the story of the cosmology of a computational regime, the 
emergence of cybernetic life patterns and behaviours, and the challenge of 
maintaining equilibrium balances. Chris Langton, in his review of SimLife, follows 
the genesis mythology of construction, creation and change that is enacted 
through play. For Langton, the player "a la 'Genesis,' must first define a physical 
world ... create the plants and animals who will 'live their lives' in this newly 
created world ... populate the world with them" and "start the simulation going" 
(Langton 1991; 4·6). It is this (re)enactment and genesis myth creation that firmly 
positions the player as an external patriarchal god, given the task of overseeing 
and caretaking the digital emplacement and the creatures that inhabit it But on 
the seventh day, the player does not get to rest Langton also highlights the 
challenge and goal of the game of "setting the world on an open·ended course" 
(Langton 1991; 6); reaching a level of equilibrium within the gameworld whereby 
the ecosystem can develop with minimal intervention. Langton finds that: 
This goal is not easy to achieve. Establishing a viable ecosystem is not at all 
straightforward, and many worlds become barren of 'life' before one 
achieves a few long·lived populations. (Langton 1991; 6) 
The complexity and challenge of SimLife is found in the learning, understanding 
and making use of the system. It is through developing an intuition of how the 
cybernetic systems of feedback and control are interlinked, and how one as the 
player can influence and manipulate the controls of the game successfully, that 
meaningful play is produced. The power of the player as patriarchal god is 
balanced by the emergent god·as·system, as with other games from this 
genealogy. The mythic narratives produced from gameplay intermingle the 
necessity of a patriarchal god that gives life to the system, the interconnectedness 
of all things and the power of emergence, and the interplay between these two 
vantage points. 
The Development of Heterotopian Emplacements of Compensation 
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The genealogy of evolutionary artificial life games and programs, popular with a 
general audience, traces the development of these as heterotopian emplacements 
of compensation for life, nature and cosmos. Fermented in the Game of Life, these 
games and programs develop the ingredients to take forward in an investigation 
of Creatures and the meanings of life itself that are produced through gameplay. 
Developed with close connections and relationships of kinship with carbon life and 
the material molecular world in mind, a cosmology of computational regimes and 
neo-Darwinian and cybernetic definitions of life itself have been progressed and 
elaborated. From the backbone of the Game of Life's deterministic grid gamespace 
of discrete space and time through to the equally deterministic SimLife, the games 
and programs of the genealogy produce a set of statements about life, nature and 
the cosmos that remain consistent throughout. They produce a scientific and 
spiritual discourse of construction, creation and change through gameplay. 
The first of these statements is the reduction of all things to information_ From 
the binary on/off, open/closed grid of Life through to the increasingly complex 
simulations of planetary subsystems in SimEarth and rules of engagement in 
Sim Life , the construction of space, the creatures that inhabit it and the manner in 
which they intra-act are all defined and instructed as information, code and rules. 
Within the computational regimes of artificial life, all things can be reduced to 
information_ The second foundational statement that is produced is 
interconnectedness of this information. Recalling the rules of Life, where the state 
of any cell is governed by the states of its neighbours, in the course of generations 
through the cybernetic systems of feedback and control in later games, the 
application of change to the system is regulated by the state of neighbouring and 
connected bits of information_ In order to know the progression of the system at 
any point, knowledge of all points of the system and the rules is essential; 
everything within the system is connected. This also means that there is a limit to 
the system. Any system must be closed and self-organised on a global scale. 
Taking the discrete nature of all things within the system and their 
interconnectedness in the progression and application of rules brings the 
statement that the system is deterministic. Given a defined initial state and a 
given set of rules, the system will follow a single path of history without external 
influence. This gives the basic definition of computational regimes - closed 
systems of discrete information units that obey simple rules that are dependent 
on the state of neighbours through the progression of generations. 
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From this foundational definition, statements about the nature of life itself have 
also been developed. As with all things, life is fundamentally based on information 
and is codified as genetic algorithms. The basic life·like behaviour these strings of 
code are attributed with is evolution, as demonstrated in Tierra, giving a 
statement about life that is based within evolutionary discourses. As the intra· 
actions between artificial life creatures and between creatures and their 
surrounding environment develops, the neo·Darwinian definition of life based in 
evolution has grown to a cybernetic definition that places living things within 
cybernetic systems of feedback and control. The cybernetic definition of life also 
reflects the interconnectedness of all things. It is these statements that lay the 
ontological foundations about the nature of reality, life and cosmos within 
conceptualisations of computational regimes. Spiritually and scientifically, the 
narratives that are produced in gameplay, and the associated meanings that are 
taken away from play, are structured around these statements regarding the 
ontology of the real, nature and life that bind the digital and physical together. 
Within such a framework, the digital emplacements of evolutionary artificial life 
games and programs become heterotropic emplacements of compensation as 
perfected examples of computational regimes. As such, the meanings that are 
taken away from these games and programs come to define our own world, 
nature and cosmos, as exemplified with Fredkin's conceptualisation of Finite 
Nature. The simulational model has supplanted and come to define what it 
models. The Creatures series is the most developed instance of this and takes us 
beyond life·as·we·know·it to new formations of life·as·it·could be. The next chapter 
investigates Creatures and the game's culture in developing bonds on kinship and 
common narratives and histories between silicon and carbon life. 
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Chapter 8 
Creatures: Playing with Life, Nature and Cosmos 
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Playing Creatures develops relationships with new digital forms of life. Progressing 
from the genealogy of games and programs before it, Creatures produces bonds of 
kinship (Kember 2003: 97) and connections between silicon entities and carbon 
life, and between digital and material worlds. The creation of a game's culture 
focuses on the care and nurturing of these silicon creatures as alive, and the 
common ties these entities claim with their carbon cousins, and produces 
meanings and narratives developed within gameplay and taken away from play 
about the possibilities of artificial life. As with evolutionary games and programs 
before it, Creatures develops a narrative structure through narrative scaffolding 
and mythic possibilities that produce narratives of construction, creation and 
change. Recalling the introductory section of the first chapter, gameplay focuses 
on the relationship between the player and his or her digital charges, a species of 
digital life called Norns. Norns live on the planet Albia and it is the player's task to 
establish and maintain a population of Norns, protecting them from the dangers 
Albia presents. With various levels and styles to which Creatures can be played, 
players can intra·act with Norns as virtual pets, through to performing complex 
genetic and evolutionary experiments. All gameplay styles are presented within an 
overlying structure that considers close ties of affinity between carbon and silicon. 
Creatures becomes "a case study which illustrates a dynamic relationship between 
the games' producers and consumers, between science and engineering and 
between science and culture" (Kember 2003: 83). While Kember utilises Creatures 
in the initiation and continuation of dialougue with Steve Grand, the game's 
designer and leading British artificial life researcher, this chapter focuses on a 
detailed analysis of how Creatures has been able to treat silicon entities as being 
alive. As with the investigation of the genealogy of games in chapter seven, this 
chapter focuses on gameplay and an analysis of the creation of a game's culture 
that considers Norns as forms of life forging close bonds of kinship with their 
human players. This kinship is more than skin·deep, uniting Norn and human 
within a cybernetic definition of life. It introduces Albia as not only the gamespace 
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of Creatures, but also as a cybernetic artificial life emplacement that makes 
connections with the material universe as computational regimes. It outlines the 
manner into which players are aligned with this culture of the game, through 
structures of feeling that promote Creatures as a game about the technoscience of 
life and the nurturing and care of this life. Moving into an examination of 
gameplay, the chapter introduces players and the roles and placement they are 
offered in the game. It ties these positions to mythic narratives of construction, 
creation and change that are structured through play. Realising the negotiated 
hegemonic order that develops through immediate and extended play, the chapter 
looks to how players have adapted gameplay styles within Creatures and how 
these new styles of play relate to the original game's culture. Finally, it presents 
the gameplay style of the player Anti·Norn as an example of a possible alternative 
mode of play and resistance within Creatures and its game culture 12. 
Welcome to Albia 
The simplest way to describe Albia is as a digital planetary ecosystem, the 
games pace of the Creatures series (except in Creatures 3, where we are taken on a 
spacecraft built by the ancient race of Shee, but the terrain remains Albian·like), 
and the cyberspace that Norns, Grendels, Grettins and other digital life forms 
inhabit and live out their lives under the watchful eye of the player. An 
examination of Albia as the gamespace of Creatures covers a number of 
conceptual layers and initiates a fuller examination of the game and the Creatures 
game's culture. Albia is both the gamespace in which Creatures is played and 
which activity is structured, and a cybernetic artificial life emplacement designed 
as a cyberspace in which intelligent behaviour can emerge within a cybernetic 
definition of life. It illuminates Creatures as a cybernetic artificial life emplacement 
within the structure of the Albian ecosystem and gives a first level spatial semiotic 
analysis of the game, while serving as a precursor to a fuller examination of the 
game's culture. As a structured and structuring space, the landscape of Albia 
directs gameplay within Creatures, structures the narratives formed during and 
taken away from gameplay, and the production of meaning. 
Scientifically, Creatures is a working artificial life emplacement, and can be 
examined to how the Albian ecosystem has been designed, how it operates, how 
12 Kember (2003: 102·105) investigates Steve Grand's and the Creatures community's opinions and 
discussion surrounding Anti·Norn's torture of Norns. This is focused on the questions of Norn 
'aliveness' that were raised within player news groups and discussions in reference to Norn torture and 
Anti·Norn specifically and includes her interview with Grand on the topic. 
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this supports new cybernetic definitions of life, and how these intra·act in 
gameplay in the production of artificial life entities. In the cybernetic definition of 
life postulated by Steve Grand, we are reminded that a key requirement for life, 
and especially the emergence of intelligence, is the interaction between a living 
entity and its environment For Norns to exhibit cybernetic intelligent life·like 
behaviour, they need to be embedded within an informational environment 
consisting of cybernetic systems of communication and control. Within this 
model, from these environmental first level interactions, intelligence and life can 
emerge. The Albian ecosystem not only becomes a semiotic space that structures 
gameplay, but also is key in the formation of an artificial life emplacement within 
a cybernetic definition of life. Albia is constitutive and an integral part of the 
artificial life system. 
The Albian Ecosystem: Setting the Scene 
Albia is a lush digital environment and space that seamlessly combines frontier 
naturalism with high technology. It is a small world that the player learns was 
once inhabited by creatures called the Shee, an intelligent race fond of science. 
The Shee have since evacuated the planet, leaving behind a range of technologies, 
including a hatchery containing the six remaining Norn eggs for the player to 
hatch. Albia is technically a disc world (not spherical as is the Earth) and operates 
on its outer edge in a two·and·a·half dimensional space. That is, there is right, 
left, up and down, but depth is limited to layering in front or behind other objects, 
everything effectively occurs on the same two·dimensional plane. North and south 
do not make sense on Albia; all of Albian life operates on the edge of the disc that 
forms the planet The player can only travel east (right) or west (left). Travelling 
far enough either left or right takes one right around the world, eventually 
returning to the starting point Albia has a number of microenvironments. The 
game begins in the deserted Shee city, a Robinson Crusoe set of buildings with 
their underground cellars and structures, and then traverses the Eastern and 
Western Oceans, with a tropical desert island separating the two; vegetable 
gardens, a jungle, and even a Grendal's liar where the Norns' nemesis enjoys to 
spend time lurking and awaiting hapless Norns. Albia presents a very lush 
'natural' ecosystem. Dotted around the planet are a number of technological 
items that compliment their surroundings. In fact we find out that: 
From the deserted Shee city in the east, to the oceans and jungles of the 
west, Albia is positively covered in structures, of all kinds. The ancient Shee 
civilization left behind some incredible machinery when they departed for 
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another home, including the Learning Machine that allows you to reach your 
Norns to speak and the mysterious infinite carrot dispenser, which can be 
found on the Desert Island that separates the Eastern and Western Oceans. 
(Simpson 1997: 8) 
The emplacement of Albia is presented as a seamless partnership between the 
natural and the technological. Complimenting the tropical environs are a number 
of technological items, including computers, incubators, food production 
machines, and transporters (from more traditional submarines and gondolas to 
high·tech Star Trek style instant transporters). Keeping within a posthuman 
imaginary, the technological and natural become inseparably entwined in Albia. 
There are technologies producing the natural elements on the planet (such as 
carrot producing machines). There are technologies to be used to birth a new 
Norn (incubators which are essential when an egg has been touched by the player, 
as touched eggs will not hatch on their own), and there are technologies that have 
protected the Norn species from the Grendels so that the player can repopulate 
the species. Creatures 3 further develops this; the player is taken aboard the Shee 
Spacecraft, which has been split into "five separate environments, each with their 
own ecology" (Creatures 3 game packaging 1999). Here the fluidity between 
technology and nature is at its most intimate. The most advanced technology of 
the Shee race is a series of protected natural environmental ecosystems travelling 
through space. Nature also becomes technological in Creatures with much of the 
natural vegetation having medicinal properties, with the ability to rejuvenate (or 
poison) Norns or even tomatoes that increase Norn sex drives. The player must be 
able to harness these natural technologies in order to successfully play Creatures. 
Kember finds that: 
In keeping with traditional Western techno·scientific perspectives, nature is 
constructed as a resource for exploration, observation, experimentation and 
exploitation. The presence of both danger and biological potential is seen to 
justify and reward technological intervention. (2003: 95) 
Creatures is definitely playing in a new technological nature (re)created; there is 
an inability to distinguish within the game between the technological, the cultural 
and the natural. The things brought together in the assembly that makes up 
Creatures cannot be defined as either 'up there' as cultural, or 'out there' as 
natural. They are things 'down there' actively engaged in the production of both. 
This is further developed as the new digital 'natures' Creatures creates reflect and 
inform about our own. They are (nature)cultural artefacts that themselves create 
and produce new nature(culture)s. The narratives and statements these new 
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(re)created natures produce reflect, reinforce and supplant our own with specific 
discourses of what nature is. 
Although Albia is a disk world and therefore operates in two (and a half) 
dimensions, it is presented to the player with a great amount of depth, as if a 
three·dimensional sphere with recognisable Cartesian horizons including distant 
mountains, oceans and islands. With a little investigation, however, one can 
discover that this illusion of depth is not natural to Albia, but has been "added for 
the enjoyment of Albia's human visitors from here on Earth" (Simpson 1997: 4). 
This is an added effect to aid human players in feeling at home in the unusual 
dimensions of Albia. This landscape sets the stage for the game, structuring the 
feeling of the game and semiotically positioning the player with additional 
reference points to the spiritual and scientific discourses that the game presents. 
In the first two editions of Creatures, oriental style vistas are found, with Creatures 
1 referencing the Far East, with rocky islands and ranges reminiscent of exotic 
Thai locales, and Creatures 2 presenting a distinctly Japanese flavour, with Albia's 
own (simulacrum) Mt. Fuji visible in the distance. This exotic mystic landscape is 
further reinforced with oriental style buildings complementing this background. 
This humanising feature becomes a structuring feature of the game, put in place 
to make players comfortable in a new nature of strange dimensions, but also 
placing players firmly within the spiritual heritage of both artificial life and the 
posthuman. We are reminded of both artificial life's and postmodern spirituality's 
inclusive nod to Eastern religions and especially Zen Buddhism. Our 'artificial' 
backdrop continues this theme, the Eastern flavour of the spatial presentation of 
Albia is kept on the sidelines, not fully engaged with, but a background to 
structure and frame the game. As becomes apparent in gameplay, the mythic 
possibilities of Creatures structure and produce a much more post· modern Judeo-
Christian tradition in its spiritual mythology, reflecting the narratives developed in 
chapters six and seven and developed throughout the genealogy. 
Moving to the foreground gamespace where gameplay occurs, players and Norns 
are presented again with two differing outlooks to Albia and its landscape. As with 
the humanised backdrops, players are presented with an Albian aesthetic that 
structures meaning development and gameplay. Norn Albia is simpler than 
human Albia; where humans see a number of different types of food, Norns see 
one type; where humans see a number of different types of toys to interact with, 
Norns again see only one. To this end, the player is recommended to name 
objects carefully, realising that "Norns are only able to distinguish between 
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categories of object, rather on specific types" (Simpson 1997:59). Carrots and 
cheese are both seen as food by the Norns, there is no difference in Norn Albia 
between the two; the distinction is a human benefit. Norns are able to distinguish 
twenty different categories (in Creatures 1). The richer, human Albian landscape 
encompasses at least forty·two items within these categories. This presents 
human players with a diverse environment in which to interact with the Norns and 
other Albian life. Aesthetically, a player is presented with a lush frontier style 
world with a wide range of items to interact with and make use of - from food and 
toys to transport vehicles and teaching machines. All are familiar to a human of 
Western origin: carrots, cheese and honey food, coffee drinks, spinning top and 
ball toys, fish and bees. It is a complete ecosystem, a more than adequate nature 
to raise life in. It is an environment reminiscent of the player's own, where items 
are easily recognisable and connections between the ecosystems of Albia and 
Earth can be made. 
This frontier landscape of Albia becomes an exploratory space of intra·action with 
these new artificial life entities. Even while the player finds him or herself as part 
of an archaeological adventure, rediscovering the technologies of the ancient race 
of Shee, Creatures does not look backwards, but forwards. The player definitely 
inhabits new techno·spatial frontiers in Creatures. As cybernetic systems of life 
itself where the world as system operates by 'the rules' in a bottom up system of 
emergence and feedback, the Creatures series forms heterotopian emplacements 
of compensation. Exemplifying a cybernetic definition of life itself, Albia operates 
as a complete cybernetic ecosystem, with a wide range a variety of plants, 
animals and natural forces that connect with each other in cybernetic systems of 
feedback and control: 
The sun is shining in Albia. Bees buzz around looking for flowers, 
caterpillars munch their way through beelancanth plants, and little fluffy 
clouds drift overhead. Earlier it was raining, but the water has long since 
dried out in the midday sun. Ants march across the ground looking for 
rotting fruit to carry back to their nests. If they find enough, queen ants will 
explore the world trying to find new homes ... (Simpson 1998: xi) 
Each of these things operates in the same manner within Albia, through a system 
of cybernetic intra·actions in which Norns and the other 'higher' life forms of the 
planet form an integral part. Even the player, digitally represented as a floating 
hand, is (at least superficially) included within this system. The gamespace of 
Creatures is a full cybernetic emplacement; weather patterns and the intra·actions 
of lower and higher life forms all emerge as the result of first level interactions, 
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and are cybernetic connected through systems of feedback and control. This 
interconnectedness of things with the ecosystem of Albia contributes to the 
richness of the game and makes further connections between digital and material 
worlds. In Creatures 2 we find the insects and animals of Albia are connected, 
where bees "pollinate the flowers of Albia", molluscs live "off the detritus built up 
from dead and decaying matter", spiders "feed off on unwary insects foolish 
enough to get trapped in [their] web", and bats "live off fruit" (Simpson 1998: 
89). Not only do these creatures add interest to the Albian landscape, they build 
and create the cybernetic richness deemed necessary for the production of 
intelligent life. As part of the assembly of the gamespace they form part of the 
robust cybernetic systems that allow seemingly novel responses to emerge and 
complex lifeforms, such as Norns, to exist. The things that make up the 
cybernetic components of Albia take on aesthetic and semiotic value in their 
structuring and shaping into things we humans can understand relating worlds 
together; but at a fundamental level, Albia operates as it does because of the 
intra·actions formed by its inhabitants (and how these have been programmed to 
operate; the rules they follow). At the most basic, this is as genetic algorithms of 
propagating informational units operating in a holistic cybernetic system of 
feedback, control and communication leading to emerging systems of increasing 
complexity displaying lifelike behaviours and intelligence. It is a deterministic 
informational system; a realised utopian emplacement of Grand's responsible 
deterministic definition of life itself. 
The one item within Creatures that is not determined by the programming of the 
game is the actions of the hand: the player's representative and presence in the 
gamespace. The hand is a floating entity, disembodied from the rest of its body 
and the player's digital extension of self, able to interact with the Albian 
environment, including picking up other objects and intra-acting with the Norns 
and other creatures. While it forms part of the Albian ecosystem, it is not holey 
determined by its programming, as control of its actions are held by the player_ 
The hand forms the player's extended presence into the cyberspace of Albia, all 
the actions that the player can perform in Creatures are controlled and affected 
through the hand. As is typical with 'god-si ms', the hand presents a player 
positioning that is outside and above the Albian terrain, included within the 
system, yet overseeing it. As found throughout the genealogy of games and 
programs, the player is positioned within a patriarchal god vantage point. It is 
reminiscent of a classical Western Christian representation, white and male, as if 
created by Michelangelo. The hand positions the player, aids in the definition of 
his or her role within the game, provides a perspective into the Albian ecosystem 
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and extends the player into the gamespace allowing intra·action with the other 
creatures and objects of the game. 
Developing the Culture of Creatures 
Creatures is a game about the technoscience of life itself. And more than (just) 
(playing with) an experimental laboratory world, it is an exploration of an 
emerging relationship with a specific new type of life in a new digital medium. 
Through play and intra·action with Creatures, the player finds and develops a 
game culture, forms an introduction to how Creatures is to be played, and begins 
to guide the production of meanings that can be produced through immediate 
and extended gameplay. An investigation into the structures in place to align the 
(potential) player to the kind of game Creatures is highlights initial elements that 
produce feeling for the game, and go on to provide initial structure to the 
production of meaning that gameplay creates. Elements that structure feeling 
found in the game packaging, instructions and pre·game video vignettes on the 
CD·ROM align the player to what kind of game Creatures is. They introduce their 
positioning and open the players to the game's culture as an integral participant. 
Involvement with and playing of Creatures is a productive practice; the foundations 
for this active culture are laid in structures of feeling that introduce and 
coordinate new members of the culture, realising the development of a common 
sense within it. 
In Creatures, we find a number of structures in place to introduce, structure and 
reinforce human intra·action and relationships with new life. They develop a 
common sensibility about life, as defined in cybernetic terms, which not only 
positions Norns as alive in their own right, but also creates bonds of kinship with 
human and carbon life. They align the player with the nurturing and techno· 
scientific aspects of the game and build the expectations of finding 'real life' on 
their PC, within the game. The Creatures 1 game box prominently warns of 'Digital 
DNA Enclosed'. This is a game that experiments with the very essence of life itself 
in the cybernetic definition of gene fetishism and already equates silicon and 
carbon lifeforms. Associating with both the game's techno·scientific computer and 
biological science underpinnings, we are encouraged to 'Get A·Life' in the form of 
these new life forms - Norns - to actually "create life on your PC", with 
recommendations by leading biologist and iconic neo·Darwinist figure Richard 
Dawkins. The game's scientific stature continues to be structured through 
terminology, where the players find that Norns come "complete with their own 
biochemistry, brains, and digital DNA." The game's developers, Cyberlife, appear 
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more as a scientific brand than an entertainment product developer, complete 
with a ubiquitous double helix logo. This further forges the ties between silicon 
and carbon, and definitions of life emphasising a focus on genetics as code. The 
status of Creatures as a game at all is questioned by Dawkins who finds it instead 
"the most impressive example of artificial life [he has] ever seen," further 
structuring feeling for the serious techno·science at play. By Creatures 3, the bold 
claims of Norns' aliveness have been downplayed, instead quoted as "behav[ing] 
as though they are really alive" rather than as actual instances of life. The 
integration of technoscience within a (re)created nature, however, is most evident 
with 'advanced machines' that, when connected, form 'huge automated devices' 
to aid the player in controlling Norns and the Shee spacecraft environment or 
ecosystem. 
Balancing the techno·science of Creatures are initial structures that highlight and 
build a feeling for the nurturing aspect of the game. Creatures may be about the 
cutting edge of techo(life)science, but it is also about building relationships of 
kinship between silicon and carbon - between Norns and humans. As with all new 
life, Norns need to be cared for and raised carefully. On the game box of Creatures 
1 players are prompted to 'play,' 'teach,' 'protect,' 'laugh,' 'exchange,' and 
'encourage' in their intra·actions with the species of Creatures. Norns are 
presented as "friendly, curious, social, and eager to learn." They are categorised 
as 'small children' who require the player's help in order to survive. The 
packaging states, "their life is in your hands." The Creatures 3 game box describes 
Norns as "Cute, loveable and endearing, [ ... ] often victims of Grendel violence and 
Ettin impish behaviour." Norns are structured as helpless children that need the 
player's care and nurturing to survive and thrive. To this end, the player is 
presented with a section of the Shee spacecraft as a "Norn Terranium - Specially 
designed for Norn care, this world contains everything you'll need to hatch, teach 
and care for your Norns." Feeling within Creatures is structured here, as a game 
about caring and protecting new life. The relationship of nurturing is one of 
kinship; the player raises Norns as small children. The player takes on the roles of 
parent, guardian and god. The relationship of kinship not only reinforces the 
techno·scientific claims of the synthesis of actual life in the game (as it is difficult 
to form bonds of kinship to non·living things), but also informs the player of how 
this new life should be positioned and thought of, and how this new life relates to 
our own. The bond of kinship between Norns and humans translates beyond an 
emotional level to a common ontological heritage. Norns are anthropomorphised 
as children, because they act just like us and are just like us (or, more to the 
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point, we must be just like them). A common essence between Norn and human 
life finds structuring in the foundations of digital creatures that share family 
values with their human caretakers, on more than a mere social relationship. The 
ties are already structured much more deeply, as human's immaculately machinic 
produced children, with their own DNA tying bonds of neo·Darwinian and 
cybernetic kinship with their carbon guardians. 
Continuing with the induction of players into the culture of Creatures, the pre· 
game video vignettes structure and build common sense within the game. The 
vignettes form part of the game CD·ROM that needs to be loaded in the computer 
in order for the game to be played. In Creatures 2 we open with a spider crawling 
over a cave wall, painted with prehistoric cave paintings of a mythic past. As the 
spider makes its way across the stone, the history of Albian uncovers itself 
through the paintings, from the birth of the Norns (complete with divine electric 
bursts), natural disasters (volcanoes erupting), the threat of Grendels, the 
industrious Ettins constructing the built environment, and the departure into deep 
space of the Shee. The spider moves us away from our historic journey by 
stepping off the cave wall and onto the metallic piping of Shee technology. We are 
then accelerated into a scene of active technoscience, as our lowly spider trips the 
machines into action, mistaking an arachnid shape for egg and triggering the 
production of a Norn egg. This machinic birth is accompanied by a dazzling 
display of laser light power, and the release of binary code illuminating its way up 
the machinery. The action collimates in the machine opening and depositing a 
fresh Norn egg in anticipation of the initiation of the game. 
While the vignette provides a mythic history lesson of Albia and the creatures that 
populate it, its archaeological value is offset by the triggering of machinery that 
dramatically produce the promise of new life, being an egg to realise new 
relationships between carbon and silicon life. Creatures is not a game that looks to 
the past, but instead to brave new futures. The relationship between 
technoscience and life is structured clearly within the Creatures 2 vignette. The 
ancient technological machinery of the Shee is tripped into operation and 
produces the potential for new life as a machinic technoscience conception. To 
ensure the connection between life, information and technology is made, binary 
life code streams up the machines, amalgamated and realised as the Norn egg. 
As binary Os and Is, it is code that becomes the common denominator in the 
production of new life. The vignette structures a perfected study of life in the 
cybernetic definition: the gleaming new egg standing as the proud progeny of its 
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machine parent, ready for the player to take forth and multiply. It continues to 
structure the game as concerning new life that is tightly entwined with technology 
in new allegiances of code. 
In Creatures 3 the vignette takes us away from the Albian landscape into outer 
space. Swirling galaxies fade in and out of view, and as the camera pans out we 
realise that the space-scape is actually being reflected in the eye of a Norn looking 
into space with awe and wonder. As the camera continues panning, the lush 
natural environment surrounding the Norn becomes visible before a blue force 
field hums into existence, revealing that the scene is an external window of a giant 
Shee spacecraft. As we continue to pan out, the Shee spacecraft arcs into the 
horizon. The setting of Creatures 3 departs from the two previous instantiations of 
the game because it does not occur on Albia, but on the ancient Shee spacecraft 
that had departed Albia in historic times past (as discovered in the cave paintings 
shown in Creatures 2). While the vignette for Creatures 3 highlights this change of 
perspective, it also reinforces the partnership of technoscience and nature in the 
game, and importantly structures a post-human cosmology. The lone inquisitive 
Norn looks out into the depths of space, fractally reflected in his eyes; the bond 
between Norn and universe is set in place. The universe is both within the Norn 
and beyond him, and both are intimately tied together. The vignette for Creatures 
3 provides an initial structuring of the mythic possibilities of the game and of the 
series as a whole, especially as a continuation of the vignette found in Creatures 2, 
where binary code is implicated and harnessed in the production of life. Creatures 
3 progresses this fusion of life and informational code out to the stuff of the 
universe itself. The Norn is the cosmic Norn connected to everything at once in a 
fractal web of swirling galaxy patterns. Just as within post-modern spirituality, the 
cosmic Christ is connected through a cybernetic web of information patterns in 
the holistic universe. The solitary Norn realises the interconnectedness of all 
things in his outward gaze, and in doing so structures feelings towards a 
cosmological common sense of the holistic universe. 
In a similar manner, press coverage of Creatures similarly structures a feeling of 
the game in its techno-scientific status and claimed production of life. Leading 
computer game magazine Edge focuses its review of Creatures, and Cyberlife 
Technology, on Artificial Life as a leading techno science and its possibilities. 
Following "the creatures' progress," Edge confirms the life status of Norns as 
"actual living creatures" with "simulated blood systems, instinctive drives and 
rudimentary brains employing neural network technology" and who mate, 
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"donating their coded DNA to the resulting progeny" (Edge 75 1999: 41), 
structuring Norns' techno-scientific interest as coded proliferating life forms_ The 
serious science of Creatures is structured further, and reinforced through the 
article's introduction of Cyberlife as part of Cambridge's great history of 
"scientific glory," sided with Newton, Darwin and Hawkins (Edge 75 1999: 40)_ 
Further aligning Dawkin's endorsement found on the Creatures 1 game box, this 
places the game firmly within a (techno)scientific framework and the belies the 
significance of the 'play' at work_ The Shee spacecraft is described as "essentially 
a gigantic breeding experiment" and the game's producer Toby Simpson boasts 
of the improved biological systems incorporated in the game_ As with material 
published by Cyberlife as the game producers, the connections between silicon 
and carbon are pronounced, further establishing the game's developing culture of 
new life and the player's connection with this life as kin and caretakeL From both 
primary and secondary sources, (potential) players coming to Creatures find a 
common culture based around a story of life itself, the technoscience that has 
created this culture and our ontological relationship to this life_ It prepares 
players to what playing Creatures will be like, and hints at a feeling for the life they 
are to find within their computers and the nurturing and experimental role of the 
player's position_ It aligns the player to the spiritual and scientific grand narrative 
of construction, creation and change played through in gameplay_ 
Creatures is structured along a number of related directions that bring players 
towards an understanding of what the game is about, and the development of a 
common sense for the game's emerging culture_ Key in the structuring of 
Creatures is the sense that the game is about a specific variety of life itself, and 
our relationship with that life in both a techno-scientific and nurturing role_ 
Included in this relationship, common bonds between carbon and silicon are 
structured through familial bonds of kinship between human and Norn and a 
more encompassing common cosmology of the living holistic universe_ Whilst 
structures of feeling are most commonplace at entry pOints to a culture, they are 
present and continually produced throughout the game's culture_ In the case of 
Creatures, these are the things that players first come across to the entry point of 
the game This is not only in the immediate game play but also broadens in 
extended game play and in other points of contact with the culture_ Importantly, 
through the productive intra-action of gameplay, the structures of feeling are often 
developed by players and other members of the culture_ 
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Playing God 
The player's presence is extended within the gamespace of Albia, represented 
digitally as a floating hand positioned above (or in front of) and involved in the 
activity of Albian life. This typical player positioning within the 'god-sim' genre, 
and common throughout the genealogy of games covered in chapter seven, places 
the player spiritually in a participatory patriarchal god vantage point, and 
scientifically as researcher or scientist. The hand, as the player's extension into 
the cyberspace emplacement of Albia, realises an important heterotopian feature 
found throughout the genre. By the very act of entering Albia as a heterotopia, the 
player is at once excluded by his or her presence. As an extension of the 
embodied player, the hand allows the player an entry point into the gamespace. 
Floating over and in front of the Albian terrain, however, it also highlights that 
while the player may be present, he or she is not included in the emplacement 
itself and remains as an outsider looking into the space. This element of the 
gamespace of Creatures as a digital space and as a heterotopian cybernetic space 
excludes the player; they are not digitally constituted or fully conforming to the 
underlying programming rules of Albia as a computational regime. This excluded 
position within the Albian emplacement is reflected in the spiritual role of 
patriarchal god that the player is able to hold. In order to fulfil the scientific and 
spiritual grand narratives the game presents, the player must be outside of the 
system, technically. They rely on the player (and game producers) to hold a 
position exterior to the system. 
When examining issues of power and control within the game specifically, the 
excluded nature of the player's position within the gamespace and role as a 
patriarchal god figure highlights the player's limited power within the game. 
Found throughout evolutionary computer games, the player must negotiate 
positions of power with the system. Even accounting for the highly participatory 
role that the player finds within Creatures, there is a negotiation between player 
and system (spiritual positioned as an emergent god) that takes place within 
gameplay, as there is with other evolutionary artificial life games. The negotiation 
of power between player and system is structured within Creatures as mythic 
possibilities that the player is pointed towards and guided through in gameplay. 
Mythic Possibilities 
Conforming to the mythic possibilities of construction, creation and change, play 
in Creatures develops through three stages of spiritual and scientific mythic 
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possibilities: the construction of a world or universe, the creation of life within this 
universe, and change or the evolution of life over time. Construction, creation and 
change are technically necessary for the scientific development and running of 
artificial life computer systems. Equalling this technical aspect of gameplay to a 
post· modern spirituality, tied closely with a Judeo·Christian Genesis story, 
connects Creatures with greater cultural grand narratives. 
The spiritual and mythic possibilities of a technological Judeo-Christian Genesis 
story structures the parameters of construction, creation and change within 
Creatures. The player enacts and realises these through the intra·action of 
gameplay. The player realises his or her god positioning, and a specific mythic 
story of life within Creatures is established, through the (re)enactment and playing 
through of a unique mythic genesis narrative. It is unique as players in each 
instance of Creatures realises their mythic possibilities individually each time the 
game is played. As part of a structured and structuring emplacement, gameplay 
throughout all instantiations of Creatures structures itself around the mythic 
possibilities programmed into the game, and the player must conform to this 
direction of gameplay to make playa success. Creatures continually produces new 
relationships between carbon and silicon life and new meanings of life itself 
through the productive practice of gameplay. Far from recreating a distinctly 
Judeo-Christian relationship of external and divinely powerful god, players of 
Creatures soon realise that different relationships of power are present in Albia: 
ones that move towards a posthuman spirituality in the interconnectedness of all 
things. 
God as System 
Retaining a post-modern spiritual duality between a patriarchal and emergent god 
figure, Creatures challenges the player's position as a unitary god, finding an 
emergent spirituality of process and the interconnectedness of all things in the 
mythic possibility of change. After the initial mythic challenges of construction 
and creation, the player's challenge is to guide new Norns throughout their day-to-
day life, taking a role of leader and nurturer. This is a simple task when Albia 
contains only a few Norns to track, maintain and keep in order, but proves 
increasingly difficult as the Norn population increases. These difficulties arise not 
only because of the increased logistics involved in managing growing numbers of 
Norns, but with the increased amount of stimuli available from other Norns it 
William Gavin Mackie Loading World 207 
becomes more difficult to engage and maintain a Norn's attention. Norns are 
attracted to movement and they become easily distracted, preferring each other's 
company to that of the player. When they do pay attention to the player, even then 
ensuring Norn obedience is difficult. Norns come across as wilful little creatures, 
and players quickly realise that the challenge is not to teach and adapt Norns to 
their style of play, but the opposite; players must adapt to the workings of the 
game in order to build and maintain relationships with the Norns. Maintaining a 
level of control in the game means understanding and playing by 'the rules.' 
Successful play is achieved by working with the structures and programming of 
the game, adjusting play style to the game's operations. Within the mythic 
structure of change, power is shared between the player and the system, and the 
player guides and manages within the confines of emergent processes. 
The mythic possibility of change encourages a gameplay style that structures 
itself around a spiritual mythology of the interconnectedness of all things, within 
day·to·day life and existence in Albia. Players are brought into this system, but in 
keeping with Creatures as a heterotopian emplacement, they are also excluded 
because the emergent programming of the game does not constitute them. The 
challenge that the players face becomes the integration with the system, learning 
the structure of the underlying programming in its emerging systems and 
processes in order to exert influence over the creation of history in the game. The 
player's god positioning does not challenge the power of the underlying system, 
but instead influences and offsets the deterministic nature of the system as a 
whole. As with SimLife and SimEarth, the player has influence over how the game 
progresses but cannot alter or change the fundamental rules of the system. 
The player therefore shares the status of god with the game, the player as a 
participatory patriarchal god shaping intra·action within Albia, and the system as 
an emergent god, tending towards deterministic cybernetic process of 
communication and control. Players challenge the determinism of the system, 
creating gameplay and the production of history through their involvement with 
the entities of Albia. If left on its own (as is done with a Wolfing Run), the system 
sustains itself through its interconnectedness and self·organisation and 
emergence. It is within these properties of the system that the rules and the offset 
of power are kept. 
Construction, Creation and Change - the Story of Life in Creatures 
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Life in Creatures is structured within the ideals of the cybernetic definition of life 
itself. Norn life is grounded in genetic and cybernetic determinism, and the 
maintenance of homeostatic equilibrium, through negative feedback loops within 
their own digital metabolism and between themselves and the environment that 
they are embedded within and form part of. Norns are phenotypically defined and 
realised by their (digital) DNA; they operate on a system of gene action where 
code contains both the instructions for representation and the means for its 
actualisation. Albian life, at this elementary level, is codified. Departing from a 
neo·Darwinian evolutionary framework, having an embedded body within the 
cybernetic environment of Albia is key in the schematics of life within Creatures 
(although, in keeping with a cybernetic framework it is embedded information that 
is important). It is Norn DNA codes for Norn systems, the phenotypic realisation 
of the genotype, that through establishing systems of feedback and control with 
the surrounding environment and within the Norn maintain their aliveness and 
create the conditions for the emergence of life·like behaviours (intelligence). The 
player's intra-action with this life is two-fold: establishing and maintaining 
conditions of homeostasis to ensure Norn health (nurturing); and breeding or 
enginerring Norns to enhance the genetic value of the population. 
The story of this Norn aliveness is structured within the mythic scientific and 
spiritual grand narratives of construction, creation and change, which have been 
developed throughout the genealogy of evolutionary artificial life games and 
programs. The birth of a new computational regime requires the allocation of 
computer memory space necessary to construct a virtual computer-within-
computer to contain and constitute the artificial life programming_ The allotment 
of this space and the construction of Albia are aligned with the mythic telling of 
the construction of new universes and worlds, created to host and become home 
to new life. In the act of pressing play and starting the game, receiving the 
proclamation 'loading world', the player initiates the play through of the mythic 
possibilities of the game in the construction of Albia, scientifically constructing 
the conditions for 'intelligent' cybernetic life to emerge whilst spiritually 
constructing the world and universe as patriarchal gOd. The act of construction 
partitions an area of computer disk space as a new digital Albian universe, planet 
and ecosystem, and heralds the mythic journey at hand. Genesis stories begin 
with the construction of the universe and world; Creatures, following the tradition 
of artificial life programs, is no different. The player's next task is one of creation. 
It is the player's hand extension into Albia whose god-like touch will bring life to 
the screen and properly initiate the game, with the birth of the first Norn. The 
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creation of life is the second step in the running of Artificial Life programs: once a 
virtual computer has been partitioned (the construction of a new universe) this 
memory space must be seeded with computer algorithms that have the potential 
to self·replicate within the conditions of the virtual computer. Selecting a Norn 
egg from the hatchery, the player hatches the first Norn and seeds the world with 
intelligent life, with the aid of the technology of the incubator. In Creatures, 
creation is the combination of godly intervention and technoscience in action. 
Whilst the construction of Albia and its ecosystem brings the rudiments of life, it 
is only through the touch of god and workings of technoscience that life with the 
potential for 'intelligence' is introduced to Albia and Creatures. The choosing and 
birth of the first Norn proclaims the start of gameplay and the start of the player's 
relationshi p with his or her new charges and new life. Unlike Genesis, on the 
seventh day god does not rest; the god· players must now give their full attention 
to the nurturing and successful raising of the new life at their disposal. 
Continuing the mythic journey, the bulk of gameplay relates to change in the 
development of individual Norns and the related evolutionary development of the 
Norn species. Here, "the breeding of successive generations of norns ... leads of 
course to evolution which is - given the underlying ALife philosophy - the true 
agent of the game and more powerful than the god·like Shee and their player· 
programmer descendents" (Kember 2003: 97). The player continues as a 
participatory patriarchal god, mythically positioning throughout the game and 
able to keep a panoptic vantage of Albia. Through the hand, the player influences 
and controls Albian activities, including the ability to remove or inject Norns 
and/or other objects into the gamespace (in Creature·speak referred to as 'cobs') 
as Albian history is created. Within Creatures, individual Norns 'physically' develop 
throughout their lives as well as the Norn species progressively evolving through 
breeding of generations. Birthed within a scientific discourse of the cybernetic 
definition of life, Norns develop through a system of learning based in bottom·up 
emergent patterns and cybernetic relationships within itself, and the environment 
that surrounds it. Through player·Norn intra·action and with the aid of the 
'learning computers', Norns learn rudimentary speech patterns and simple 
actions, directions and objects. With return visits to the hatchery and through 
'natural' births, a Norn population is formed. It is the player's objective to 
maintain and develop this population through a combination of breeding, raiSing 
and nurturing, playing through the possibility of change over time, and the 
development of Norn and Albian history. The third criterion for the successful 
production of an Artificial Life emplacement is fulfilled in the creation of change 
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through the production of history. Change in Albia consists of the everyday 
developments of the Albian ecosystem, in unfolding cybernetic processes and 
systems that within the computational regime of a responsible deterministic 
model emerge as the day·to·day reality of Albia. Gameplay becomes history 
making. Change is also evolutionary, in the continued development of the 
relationship between the player and Norns, and the development of the Norn 
lineage through natural mating, breeding programs, and other genetic 
manipulation and engineering techniques. The player influences the process of 
change through his or her manipulation and control of Albian occurrences, 
especially in the continued intra·action with Norns. To support this goal the player 
has been supplied with a number of 'Kits' offering a range of tools in each of six 
special isms - an Owner's Kit, Health Kit, Breeder's Kit, Science Kit, Neuroscience 
Kit, and Observation Kit. Accessing each Kit makes advanced tools available for 
the monitoring of Norn biochemistry, the supply of and means to inject medical 
and other substances to each Norn, the investigation of the genetic make·up of 
each Norn, and tools for the tracking and recording of Norn life. 
Following gameplay through the mythic possibility of change in Creatures, life 
plays as both a scientific challenge and as a continuing soap opera in the 
development of history. Players must keep their Norns alive, healthy, propagating 
and evolving, as well as take part in the production of daily history through 
participating in Norn life stories that mimic our own. Bonds of kinship, created 
through the production of common histories and life·recording tools, tighten 
claims of Norn aliveness as well as forge bonds between human and Norn that are 
more than skin deep. "Norns are like children: a new generation" (Kember 2003: 
97). The Kits and tools available in gameplay allow the player to accomplish his or 
her goals, forming narrative structures that shape gameplay and the production of 
meaning within the game. 
The Production of History - the Recording of Norn Life through Change 
The bulk of gameplay in Creatures is taking part in change: the unfolding of day· 
to·day events of Norn existence. Following a paidea style of play, there is a start 
point to the game but no objective end point; there is no set of goals that result in 
the end of the game (unless the player fails to successfully establish a Norn 
lineage and exhausts the egg supply in the hatchery). The creation of history 
through official and unofficial recording of events, therefore, becomes a central 
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focus in the development of play and forms narrative structures that shape and 
guide gameplay in the production of bonds between human and Norn life stories, 
through common life histories. Within Creatures the recording device 
automatically records all events of merit, a running time·stamped log of 
occurrences such as births and deaths. Whilst this creates a list of events in the 
ecosystem, much like a anthropologist's or zoologist's field notebook or similar 
logs in previous programs such as Tierra, the player has been given a number of 
tools to both officially document and socially celebrate Norns' lives in the 
'Owner's Kit.' The Owner's Kit contains the tools and official documentation 
necessary to register and validate Norn life as a citizen of Albia, and recognition 
as an intelligent individual entity. Registering a birth details the Norn's name, 
gender and age, and lists the owner (player). Upon verification, a Birth Certificate 
for the Norn is supplied. This step is vital within gameplay, as it is through 
registering the Norn that he or she learns his or her name, fulfilling the creation of 
self·identity for the Norn. It is also a prerequisite to be able to gain an official 
Birth Certificate for the Norn, to create ancestral traces through pedigrees, and 
the ability for the Norn's life to be celebrated with photographs and a tombstone 
when they are deceased. The player is so warned: "If you don't register your 
Norn's birth, you won't get a birth certificate, and you will not be able to select a 
picture or leave any final words when your Norn dies!" (Simpson 1997: 90). All of 
these structure the production and recording of history in a manner familiar with 
parallel human lives. Birth registration regulates Nornian society, documenting 
official births, creating recorded citizens, and pairing Norn life with similar 
regulatory processes within Western contemporary cultures. 
Registering a Norn birth officiates the new life with a Birth Certificate and, with 
the logging of the event in the recording device, initiates a recorded life history for 
the Norn, structuring an anthropomorphised official and regulated Albian 
'citizenship.' The recording of life history is continued through the social tools of 
photography and captioned diaries. With the registration of birth, the player 
becomes able to access the other tool of the Owner's Kit: the Photo Album. Here 
the player as parent is able to take photographs of the selected Norn, edit the 
album, and write additional entries with each photograph in a system not 
dissimilar to scrap booking. By implementing techniques that we are familiar with 
as humans in the creation of our own continued production of self, bonds of 
kinship between human and Norn are further entrenched. 
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Photography gains importance in the game practice of Norn 'adoption.' Adoption 
continues in the production of kinship between player and Norn. The trading of 
Norns between players over the Internet has been integral to Creatures from the 
first instantiation of the game, opening the game from the immediate play of 
players and intra-actions within their iteration of Albia to an extended play, 
connecting players and multiple iterations of the game. Players have developed 
this aspect of trading into a more developed culture of adoption, where players 
have created websites (or areas of websites) devoted to the display and 
description of various Norns available for players to download and import to their 
own Albian terrain. The movement from 'trading' to 'adoption' is traceable to a 
Creatures player using the online tag 'Anti-Norn.' 'Anti-Norn' caused a sensation in 
the Creatures community through the creation of a website devoted to tortured 
Norns that he had systematically punished, and who displayed diminished 
'behavioural traits.' Downloading and including these Norns in a player's own 
Albia became known as adoption, with players challenging themselves to 
rehabilitate these 'damaged' Norns. Adoption has since branched out to include 
all forms of trading Norns over the Internet, and typically includes Norns that a 
player is particularly proud of. This might be through breeding, strange 
occurrences creating unusual prodigy, or by manipulation and recoding of the 
Norn's computer code/digital DNA. Photography is an important tool in adoption, 
with photos of hopeful Norns posted onto websites with descriptions for new 
prospective owners to browse. These often include anthropomorphised 
biographies of the Norns available for download, complete with photo snaps of 
grinning Norns vying for new parents. Adoption practices structure the techno-
scientific status of the game, with most Norns included for adoption being the 
proud parent or player's best efforts in the genetic manipulation of the Nornian 
gene pool, achieving new colours and interesting traits. These are often described 
in technical terms, specifying the genotypic structure and or the phenotypic 
attribute in a manner akin to a biological specialist. 
The creation of history through photographic documentation, either 
commemorating events or tracking Norns through adoption, can continue 
throughout each Norn's life. Photography is a social tool, enabling and structuring 
both the development of gameplay and relationship between player and Norn. 
When a Norn dies, this relationship is formalised again in the placement of a 
tombstone, allowing the player the opportunity to pay their last respects to 
honour the deceased Norn. Death is both a social practise and official event; the 
player chooses a photo and writes a caption to place on the tombstone and the 
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death is officially recorded in the recording device. Even in death, connections and 
links are made between human and Norn, as official and social ties are structured 
in gameplay tying Norn and human social practice. 
Raising Life the Technoscience Way 
Nurturing life in Creatures goes beyond mere guardianship and social ties to a 
more encompassing techno·scientific challenge, ensuring Norn life and wellbeing 
through the management of individual Norn bodies and the continued Norn 
lineage. Players must develop skills to keep their Norns healthy as well as 
maintaining and improving the Norn 'gene pool' through breeding and genetic 
engineering techniques. In aid of these challenges, the player is supplied with 
advanced tools in a number of player Kits, which allow both a number of 
monitoring and observation tools as well as to directly intervene with specified 
Norns. These tools structure a narrative supporting a cybernetic definition of life, 
signalling the player in the maintenance and manipulation of a number of Nornian 
'biochemical' feedback systems in the production of health and wellbeing. The 
Health Kit tracks a Norn's fitness through the monitoring and regulation of drives 
and needs. Attempting to maintain homeostatic equilibrium, Norns will self 
regulate and will "learn to perform actions that will reduce the levels of these 
meters" (Simpson 1997: 92). These include the maintenance of pain, hunger, 
exhaustion, sleepiness and boredom - the player is given specific additional 
advice about how to encourage the Norn to self·regulate each of these areas. The 
levels of each drive indicate which are at homeostasis and which would benefit 
from intervention. Each drive and need is generated from a combination of 
'chemical' levels and interactions that the player can monitor in the Science Kit. 
With such knowledge, the player can choose to 'prescribe' a medicine available 
from the 'Doctor's Page' of the Health Kit or can take more direct action and 
move to the 'Injections' page of the Science Kit where certain chemicals can be 
hypodermically syringed into the Norn. Gameplay is structured around the ability 
to monitor and intervene in the cybernetic processes of feedback between the 
Norn and its environment. Health and wellbeing in Creatures is structured as the 
maintenance of drives and needs, produced through the regulation and balance of 
biochemical feedback loops. 
Sex and reproduction follow similar narrative structures, with both male and 
female sex drives and female fertility generated through biochemical levels and 
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balances, which the player can monitor and influence in the Breeder's Kit. As with 
other drives and needs, sex for Norns is directed by the attempt to maintain 
homeostatic balance. Narrative scaffolding produces a connection between silicon 
and carbon within the game. The player is informed that "Animals need to breed 
in order to survive, and in Norns sex is a primary drive. Norns start to develop a 
sex drive during adolescence, and a high level indicates a need for them to mate" 
(Simpson 1997: 96). Kinship bonds between animals and Norns are enforced in 
claimed parallel cybernetic reproductive strategies. Norn sex, the 'kiss·pop' of a 
heterosexual male and female sexual meeting, alleviates unbalanced drive levels 
and achieves Norn homeostasis. To aid in Norn reproduction, as is available with 
other drives and needs, the player is given the opportunity to influence 
biochemical levels. In encouraging sexual mating, the player has access to 
chemical substances to increase sex drive through the 'Aphrodisiacs Page,' where 
"mating·related herbs" are available to supply to the Norns to raise or lower their 
sex drive. In this way, the player is able to influence biochemical levels relating to 
the balance or imbalance of sex drive chemical levels. 
Having the ability to influence sex drive is important in Creatures, in developing 
Norn breeding programs, and ensuring that the Norns that the player wishes to 
mate are encouraged to do so, while others are discouraged from doing so. With 
the purpose of the evolution of the Norn species, Norn breeding is a central 
concern within Creatures and the player has been given three standards 
techniques in which to influence Nornian evolution, both in artificial selection and 
genetic engineering. The first is using standard breeding programs through which 
certain traits are artificially selected for, similar to the breeding of pedigree dogs. 
It is through this type of manipulation that the Breeder's Kit is useful, in the 
monitoring and control of Norn sexuality. Creatures 2 furthered the interest in 
genetic experimentation with the addition of a gene·splicing machine, providing 
technoscience equipment so that players could experiment with the mixing of 
genes without the reliance on sex, pregnancy and birth. The gene·splicing 
machine operates by combining the genomes of two creatures into something new 
and unexpected by the random amalgamation of the donor codes. It opens 
Creatures to transgenic engineering; Norns can be spliced with the higher 
creatures of Albia, creating unusual combinations of Norn·Grendel, Norn·Ettin or 
Grendel·Ettin. The third and most involved manipulation is the genetic 
engineering of new species through the writing of new genetic code through the 
Genetics' Kit (an official addition to the game that can be purchased separately) 
or by using a variety of third party programs developed by players for the task. 
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Genetic engineering of new species can be the addition of new sprites or altering 
the manner in which the creatures appear on screen, to the more involved 
recoding of behavioural and biochemical genotypes, developing species that 
exhibit new ways of living. 
Players have taken the genetic engineering of the Norn DNA to fantastic and 
unusual ends, creating new strains and breeds not envisaged by the game 
producers. Enthusiast 'Nornlove' has attempted to compile a (non·exhaustive) 
breed register for Creatures with 96 different breeds archived, of which only 16 are 
original or developed by Cyberlife13. The remaining 80 breeds are the result of 
player development and include breeds with unusual colourings (such as Star 
Trek Norns in Federation uniform and Borg Norns with bionic enhancements, or 
Valentine Norns with hearts on their chests) to unusual traits such as Calvin 
Norns who can make some of their own food through 'photosynthesis.' Another 
example of a player developed breed, MerNorns have been extremely popular 
amongst players. Developed by players Lis Morris and Wafuru (J. Vara), MerNorns 
begin life on land, spend adolescence as amphibians, and adulthood as ocean 
dwellers, living and breathing underwater14. MerNorns deviate in Norn appearance 
(by adulthood, MerNorns' legs are replaced by a fish tail) and chemistry (by 
moving from air breathing to water breathing) in ways that Norns were not 
originally intended. This example of player inventiveness remains within the 
culture of the investigation and nurturing of digital cybernetic life found within 
Creatures. Players produce these radical movements in Norn evolution as part of 
programs of genetic engineering and experimentation, in ways that adhere to 
underlying structures of the game and further the development of narrative 
structures that focus on gene action as the code and basis of life. Through 
extended play and the labour of players, Creatures has widened narrative 
structures that continue a common sense of life itself as a cybernetic system of 
alliances of code, communication, feedback and control. 
From Carbon to Silicon and Back Again 
Creatures produces links and connections between silicon and carbon life that 
structure the underlying ontological similarity between the two in both immediate 
and extended play. Creatures has been structured as a game about life in both its 
13 www.nornlove.tripod/breeds.html 
14 www.helephant.com/wafuru/e/mer.html 
William Gavin Mackie Loading World 216 
techno·scientific and nurturing parameters. It creates familial bonds of kinship 
between silicon and carbon that are cemented in a common foundation of code, 
emergence and cybernetics. Finding a common foundation of code and 
information within the techno(iife)science's allegiance with informatics, Norns not 
only mimic and simulate carbon life, they ask to be considered as actual 
instances of cybernetic life. As Kember highlights: 
Kinship is represented on the level of narrative and interactivity and is 
underlined by a deeper level or principal of connection. The game is based 
on the principle that norns, as artificiallife·forms, are alive or possess the 
same essential life criteria as humans, including autonomy, self· 
organisation and evolution. (2003: 97) 
As part of a realised utopian cybernetic emplacement, Norns move beyond a 
reflection of carbon life to supplant it As a perfected informational universe, Albia 
compensates our own muddled universe and informs us of our own informational 
composition. As with other Artificial Life heterotropic emplacements, Albia 
exemplifies a definition of life and cosmos that our own universe is defined 
against It is through this suppletion that computational regimes are understood. 
The universe comes to be considered as the same as the models created to 
simulate it; we look to the 'simulations' to define our own. 
These links between the scientific and ontological status of carbon and silicon life 
are made concrete on the official Creatures website 15 . Here, the connection of the 
biological within computation is paramount, and users find various articles of 
support and advice, with subject matter including understanding Norn 
biochemistry, ecosystem studies, extended evolutionary experiments of the 'most 
healthy' Norns, the technologies of Cyberlife and Artificial Life, and an assessment 
of how a carbon living being can be reproduced inside a computer. For players 
who wish to further their understanding of the technoscience and links that 
Creatures makes, an online bookshop guides users in the subject areas of 
Creatures, Biology, Genetics and Artificial Life with a large selection of titles 
including prominent biologists such as Richard Dawkins and Steve Grand. The 
Creatures website disturbs the boundaries between gameplay and scientific 
practice, between game and educational content, and between carbon and silicon 
life. Links and ties are both formally and informally forged between gameplay, and 
more 'properly' scientific areas of biology, artificial life research and the 
philosophy of the meaning of life itself. Through the website, players are given the 
15 www.creatures.co.uk 
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opportunity to explore possible lines of gameplay that they could take with 
Creatures and how this can tie back to a greater enjoyment of the game, a greater 
understanding of the technoscience behind it and the connections made between 
silicon and carbon life. 
'Anti-Nom'; Is sadomasochism resistance? 
Creatures is a game that develops a culture and common sense assumptions built 
around ideals of life itself, defined as self-organising code embedded within a 
deterministic cybernetic system and post-modern spiritual underpinnings. 
Through structures of feeling, players and others associated with the game's 
culture are introduced and aligned along the techno-scientific and spiritual 
meanings of life itself that are structured for, and produced in, gameplay. To be 
able to play the game in any meaningful sense, players must align themselves 
with Creatures as a game about the raising and nurturing of digital life. Players are 
responsible for the protection of this life; they hold a privileged patriarchal 
position within the game, and success is based on the ability to create a thriving 
population of creatures that progressively advance through generations. Without 
this basic understanding of the common sense of Creatures, gameplay can only be 
unsuccessful; the game will not make sense and the player will not be able to 
progress in the play of the game or make any meaningful connections between 
action and gameplay. Players become involved in the production of the game's 
culture through play and intra-action, both within the game in immediate play and 
through more elaborate connections in extended play. As well as developing new 
types and species of Norns, Grendels and Ettins, players have introduced new 
objects to Albia 16 such as toys, food, machines, and other creatures such as fish 
and penguins. They have developed new landscapes and worlds for Norns to 
inhabit, and have influenced, through player feedback, new iterations and add-ons 
to the game from the developers. This player-developer intra-action has become 
instrumental to the development of Creatures and its culture. To this end, 
Creatures Labs created the 'Creatures Developer Network,' a membership 
affiliation of Creatures players who voluntarily register to beta test and further 
develop aspects of the game. There is an immense amount of free labour involved 
in the production and maintenance of a Creatures' game culture. There are Albias 
to be attended to, Norns to breed and engineer, websites to build and maintain, 
web forums and newsgroups to populate, and development to continue. This 
creates a collection of immediate and extended gameplay intra-actions that come 
16 In Creatures these are commonly referred to as 'cob's' - Creatures OBject. 
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together to continually produce a game's culture and common sense, developing 
meanings through gameplay about the nature of life itself. 
The case of the player 'Anti·Norn' initially challenges the production of culture 
surrounding Creatures as concerned with the raising, nurturing and development 
of digital lifeforms. 'Anti·Norn' achieved infamous status throughout the Creatures 
community in the production of a website devoted to the act of torturing Norns, 
exhibiting images of Norns within Creatures games displaying submissive poses 
and verbalising equally helpless language. 'Anti·Norn' is a male American ex· 
marine who achieved such atypical Norn outcomes through the continued 'slap· 
punishing' of his Norn population and by teaching Norns submissive language. 
These 'abused' Norns became a calling point for outraged players who began the 
practice of adoption, downloading 'Anti-Norn's' Norns to rehabilitate and develop 
them, in a manner not dissimilar to intervention by fostering and adoption from 
unsuitable and abusive parents, or owners of abused children or pets. 'Anti-Norn' 
himself became vilified within the Creatures community, sparking a debate within 
Creatures newsgroups on the moral and ethical implications of torturing and 
abusing digital life forms (Kember 2003), and whether Norns counted as being 
alive, and therefore had any rights. The furore 'Anti-Norn' created was so intense 
that he even received a death threat from another Creatures player and many 
debated whether sanctions should be taken against him within the community. 
Much of the reaction from other players focused on the completely contrary style 
of gameplay 'Anti-Norn' formed in Creatures, and the implications this had in 
attempts to define the life status of Norns. Far from the nurturing and guiding 
hand that most players bring to their Norns,' Anti·Norn' dismissed this style of 
play for another more apparently sinister and oppositional approach. As an 
alternative to creating 'happy' Norns who were well balanced, outgoing and social, 
'Anti-Norn's' population became, through adverse treatment, withdrawn, cowardly 
and confused. For the majority of the Creatures community, this violated the 
game's accepted culture that had been cultivated within the greater assembly of 
players, eliciting a highly negative response from other players including the 
aforementioned death threat. Commenting on player reaction to 'Anti-Norn', Steve 
Grand finds that the community "showed a greater regard for the creatures than it 
did for the life of this one human being" (creatures.wikia.com/wiki/AntiNorn). 
'Anti-Norn's' gameplay embodies an alternative and oppositional gameplay style 
within the Creatures' player population and the game's acceptable culture. 'Anti-
Norn's' torturing of Norns can be framed as a form of resistance against the 
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hegemony of the existing game culture. Through torturing and abusing Norns, 
'Anti·Norn's' gameplay attempts to question and (re)establish boundaries of life 
itself, between digital and carbon. By effectively denying Norns anything 
resembling 'human' or 'animal' rights, Anti·Norn challenges the ontological unity 
between digital and carbon and the equivalent life status each is allowed to 
achieve. 
While 'Anti·Norn' displays an alternative and challenging style of play, examining 
his oppositional gameplay style within the framework of Raymond William's 
proposition that "the dominant culture ... at once produces and limits its own 
forms of counter·culture" (1977: 114) Norn torture becomes a case of 'counter· 
culture' that ultimately remains within the constraints of the dominant game's 
culture. The question of whether it is possible to torture and abuse a non·living 
thing is raised - can Norns be abused if they are not living, or at least acceptably 
life·like? In other words, a gameplay style focused on the torture and abuse of 
Norns remains concerned with life and our intra·action with that life, as humans. 
In a hegemonic game culture centralised and focused on the production of 
'positive' life intra·actions, its resistance comes not in the form of anti·life, but in 
the production of 'negative' intra·actions. Whilst highly original, 'Anti·Norn's' style 
of gameplay nonetheless ultimately remains within the dominant culture's remit 
of the production of digital life. 'Anti·Norn's' subversive style of gameplay remains 
within the remit of intra·acting with life. Torturing an entity, found outside of the 
gamut of things allowed to be alive or considered to be lifelike, would not make 
sense. Creatures is a game structured around the production and proliferation of 
life, to attempt to play Creatures without this central core structure would not 
produce meaningful gameplay. 'Anti·Norn's' resistance is produced and 
subsumed within the greater culture of the game. He remains within the 
parameters of the culture of Creatures, but exposes the game's production of 
meaning through subverting the player's role from nurturer to sadomasochist. By 
dramatically torturing and displaying abused Norns, 'Anti·Norn' visibly fractures 
the aura surrounding the life status of Norns and makes the game's culture of life 
itself evident and debateable. Kember's analysis of Creatures' newsgroups during 
the height of the Anti·Norn torture debate shows how the focus of discussion of 
Norn torture was linked to debate on their status as alive (2003: 102). Allowing 
humans to torture Norns alarmingly calls into question their status as living 
creatures in an interesting duality - on one side Norns can only really be tortured 
if indeed they are living, and on the other if Norns are living should they not 
qualify to rights that would protect them from abuse? This debate is played 
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through within the greater game's culture that, even in its counter·culture, is 
firmly entrenched in narrative structures and grand narratives of life itself. 
Creating Narratives, Producing Meaning 
Playing Creatures produces an Albian game history through the intra·action of the 
assembly, brought together within gameplay. The player is a key agent within this 
assembly in the production of history through the maintenance of Norn lives and 
evolutionary lineage - intra·acting with the creatures and objects within the game 
to influence the daily activity of gameplay, as well as further intra·action with 
other players in extended play, trading, informing, debating and showing off with 
each other. This gameplay produces the official recording of life on Albia and 
develops the narratives that players produce and take away from gameplay. The 
production of narratives that produce meaning from play are intimately tied with 
the creation of history. Failing to remain within the confines of gameplay initially 
structured within the game, the assembly of Creatures players have developed 
goal·setting situations in the playing of Creatures that challenge players with 
additional ludic style scenarios within the continued development of history, 
which the paedia setting of the game takes. These games·within·games highlight 
the challenge of life at play within Creatures. 
Breeding experiments such as 'Wolfing Runs,' where the game is left running on 
its own at increased speed to encourage the natural evolution of Norns through 
generations, or the trading and one·upmanship that comes with the 'genetic 
engineering' or breeding of new Norn traits, are based around a gameplay style of 
scientific experimentation with the creatures within the game and as additional 
features introduced through player development. Even the rehabilitation of 'Anti· 
Norn's' abused Norns, through adoption and download, produce narratives 
around the story of life and lives, with narratives of abuse, rescue, vulnerable and 
at risk populations, adoption and protection. The 'Norn Genome Project' initiated 
by the player community to crack Norn 'genetic code,' and analogous to its 
human counterpart, as well as numerous player produced 'gene splicing' and 
engineering tools available for Creatures 1, not only produce advanced narratives 
about (Norn) cyber·biological life sciences, but have also prompted Cyberlife to 
include more advanced techno(life)scientific features in later iterations of the 
game. One of the joys of playing Creatures, and key to its success, is how 
gameplay can take many levels, from keeping Norns as digital pets to advanced 
'genetic engineering' and computer programming. A serious style of gameplay is 
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adopted by a large number of players, treating Creatures as an experimental 
emplacement for the exploration of the life processes that Norns and the other 
creatures of Albia display, connecting with each other through websites and 
newsgroups. This highlights how the discourse of life itself, which the game 
introduces, has been readily adopted and further enhanced within the game's 
culture by the greater assembly brought together in extended gameplay. 
Throughout gameplay and the associated work involved in extended play, 
connections between human and Norn are made, from the 'Norn Genome 
Project,' to adoption agencies and 'Creatures Wiki', an online user·populated 
encyclopaedia site devoted to Creatures. These mirror and extend the similar 
connections between silicon and carbon that the official Creatures website makes. 
Players consider Creatures a serious game for playing with life. When combined 
with the ties bonding silicon with carbon life that the Creatures website forges, and 
especially with Steve Grand's own model of computational regime in responsible 
determinism that crosses both Albian and Earthly life, nature and universes; a 
specific and unitary story of life itself emerges, told repeatedly through the 
narratives taken from gameplay and surrounding activities, and intimately tied 
with other similar discourses produced within the sphere of the contemporary life 
sciences. Prior to a critique of what life is deemed of value within artificial life 
emplacements (Adam 1998), there needs to be a close examination of the 
ontological foundation of computational regimes at play within Creatures and 
other evolutionary artificial life computer games and programs, their bundling of 
discrete space and time, the deterministic cosmological model that emerges, the 
reliance on genetic action in the construction of life itself and the grand spiritual 
and scientific narratives that are all repeatedly played through and (re)produced 
in the mythic possibilities and narrative structures of these games. 
Creatures offers statements on the nature of life itself, digital life, and the nature 
of reality as a cosmology; structured gameplay produces meaning and player 
narratives. That is, structuring gameplay around a life ecosystem of a 
deterministic cybernetic model, of feedback and control, gives a statement that 
life is defined as such a model and produces meaning through play that supports 
such a statement. It offers statements that effectively complex life·like behaviour 
can be produced in a computer that counts as life. It offers statements on the 
interconnected and deterministic nature of the cosmos as a computational 
regime. Creatures is a productive thing; meaning is produced through gameplay 
that is structured around statements about life itself. Playing Creatures continually 
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produces new games and new narratives that are each unique, but each produces 
and builds upon a game's culture focused on a cybernetic definition of life and a 
cosmology of computational regimes based within responsible determinism. 
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Chapter 9 
'Does it Work': A Conclusion 
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Information is alive. (Brouwer and Mulder 2003) 
The change in accent made by Brouwer and Mulder in 2003 to Ray's 1988 
proclamation "information wants to be alive" demonstrates the entrenchment of 
informatics within the life sciences in the fifteen years between these two 
provocative declarations. Through the partnership of informatics and life itself a 
range of cultural formations have been attributed as living processes. It is within 
and as part of this collection of assemblages, promoting and producing new 
informational and cybernetic definitions of life and its processes, that replicating 
strings of computer code find support in their own project as being counted as 
instances of life. They have been created within evolutionary computer games as 
things 'down there' and ascribed with the code of new life, products of culture 
that define our natures. The life status that is accredited to the creatures and 
emplacements of evolutionary computer games has come to exemplify 
evolutionary and cybernetic definitions of life itself. As both heterotopias of 
compensation and a suppletion of life itself, these emplacements epitomise and 
define the essence of living within the neo-Darwinian evolutionary and cybernetic 
definitions of life. 
Creatures, its peers and predecessors enable productive practices that 
(re)produce new definitions of life formulated within conceptualisations of 
information, code, reproduction, evolution and cybernetics. These practices have 
continued with the recent game Spore, released in late 2008_ Finding a theoretical 
heritage within twentieth-century informatics, cybernetic theory, computer and 
the life sciences that codifies the gene as the book and essential ingredient of life, 
and forging a genealogical ancestry through games and programs that develop 
spiritual and scientific narratives connecting silicon and carbon life in mutual 
histories, evolutionary artificial life games and programs claim to create new 
forms of life_ This new life connects with common terminology, systems, 
aesthetics, life patterns and ties of nurturing and kinship. The formulation of life 
that these games and artificial life emplacements (re)create forges a unitary and 
essential vision of life itself. Furthermore, the material and digital are connected 
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spatially, through common natures and cosmologies within computational 
regimes. Within these patterns of emergence and connection are formed that 
postulates a deterministic formulation of life, nature and cosmos. Moving forward 
from Creatures, Spore continues the development of evolutionary computer games, 
with similar statements about life, nature and cosmos. 
This chapter culminates the investigation of how it has become possible to talk of 
silicon entities as alive by incorporating a critique of computational regimes. It 
begins with an introduction of Spore, and an investigation of this game's 
continued aliegience with many of the ideals covered within the thesis. It moves 
on to ask whether evolutionary computer games, as computational regimes, and 
the statements that are produced within gamplay actually work. Reminded of the 
materialist positioning developed in chapter one and taken thoughout the thesis, 
it explores the similarities between carbon and silicon while respecting their 
differences. The chapter suggests that silicon creatures could find their own life or 
life·like behaviours without the need to resort to an essentialist definition of life 
itself. 
Reworking the relationship and intra·action between silicon and carbon creatures 
highlights the need to find affiliations that acknowledge the mutuality between 
human and silicon. Reminded of the materialist position this thesis developed in 
the introductory chapter, and especially Barad's concept of intra-actions between 
things in the co-construction of the real, this chapter looks to new relations and 
intra-actions between human and silicon entities. Turning to Donna Haraway's 
investigation of the bond between human and dog species in their shared and 
entwined histories as companion species, similar patterns can be found in our 
relatively brief, new connections with silicon creatures. Reuniting the assembly 
surrounding artificial life and our intra-actions with the creatures it produces 
allows for debate over propositions of the nature of our own cosmology_ Exploring 
the possibility of emergence without the reliance or reduction to deterministic 
models could open the possibility of politics, resistance and change in new co-
constructions of space, time and reality_ After introducing Spore, and before 
heading into these less charted territories, this chapter recalls the original query 
of the thesis: how it has become possible to think of digital things as living 
creatures and the common nature proposed between the material and digital. 
Spore (2008 - ): Evolution by Design 
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In keeping with the genealogy of evolutionary games preceeding it, Spore focuses 
on developing relationships of nurture and kinship between player and the digital 
entities within the game. It is not so much the breeding and genetic engineering 
found in Creatures and SimLife that is of interest, however, but the story of 
evolution and the struggle of species for survival. The player's objective in Spore is 
to enable his or her creature and future species population to survive, out·perform 
or even eliminate other species. To do so, the player must guide both day-to-day 
activities as well as design creatures with advantageous attributes, over the 
course of five specific game levels: cell stage, creature stage, tribal stage, 
civilization stage and space stage_ While each of these has a ludic style 
evolutionary goal for successful completion, the five levels when put together form 
an overarching story of progressive evolutionism. While gameplay is not strictly 
focused on the workings of individual lifeforms, as is Creatures, many of the same 
statements about life, nature and the cosmos are structured within and produced 
through game play. 
The official Spore website structures feeling for the game, proclaiming: "It's a bit 
like the present you imagine a god might get on their first birthday: a mini 
universe of creation in a bOX,,17. Game packaging continues, headlining "Your 
personal universe in a box" and progressing: "evolve your unique creature, 
establish tribes, build civilizations, sculpt worlds and explore the cosmos". This is 
a game about the proliferation of life, placing the player as patriarchal godhead, 
with the responsibilities this brings_ Highlighting the mythic journey of 
construction, creation and change the player will take in gameplay, both the Spore 
website and game packaging promote gameplay as four distinct activities: "Create 
your universe from microscopic to macroscopic; Evolve your creature through five 
stages; Explore other players galaxies; Share with the world,,18. From an initial 
unicellular creature within "a primeval ocean with other simple creatures" 
(Hodgson et al. 2008: 3), to intergalactic travel in the 'space stage', "the next 
great leap into the heavens" (Hodgson et al. 2008: 175), Spore gameplay focuses 
on the challenge of species evolution and development. In doing so, it follows a 
similar evolutionary path of SimEarth, especially in the ultimate goal of escaping 
the Earth or planet; one that Richard Doyle finds responds to the "desire to 
achieve a position as a transcendental observer, to be off the earth, out of body, 
or beyond the living" (1997:120). To achieve this end state, evolution affects all 
withi n Spore: 
17 http://eu.spore.com/whatisspore/index.cfm 
18 http://eu.spore.com/whatisspore/ overview .cfm 
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Evolution is a journey in which the choices and actions you make in one 
game stage have consequences in later stages. The path you take as a 
microscopic cell, for instance, affects your abilities as a creature. Your 
actions even have far reaching reverberations into the future of your 
species. (Electronic Arts 2008: 10) 
It is the player's responsibility to make decisions affecting the evolution of his or 
her creature and species: "At each stage of your evolutionary path, you will make 
choices that establish your traits ... that will serve your future generations" 
(Electronic Arts 2008: 10). While the player is involved in some evolutionary 
decisions such as becoming a carnivore or herbivore, choosing the style of 
locomotion or becoming friendly or aggressive, there is no choice or deviation 
from the set evolutionary path structured within the game. The course is one of 
progressive evolution - from single cell organisms swimming for survival, 
advancing to intelligent sentient beings with culture and technology exploring the 
galaxy. Although Spore finds Darwinian roots in gameplay, based on the survival of 
the fittest, it is definitely not about natural selection. As with Biomorphs before it, 
it is the player's design decisions upon which creature phenotypes are based, and 
success is rated. Paired with the ludic objectives of each level, and overarching 
evolutionary narrative of the game, evolution takes on strong overtones of 
intelligent design19 within play: "You begin life as a tiny cell, then you progress 
through the other stages on your journey to becoming a galactic god" (Electronic 
Arts 2008: 6). To this end players are presented with a 'History' chart, a 
"personal history of your generational path" so that each player can "check how 
your evolutionary choices and actions are tracking" (Electronic Arts 2008: 9). This 
graph not only plots creature 'generations', but also pOSitions the player against 
the progressive evolution tracked through the game. Players are encouraged to 
select carefully how they shape each creature, with 'design hints', 'tips' and 
'notes' guiding players to think of the consequence of evolutionary choices 
(Hodgson et al. 2008). What emerges is gameplay structured around the 
emerging progressive evolutionary story of the species, with players strategically 
making choices at earlier stages of play (and evolution) to affect the species at 
later stages. 
19 Closely related with creationism, intelligent design is a teleological response to the question of 
evolution, suggesting that features of the universe and living things follow a specific design 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/lntelligenCdesign#cite_note·Dlposition·O). It implies an invisible hand 
designing and guiding evolution, and aligns with what Mary Midgley considers evolution purposed for 
the development of intelligence, "To increase this intelligence is ... the purpose of all life" (1985: 84). 
This aligns with the type of evolution professed by Teilhard in his "Main Road of Cosmic History, 
leading unambiguously from a pre· biotic cosmos up to the present state of humanity, and pointing 
firmly onward to a 'hyper·personal' future" (Toulmin 1982: 118) and his popular concept of a global 
brain - the noosphere, often linked within digital circles to the Internet. 
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Neither an essence of life as information, nor game worlds as computational 
regimes, are lost within Spore. Finding allegiance with the codification of life itself, 
players' scores within the game are paired with DNA. Players earn 'DNA points' 
through activities such as eating, and these are purposed to aid progression 
through the game; allowing the gaining of health, the evolutionary progression of 
the creature or species and the design of the creature's or species' phenotypic 
appearance. While the genetic and metabolic constitution of creatures is not 
considered as it is with Creatures and Sim Life , Spore acknowledges its allegiance 
with code through these 'DNA points'. Through the 'Spore creator', a game area 
dedicated to the design of creatures and game elements, players can trade 'DNA 
points' for new or more advanced body parts (in lower game stages), or clothing 
and cultural artefacts (in later stages) - mimicking a move from genetic to 
memetic evolution as first proposed by Richard Dawkins (1989). Spore's challenge 
is to collect enough 'DNA points' to create a successful creature design that will 
survive and progress through the evolutionary stages. The story of life as DNA 
code continues with Spore. 
As with games before it, the system and player intra·action continues to be 
shaped by computational regimes, if on a staged level·by·level basis. Each of the 
five game stages in Spore operate as mini·games, separate to each other. As the 
complexity of the creatures increase through stages, the relationship and form of 
intra·action it has with the player changes accordingly. The first two stages, cell 
and creature, involve the player on an intimate level with his or her creature, with 
the player effectively playing as the creature, directing all its actions. The 
distinction between player·god and creature·subject is lost; the player can easily 
move between the two positions. From the tribal stage onwards, the player adopts 
a more typical participatory patriarchal·godhead role, as gameplay moves to the 
player giving guidance, rather than actual direction, to the species population. 
Throughout all levels, the player's control within the game is one of influence, as 
witnessed throughout the genealogy of games. Each level operates as a 
computational regime with the player negotiating control with the game 
system(s). If left running without input from the player, the gameworld proceeds. 
Without player direction, however, the species will either continue with its last 
direction, or stall and wander aimlessly. The other species of the planet continue 
in their quests regardless. As with the informational essence of life, while these 
elements are definitively present within Spore and not entirely ignored, the 
concentration gameplay takes is on the relationship that players have with their 
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species and the species' struggle with their rivals for survival, in a story of 
progressive evolution. Overall, Spore continues within the tradition of the 
genealogy of evolutionary computer games, shifting its focus to a decisively ludic 
style of play, with narrative scaffolding that structures play through a story of 
progressive and designed evolution. Gameplay follows the mythic possibilities of 
construction, creation and change, with close spiritual ties with Teilhard and 
intelligent design. Scientifically, the strong ties of playing with life itself, as found 
in Creatures, have been muted; although connections with code, informatics, and 
connectionism remain. Spore is very much about playing with life and connecting 
mutual evolutionary histories with our own. 
How has it become possible to think of digital creatures as alive? 
The enjoyment gained from playing Spore, Creatures and their peers derives from 
the experience of intra·acting with entities inhabiting screens and computers who 
claim to be alive. The aliveness of entities such as the creatures of Spore and 
Norns extends beyond a mere marketing gimmick to a more encompassing 
assertion of the life status replicating strings of computer machine code have 
professed. Tracing a history through artificial life as a field and its coupled 
scientific partners of computer and life techno·sciences, silicon creatures claim 
life status within definitions of life steeped in informatics, cybernetics and neo· 
Darwinian evolutionism. It has been the co·development of information science, 
cybernetics and genetics throughout the twentieth century, that have formed the 
foundations to be able to talk about life in terms of replicating strings of 
informational code (Kember 2003). This underlying essentialism of life itself that 
permits the group of things included, incorporating Norns and other artificial life 
creatures, in what counts as life. Importantly, for artificial life to be considered as 
producing actual instances of life it has been the codification of the gene and the 
conceptualisation of information as separate and differentiated from its material 
substrate that has given groundwork to ascribing computer code with life. The 
creatures of Spore, Norns and their digital kin link DNA as the central figure within 
the multitude cellular functions that contribute to the metabolic processes 
associated with living. They overlook the multitude of roles of the virtual computer 
in which they perform, fulfilling a role much like the various cellular intra·actions 
involved in carbon life. Theirs is a focus on gene action, not activation within an 
array of collective intra·activity. 
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The double assumption surrounding information underlines the ability to consider 
digital and physical space as identical. It has been the conceptual ability to 
abstract 'information' separate from the material structure of which it is a part, as 
well as a reductionist approach where all things find a fundamental informational 
composition, that has allowed our cyberspaces to hold the same essential 
properties as the material space that surrounds us. Artificial life has continually 
and actively forged connections between digital and physical that has the 
tendency to ignore, deny or forget differences between spaces, be they material or 
digital. Some, such as Steve Grand, have postulated that there is no materiality to 
physical space; that, as with cyberspaces, space is reduced to information. 
Forging an equivalent composition between physical and digital strengthens 
claims of actual instances of silicon life, defined by and through the digital. 
Coupled with aesthetics that create familiar natures and creatures that, if not 
analogous to any living creatures, take on the aesthetic characteristics of their 
carbon cousins' soft and furry bodies, the coupling of digital and material takes 
on many levels. Evolutionary artificial life computer games, especially the 
Creatures series, structure play through optimising the common threads that can 
be made between digital and material through structures that develop feelings of 
commonality between Norn and human. Through structures of feeling and 
immediate and extended play, the games dicussed in the thesis build cultures in 
which players are able to investigate different intensities of the ties made 
available between silicon and carbon, from recognising Norns' 'digital DNA' to the 
ability to perform advanced genetic and evolutionary experiments, and the 
investigation of artificial life as a technoscience with ties to biological sciences 
and post· modern spiritualities. SimLife and SimEarth similarly make bold 
connections between silicon and carbon with gamespaces, landscapes and 
creatures that reflect present and historic narratives of Earth, and with gameplay 
experiments that encourage links between the intra·actions within the game and 
proposed equivalent 'real life' processes. Biomorphs and Tierra also make 
associations with carbon biology with models of genetic space (Biomorphs) and 
evolutionary patterns (Tierra) that actively relate digital and material space. Spore 
continues this tradition with an emphasis on evolutionary design in a Darwinian 
game of survival of the fittest. Moving outside 'Iife·as·we·know·it' to 'Iife·as·it· 
could·be' (Langton 1996:40) is seen as an expansion of the gamut of life, as most 
of these games perform. The range of things that are included as alive in carbon 
biology is expanded upon within artificial life, although there remains a consistent 
defining essence shared amongst all. The twinned relationship between carbon 
and silicon life remains. 
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Evolutionary artificial life computer games and programs find ties to carbon life 
through forging scientific and spiritual grand narratives that tie human, carbon 
and silicon life together with similar histories, statements and narratives. 
Continually played through, mythic possibilities develop narratives of 
construction, creation and change. Scientifically, through connectionism, 
emergence, evolutionism and cybernetics, and spiritually through post· modern 
narratives of the interconnectedness of all things and patriarchal and emergent 
god figurations, gameplay builds narratives and statements produced within and 
taken away from play. These further entwine carbon and silicon entities and 
worlds. They place the player scientifically as experimenter, and spiritually as a 
patriarchal god; they command, oversee, observe, measure and manipulate the 
creatures, landscape and other things within artificial life emplacements. 
Developed through a genealogy of games and programs that continues with Spore, 
silicon creatures are structured by narratives as instances of life through a 
scientific discourse that builds upon simple structures that, by following simple 
rules, display emergent behaviours that evolve to display intelligent behaviour, 
and through a spirituality that connects silicon and carbon life within Western 
contemporary post· modern spiritual ideals. These mythic possibilities develop 
common and unitary histories between carbon and silicon. They forge universal 
ties between silicon and carbon life, and between digital and material spaces, with 
common histories, terminology, systems, aesthetics, life patterns and through 
developing bonds of nurturing and kinship between human and artificial life. 
What Kind of Life is This Anyway? 
Artificial life at once expands what counts as life as it reduces the criteria needed 
to qualify as life. It maps and produces a unitary discourse on what it means to be 
alive, what living is about, what qualifies as productive life, as well as 
extrapolating beyond life to condense this within a singular cosmology. It 
implicates a rhetoric of progress, competition and transcendence within the 
narrative and history of life. The central figure of the gene is involved within the 
type of life that artificial life champions, viewed as the defining unit containing the 
information necessary for the production of life. This focus supports and develops 
definitions of life that are similarly centred. The evolutionary definition, from a 
neo·Darwinian perspective, defines life as the progressive evolution and 
replication of self·contained units of code. Here, bodies and the experience of day· 
to·day living are viewed as the means by which genetic code takes to enable its 
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replication. The cybernetic definition incorporates the processes of living as part 
of the cybernetic embedded state that organisms have with their environment. 
The focus, however, remains on information exchanges with the ultimate goal of 
replication and evolution. Here, there is no true distinction between organism and 
environment; both are seen as part of overlapping cybernetic systems. Organisms 
are involved within a set of negative feedback loops within themselves, and 
between themselves and their environment, for the purpose of achieving one 
positive loop (reproduction). 
Within digital artificial life emplacements structured as computational regimes, 
this kind of life is embedded as part of an encompassing deterministic system. All 
computational regimes, including evolutionary cpmuter games, find a theoretical 
heritage in the Game of Life. Through the reduction of space and time to discrete 
measurable units, the Game of Life has built a two·dimensional model that through 
adherence to a set of simple rules displays emergent patterns. Operating through 
rules connecting them to their neighbours, it is this behaviour of single units that 
produces emergent patterns from which proposed higher·level behaviours and 
intelligence form. Models of computational regimes, such as Hayles' 
'computational universe', Grand's 'responsible determinism' or Fredkin's 'Finite 
Nature', share this common reduction to recuperated modernist notions of time 
as space as discrete units. It is from this founding principle that if all points 
within the material universe could be mapped at anyone measure of time, and 
the rules of the system known, then it is possible to determine the state of the 
system at any other measure of time. Whilst investigating this model is 
impossible to achieve in practice, and therefore the calculation of accurate 
futurologies unattainable, it suggests only one determined path of unfolding. 
Evolutionary artificial life computer games and programs become prime working 
examples of computational regimes. Through organisation as bits of computer 
information (ultimately reduced to zeros and ones) and computational processing 
time clicks, following the rules set out in their programming, these games display 
emergent and life·like behaviour patterns. This produces a kind of life that is 
intimately connected with its surroundings and displays determined emergent 
behaviours that, at higher levels, become the measure of intelligence and self· 
organisation, through its ultimate reducibility to units of information 
systematically changing through discrete units of time by the application of 
simple rules. It is a kind of life that requires the external power of author and 
initiator to write the rules, set the initial structure of the universe and set time in 
motion, but also an internal power of connectionism, emergence and evolution to 
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maintain the ongoing history of the regime and development of life within. 
Evolutionary artificial life computer games, bringing together game producers, 
players and system or platform, demonstrate this kind of model perfectly. 
Creatures, Spore and their peers are therefore heterotopias of compensation for 
both evolutionary and cybernetic definitions of life within computational regimes. 
Through the assembly brought together in gameplay, these emplacements co· 
construct elements that perfect the structure and system of the computational 
universe and the process and purpose of life. Moving beyond heterotopias of 
compensation, these games have come to supplant the material world as ideal 
instances of computational regimes. It is the cosmological concepts and 
definitions of life developed within these games and programs that have been 
reflected back to define the physical world and universe they initially simulated. 
Within computational regimes and evolutionary and cybernetic definitions of life, 
it is the material universe that adheres to the definitions and workings of our 
digital emplacements. Within such a conceptualisation, we adopt the attributes 
and essence of our silicon kin, in their discrete, rule abiding and deterministic 
nature. This suppletion naturalises the set of assumptions and outcomes used in 
the creation of new digital natures and life. Alison Adam (1998) has criticised 
artificial life for the type of living that is given value within its systems. She 
highlights how the many positions that would be judged feminine, homosexual or 
'non· productive' are disqualified within these emplacements and are actively 
sought out and removed from the system, in favour of roles that are seen as 
reproductively useful within an atmosphere of capitalist competition. Prior to and 
along side a critique of the forms of life artificial life values, though, the 
recuperation of modernist formations of space and time, under the guise of 
radical new post-human natures, also need to be addressed_ 
Does It Work? 
Artificial life, within the configuration of computational regimes, has produced 
worlds that have been postulated as so similar to our own that they exemplify and 
ultimately come to define life, nature and the cosmos. Moving beyond mere 
dioramas presenting the wonders and magic of science to a lay audience, Spore, 
Creatures and other evolutionary artificial life computer games and popular 
programs implicate players, users and other humans within their assemblies in 
the co-production of new worlds of wondrous and perfected life. As assemblages, 
these games (re)create new natures and life that, although alien to Earth, share 
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common essences and inform us about our own lives, natures and cosmos. They 
produce a common set of statements about what it means to be alive, implicated 
within paired spiritual and scientific grand narratives linking digital with material 
existences. They actively form associations between digital and material and 
between silicon and carbon life. Returning to the Massumi quote in the 
introductory chapter of this thesis raises the question "Does it work?" (1992: 8). 
What new things does silicon life make it possible to think and feel? What does the 
possibility of silicon life mean for our bodies? Answering these questions 
highlights both positive and inherently problematic postulations about life and our 
relationship as humans with the creatures around us. 
Artificial life has made it possible to think about the feasibility of life outside of 
carbon chemistry. If the creatures it produces are held to be alive, it achieves a 
goal of masculine Western sciences in the creation of new life and new species. It 
holds the potential of developing and intra·acting with a new type of life, and one 
that has yet to reach its full set of capabilities. Artificial life questions what it 
means to be alive and challenges preconceived notions and definitions of life 
determined solely within carbon based biochemistry. As Kember has noted, "[the] 
debate within biology is of course not only with the origin and evolution, but also 
with the meaning of life" (2003: 14). Artificial life has the potential to open new 
propositions exploring definition(s) of life and our intra·action with the 
technologies that surround us, as humans. It challenges divisions between living 
and non·living, human and technology, and nature and culture. The Norns, 
Sporians and other creatures that we intra·act with within evolutionary computer 
games are things 'down there' not yet clearly defined as 'up here' as part of 
culture or 'out there' as part of nature. They clearly have relationships with both. 
Artificial life (re)creates new natures that claim to be intimately tied with our own, 
finding identical compositions defined within digital parameters. These place 
human bodies within discourses of replicating informational sets of code, 
abstracted from their materiality and defined by their informational formulation. 
Beyond life itself, artificial life emplacements make it possible to talk of an 
unknowable future, yet one that is ultimately deterministic. In doing so it 
questions whether a true politics of resistance is possible. It makes it possible to 
think of connectionism, emergence and evolution as powerful forces with spiritual 
godly overtones. It packages both time and space as knowable and measurable 
discrete units, in a recuperation of modernist ideals. 
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Norns, Albia, Creatures, Spore and the multitude of evolutionary artificial life 
computer games and programs, the creatures they produce and the cyberspatial 
emplacements they construct, come together as assemblages reterritorialising 
what life means, what our natures are, and how our cosmos operates. This thesis 
is not about whether Norns, the creatures of Spore and their silicon siblings count 
as instances of life; its concern lies in questions of what does it mean to talk 
about silicon life and new digital natures, and what new territories this opens for 
formulating our own lives and natures. To do so it questions an essence of life 
itself, abstracted as information and proposed as progressive informational 
evolutionism (Kember 2003, 2005). Replacing essences with a concept of habits 
and to think of propositions rather than statements (Latour 2004), it becomes 
possible to speak of the possibility of silicon life without having to evoke a form of 
essentialism that looks to singular universals to classify and define. Within a 
realist structure, essences are "thought to act as models, eternally maintaining 
their identity, while particular entities are conceived as mere copies of these 
models, resembling them with a higher or lower degree of perfection" (DeLanda 
2002: 4). Each instance of an essence maintains a core universal identity; each 
living entity is but a copy of an essential ideal of life itself. Resisting this, Bruno 
Latour calls for a program of propositions and habits: 
Articu lated propositions must have habits rather than essences. If the 
collective were to be invaded by essences with fixed and indisputable 
boundaries, natural causalities as well as human interests, no negotiation 
could be concluded, since one could expect nothing from the propositions 
but perseverance: they would persist until they won out their adversary. 
(2004: 86) 
Latour's program of political ecology stresses the need for humans to gain a 
relationship with the entities that surround us, not as objects but as nonhumans, 
whose status and meaning must be debated within collective life. That is, 
"nonhumans are not in themselves objects, and still less are they matters of fact. 
They first appear as matters of concern, as new entities that provoke perplexity 
and thus speech in those that gather around them, discuss them, and argue over 
them" (Latour 2004: 66). The new entities of artificial life, the new natures that 
are constructed and the cosmology that contains them need to be discussed and 
argued. The debate over the life status that Norns hold instigated by the 
gameplay of 'Anti·Norn' demonstrates the commencement of such a debate. This 
needs to be elaborated upon, however, to include a debate on Norn aliveness and 
also the construction of natures and cosmologies within computational regimes. It 
is a debate in which all parties must be listened to, whilst recognising the 
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difference between members. Braidotti highlights this collective, "'We' are in this 
together, but we are not all the same. Dolly the Sheep and I share a structural 
proximity, but this cannot be adequately accounted for within the logic of rights" 
(2006: 131). The thesis' concern in such a debate is the importation and 
ambiguous use and conceptualisation of information, and the recuperation of 
modernist notions of time and space that have been transferred from digital to 
material, in the production of new meanings and definitions of life, nature and 
cosmos. 
By assigning an essence of life that assumes the discrete nature of time and 
space, artificial life produces a specific model that silicon creatures adhere to 
though their digital composition. By applying this common essence across carbon 
life within informational evolutionism and models of deterministic computational 
regimes, questions of responsibility, politics and the opportunity for resistance 
become apparent. Against this, proposing a set of habits that come to 
characterise what life is, rather than any universal essence, opens a debate and 
discussion about what can qualify as life, without packaging life under any 
essential model. As philosopher Mark Bedau asserts, "For all we know, life might 
be no more unified than a collection of overlapping properties from overlapping 
disciplines" (from Kember 2003: 63). Within such a proposition, living things 
could have the habit of self·organisation, the habit of reproduction, the habit of 
change through generations via evolution, the habit of embedded cybernetic 
relationships within their environments, or the habit of defining themselves 
against their environments. Each new thing that asks to be qualified as living can 
present its habits and have its status as qualifying as living debated and decided 
within a collective. Importantly, within this mapping of habits, there becomes no 
one essential trait or one perfected model of life itself that defi nes or becomes the 
measure against which living things are assessed. Living things need not fit any 
ideal model of what it means to be alive. Life becomes a negotiated association of 
common habits between things. 
Characterising life as a set of habits releases any definition of life to find a 
universal essence as a model for living things. There would be no requirement to 
define a unitary essence common between silicon and carbon. In its place, a 
common set of habits could be negotiated that proposed instances of life could be 
evaluated within. Silicon creatures would be able to qualify or be denied the 
status of life on the merits of their habits. We would be able to reconfigure our 
intra·actions with them, changing how the "world kicks back" (Barad 1999: 2) in 
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new, fought over and considered positions. Importantly, instead of defining 
carbon life through essences exemplified within silicon life, there would no longer 
be the justification or necessity to warrant such a suppletion. The common habits 
between carbon and silicon entities could be explored whilst their differences are 
respected. The conceptualisation of information would not need to be abstracted 
from its material substrate in order to produce an essential model for life. 
Heredity, and the intra-actions leading to heredity, would become a habit of life, 
allowing recognition of the different strategies types of life, whether silicon or 
carbon, or of different species or how individuals perform in achieving heredity, or 
importantly, entities that share other life habits but do not themselves reproduce. 
Removed from any informational essentialism, reproduction, heredity and 
evolution could become common habits across living things with the variety of 
strategies that entities employ to become part of the diversity of living. 
By removing any essential defining property that must be shared across silicon 
and carbon entities, the need for an ontological universalism between digital and 
material is eliminated. Filled with habits and propositions, cosmologies of 
computational universes, can do away with any perfected essential model upon 
which our material and digital realities are defined against, as with the 
reconciliation of what counts as life. Within computational regimes, shared across 
material and digital spaces, it is the ultimate reduction of reality to discrete and 
ultimately knowable measures of time and space on which a shared ontology has 
been built. This packaged and recuperated modernist notion of time and space 
forms the defining essence of computational regimes. This has led to a cosmology 
that has been able to find a type of determinism within connectionism, emergence 
and informational evolutionism. It is this assumption and reduction of time and 
space to discrete units upon which the deterministic attribute of computational 
regimes is formulated. Computational regimes have found a perfected model 
within the closed systems of virtual computers that find a heritage in the Game of 
Life. This model has been transcribed from digital to material, establishing an 
essential model of the universe as a closed system containing an underlying grid 
of measurable points that unfold through discrete units of time. Within material 
space, all that is left is to ascertain the dimensions of the spatial grid, the 
measure of time and the rules of the system to fully enlighten the unfolding of the 
universe. Such a model normalises and naturalises the concept of space and time 
as discrete units and the universe as a computable closed system. The 
emplacements and gamespaces of evolutionary artificial life games become 
perfected new natures within this definition, defining and modelling the essence of 
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computational regimes. Moving to the proposition of habits, a realist or 
materialist ontology can be formed that does not rely on a universal composition 
between digital and material spaces. Such an ontological stance would "grant 
reality full autonomy from the human mind, disregarding the difference between 
the observable and the unobservable, and the anthropocentrism that this 
distinction implies" (DeLanda 2002: 2), yet it is one that does not depend upon 
any essential model of the building blocks of reality. As with life, similarities 
between digital and carbon can therefore be explored whilst differences 
acknowledged and respected. Importantly, the constitution of the material 
universe need not be defined and supplanted by the digital, as there would be no 
ideal model upon which universes are moulded. 
What would artificial life and evolutionary artificial life computer games look like 
when taken out of essences and statements and formulated instead within habits 
and propositions? Returning to Latour, an important aspect of political ecology is 
that there strives to be universal decisions made on the status of things as 
entities, but this universal decision must be hard won: 
The common world we took for granted must... be progressively composed, 
it is not already constituted. The common world is not behind us ready 
made, but ahead of us, an immense task which we will need to accomplish 
one step at a time ... The common world is now up for grabs. (2002: 29) 
That is not to say, however, that Latour is here prescribing to a relativist or 
constructionist ontology or standpoint. Echoing the materialist positioning of this 
thesis, his call to action renegotiates our relationship with the real in its constant 
co·construction and co·production. It strives to find new ways to understand the 
world under common terms in which both humans and nonhumans have declared 
interests. It is a way for science to invent "speech prothesis that allow nonhumans 
to participate in the discussions of humans, when humans become perplexed 
about the participation of new entities in collective life" (Latour 2004: 67). It gives 
rise to debate "without assuming some innocent, symmetrical form of interaction 
between knower and known" (Barad 1999: 2). The entities of artificial life, the 
natures they inhabit and the cosmologies that they embody have initiated such 
perplexity. Their fate and constitution must be debated within collective life, 
without recall to essentialism as a universal bond of unity. This thesis can only 
suggest and deem such a debate necessary. It adds to the debate and becomes a 
voice within the collective, but it cannot speak for the collective as a whole. No 
hard conclusions are possible, only a set of propositions to bring to the table. 
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Doing so takes diplomacy, and my role in the last section of the thesis is one of 
diplomat (Latour 2002). This leaves many of the answers open to the questions 
this thesis asks, without knowing what the ultimate outcome of the debate will be. 
Again, Latour finds this an ideal characteristic; "The great quality of diplomats is 
that they don't know for sure what are the exact and final goals - not only of their 
adversaries but also of their own people" (2002: 38). 
Two Propositions 
The first proposition I make regards the relationship between the creatures of 
artificial life and humans. It is about each of these as species that share common 
history and evolution. Bound in an essence of informational evolutionism, the 
creatures of artificial life became ideal instances of definitions of life itself. 
Artificial life finds itself, therefore, in a position to provide a more perfect version 
of life itself, in a suppletion where carbon life came to be identified and defined by 
the simulations we created. Within this conceptualisation, a common inference 
made about our relationship with artificial life was one of succession. Here, silicon 
creatures were heralded as the next, advanced level of informational evolution. 
Keith Ansell Pearson offers this as one of the fashionable grand narratives where 
"we are offered a plethora of apocalyptic scenarios concerning an alleged phase· 
space transition to a new, 'higher' level of evolution based on machine 
intelligence, resulting in a genetic take·over of carbon life by soft machines 
(robots and computers)" (1997: 148). Kember finds that this is a distinct and 
primary discourse within artificial life: 
The discourse of alife which interlinks with that of biology is precisely about 
the generation by one dominant species of a new dominant species of 
artificial or alien life·forms. This generative praxis relies the plasticity and 
potentiality of life which lies along side more normative and regulatory 
tendencies at the heart of Darwinism. (2003: 34) 
Freed from the need to deal with clumsy and slow carbon meat bodies, Norns and 
their silicon siblings can evolve quickly at speed within the digital emplacements 
we could only desire to be a part of, denied entry and excluded by our very 
material carbon embodiment. Fuelled by a transcendental desire towards a 
scientifically and technologically constructed New Jerusalem, and blocked by our 
inability to truly enter these digital hallowed grounds, the silicon creatures that 
find these emplacements home became successor species, poised to take 
informational evolutionism to new horizons that humans could not reach. These 
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exemplify the creatures Katherine Hayles suggests will constitute "a new 
evolutionary phylum that will occupy the same niche as Homo sapiens" (2005: 
132). It was only a matter of time before artificial life creatures evolved beyond 
the capabilities of their poor human relations. The stage was set for a new type 
and level of informational evolutionism that left humans behind. 
Against this I would propose an association between carbon and silicon life, and 
specifically between human and artificial life, that forms a different type of 
relationship than successor species. As a diplomat, I will temporarily and 
tentatively grant the entities of artificial life the status of life; it could be argued 
that they share numerous habits that we have come to define as living. It must 
also be remembered that there are many habits of living creatures that artificial 
life entities do not share (Boden 2000 for example), so their life status is far from 
determined. Ansell Pearson also warns of the immense danger of "conflating 
biology and technology" where "a new mythology of the machine is emerging and 
finds expression in current claims that technology is simply the pursuit of life by 
means other than life" (1997: 148). Whilst this challenges granting life status to 
the entities of artificial life, a debate within the collective need not rely on 
conceptualisations and mythologies of successor species in their relation with 
humans. Instead, I will invoke and propose a relationship as companion species, 
taking from Donna Haraway's canine manifesto of the same name (2003). 
Divorced of an essential defining model upon which life is rated, carbon and 
silicon life could develop a relationship based on shared common habits and 
retained differences. For Haraway the workings of this relationship are 
paramount. She finds that "what is at stake is two fold: 1) the relation between 
what counts as nature and what counts as culture in Western discourse and its 
cousins, and 2) the correlated issue of who and what counts as an actor. These 
things matter for political, ethical, and emotional action in technoculture" (2003: 
27). Rosi Braidotti offers a similar such 'kinship system' in her figuration of Zoe, 
which "rules through a trans·species and transgenic interconnection, or rather a 
chain of connections which can be best described as an ecological philosophy of 
non·unitary, embodied subjects" (2006: Ill). 
Relating humans, Norns, the creatures of Spore and the other entities of artificial 
life as companion species, or as connected through Zoe, acknowledges our 
entwined histories and common futures, allowing for an analysis of relations 
between carbon and silicon, in how each mutually influence the other in the 
shaping of lives. Haraway finds the objective of companion species is in 
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recounting and conveying the relationship between each; "Living with animals, 
inhabiting their/our stories, trying to tell truth about relationships, co·habiting an 
active history: that is the work of companion species, for whom 'the relation' is 
the smallest possible unit of analysis" (2003: 20). Rather than competing as 
successor species, the uncovering of the relationship that silicon life shares with 
humans creates stories of shared histories. Within a framework of computational 
regimes, this has to date revolved around producing meanings of life for both 
human and silicon, defined within forms of informational evolutionism and 
cybernetics. It has presented computational regimes as the cosmological 
formation of our natures, with a common, digitally·defined, underlying ontological 
structure. As much as looking to the past, companion species are about common 
futures. As with other species humans intra·act and create bonds of 
companionship with, silicon creatures have the potential to further develop ties 
that will create new histories of mutuality (dogs form a potent example of this but 
are far from unique). Similar to our other companions, humans and silicon 
creatures could co·develop areas of usefulness, dependence and shared active 
histories. We could share developmental paths without competing for any niche 
position containing the essential model of life itself. Ansell Pearson proposes a 
similar shared development and history between species in the concept of 
symbiosis, where an animal is defined in terms of the assemblages with other 
living beings in which it enters (1997: 134). He finds that "creative evolution on 
earth would have been impossible without the intervention of the genetic 
engineering that characterizes viroid life" (Ansell Pearson 1997: 133). The 
symbiotic relations that organisms form with each other shape lives and evolution 
over generations. 
If denied a qualification as living beings, the use of silicon entities within 
computer technoscience could continue to borrow life·like habits and processes, 
in the design of nonliving digital entities that would persist in creating innovative 
things, as with other areas of engineering and design. Continuing to forge a 
relationship with the life sciences, artificial life could build models and 
simulations of life processes, but not actual instances of life, recognising the 
limits of such simulations. If given the attribute of life, silicon creatures could 
provide an opportunity to co·create and explore new relations with novel living 
things that impact human life as much as our own human intra·action will impact 
theirs. Silicon creatures could create their own life histories, independent but 
intimately tied with our own. Their beings would be adapted for digital life but 
they would also be necessarily shaped by human needs and desires. Likewise, 
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silicon creatures will respectively shape humans, in what new things they do and 
in new things they allow us to think and do. Recognising the differences between 
silicon and carbon means that any instance of silicon and carbon life would 
necessarily be qualitatively distinct. Silicon life would explore 'Iife·as·it·could·be.' 
This would give a new appraisal of evolution: 
The point is to rethink evolution in a non·deterministic but also a non· 
anthropocentric manner ... Central to this non·essentialist vision of vitalism 
is the idea of affinity among different forces, in a set of connective 
disjunctions which are not synthesis, but a recomposition. (Braidotti 2006: 
126) 
Qualifying artificial life creatures as alive through agreed habits and without 
recourse to any essential model of life itself or historic defining features, such as 
evolution, retains political and ethical implications. As well as determining the life 
status of artificial life creatures, the collective must also consider the 
ramifications of denying or granting this status, both for silicon and carbon 
entities. Not all silicon entities may be collectively deemed as qualifying as alive. 
Conversely, Braidotti, developing Guattari's machinic formulisation of autopoiesis 
finds that: 
This results is a radical redefinition of the generative power of 'Life' ... 
Machines have their own temporality and develop through 'generations': 
they contain their own virtuality and futurity. Consequently, they entertain 
their own forms of alterity not only towards humans, but also among 
themselves. (2006: 124) 
The criteria used, and the habits considered within such a decision, affects 
carbon as well as silicon life, as granting life status to silicon creatures would also 
carry corollary effects for carbon life. What the rights of silicon creatures would be 
would need to be ascertained; along with what responsibilities humans would 
have in their care and maintenance. Expanding the gamut of life into digital 
realms means finding living things within techno·cultural spaces that are humanly 
created. 
The second key proposition I make concerns the construction of computational 
regimes. Reminded that Haraway (2003) finds one of the key foci of companion 
species is how they shape what counts as nature and what counts as culture, 
artificial life challenges popular distinctions. Silicon creatures are not only 
originally cultural techo·scientific productions themselves, but the computer 
environments they inhabit, conceptualised as digital 'virtual universes' and 
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'natures,' have been humanly (re)created within our computers. Within the 
conceptualisation of computational regimes has been the underlying discrete and 
rule based structure as a closed system of these virtual computer universes that 
has been transferred and applied to our own. Our cultural products have come to 
exemplify, define and become a reference for how nature is constructed within 
computational regimes. By divorcing ourselves from defining common essences in 
order to relate artificial life emplacements and material spaces, there is no 
requirement for each to conform to the other. Retaining a nuanced realist or 
materialist ontology that maintains an external real in constant co·construction, 
digital and material spaces can be recognised for their shared continual 
production. Importantly, the focus can be placed back on the material, in that the 
structures that produce digital space are necessarily already part of material 
space. In this way the digital spaces of artificial life emplacements can be 
constructed as closed systems of discrete time and space without limiti ng 
material space to the same constitution. Material space would therefore not be 
defined and confined by the structure of digital space. This has implications for 
each of the basic underlying assumptions within computational regimes regarding 
the structure of the universe. The first is the universe as a closed system. The 
virtual computer universes created as artificial life emplacements are necessarily 
closed systems, defined as a distinct section of computer memory, within a 
definable finite area. In contrast to this, the material universe cannot be easily 
negotiated as similarly closed. Computational regimes also assume the discrete 
unit based structure of both time and space. Wise (1997) has traced the 
modernist rationalisation of time, removing time from a natural duree of 
unfolding. Within computational regimes, time recuperates such a modernist 
rationalisation, allowing for the state of the system to be knowable at any given 
time frame. Within digital space, this rationalisation takes the form of defined 
computing ticks and the timing of the operation of the computer in completing 
each single instruction of code. Within material space, time remains open to a 
natural duree, although when conceived within modernity as divisible model there 
is no single smallest unit of time. Space is also rationalised within computational 
regimes. Within digital space this takes the form of discrete units as computer 
memory bits and displayed monitor pixels, each point within the space mapped 
and definable. In contrast, taking from a materialist approach, we are reminded of 
the ultimately unknowable state of the real. Reminded of Hayles' unmediated flux, 
among other similar mappings of the real, we cannot assume a similar discrete 
and mapped structure of material reality. This creates a conceptualisation of the 
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material universe as an open system of ultimately unknowable spatial structure, 
unfolding within a natural duree. 
Coming to this understanding of the structure of the material universe has 
obvious ramifications within the statements that computational regimes make, 
which need to be open to discussion and debate. Computational regimes have 
been conceptualised as rule based closed systems, where each spatial point is 
knowable and able to be mapped, and time progresses as a series of defined 
units. It is from these assumptions that computational regimes have been able to 
present a deterministic cosmology through the use of connectionism and 
emergence. The universe is on a single and determined path, if humanly 
unknowable. Removing the underlying assumptions that structure computational 
regimes in the material universe means that it is no longer feasible to consider 
the universe as a deterministic system. With no discrete structure of time and 
space available to give a fully mapped snapshot of the universe at any given time 
interval, there is no structure upon which any deterministic model can be formed. 
An unmediated flux formed within an open system that unfolds within a natural 
duree means that no system of progressive snapshots can be made upon which a 
deterministic model can be built. Computational regimes as deterministic 
systems are only feasible in digital space where the requirements for their 
structure can be produced. Recognising the differences in composition between 
digital and material spaces has implications for the concepts of connectionism 
and emergence. Again, with diplomacy, I do not want to dismiss connectionism 
and emergence as workable concepts at the moment. Instead, I would like to 
briefly explore what these could look like in a more nuanced approach of a 
cosmology of the material universe and how this might relate to digital spaces of 
computational regimes. As with determining the life status of different entities, 
the purpose here is to highlight the need for debate and discussion within a 
collective assembly, not to come to any hard conclusions. 
The second proposition this thesis puts forward, therefore, introduces 
unpredictability to connectionism and emergence. It gives the ability through a 
nuanced conceptualisation of connectionism and emergence to form predictions 
on future actions without reverting to a form of determinism. From actor network 
theory through to a Deleuzian view of rhizomes, there has been recognition of the 
relations and connections that entities form with each other within networks. 
Right to the molecular level, entities find connections with other entities formed 
within rhizomes and assemblages. Additionally, it is from within such networks, 
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rhizomes and assemblages that intra-action occurs. The materialist standpoint 
this thesis structures itself upon finds as one of its prime tenets the intra-
connectivity of agents, human and nonhuman, living and nonliving. The 
connection between things and the emergence of behaviours and intra-action from 
that connectivity is not the real issue here; the question of a politics of resistance 
and the ability to debate the nature of the universe and its cosmology is (Braidotti 
2006: 7-8). Presupposing a computational regime questions the ability for politics 
of resistance and highlights the issue of responsibility. Although models such as 
Grand's responsible determinism highlight the need to act in a responsible 
manner, any deterministic model ultimately negates resistance and change. 
Considering the universe as an open system, whilst retaining a model of 
connection and emergence, returns one to speaking within probabilities, 
possibilities and (non)predictability without being bound by an ultimate 
determinism. It is within such a standpoint that resistance, change and a true 
responsibility can emerge. Importantly, recognising computational regimes as a 
working conceptualisation of digital space, but within a looser model of habits, 
opens a debate within the collective on the ontological structure and cosmology of 
the universe. Other important questions that are raised by computational regimes 
can be examined and negotiated without recourse to an essential, singular and 
immobile model. The authoring and application of the rules, the construction of 
the universe, the initiation of time; all of these raise spiritual and scientific 
concerns within the conceptualisation of computational regimes when applied to 
the material universe. Having the ability to debate, discuss and negotiate the 
ontological structure of the universe, what time is and whether the universe 
operates to a set of simple rules, opens a discussion of computational regimes 
out of an essentialist model. As with a debate about what constitutes life, 
cosmologies of the material and digital universes can look to developing common 
habits, whilst retaining the properties that maintain the distinctive character of 
each. Whether conceptualising computational regimes and digital 'universes' 
under an essential model or as a set of shared habits, there are implications to 
what counts as nature and what this nature looks like. The collective that comes 
together to debate such matters must not only consider the fate of the digital 
emplacements the entities of artificial life call home, but also what the decisions 
made on these spaces say about our own material universe, its composition and 
cosmology. The questions raised and the conclusions drawn will have a social, 
political and ethical impact. 
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Evolutionary artificial life computer games have introduced a general audience to 
the possibility of life outside of carbon biology. These games connect silicon and 
carbon together intimately, producing common meanings of life, nature and the 
cosmos through play. Through developing meanings of life steeped in neo· 
Darwinian informational evolutionism and cybernetics, artificial life constitutes 
part of the assemblage reterritorialising what it means to be alive within an 
informational structure. Evolutionary computer games take the player on mythic 
journeys of construction, creation and change that produce common spiritual and 
scientific grand narratives between carbon and silicon life, and material and 
digital spaces. This has been condensed within the cosmological conception of 
computational regimes, which unite digital and material under a single ultimately 
deterministic model. It has been the matching of digital and material spaces and 
silicon and carbon life with common essences that has given ground to the ability 
to talk of the possibility of silicon life. Within such an essential model, silicon 
entities share an informational essence with carbon life that argues for their life 
status within certain definitions of life itself. Within these definitions, silicon 
entities become perfected models of life itself. In both the definition of life itself 
and in the building of a cosmology of computational regimes, our digital 
emplacements have come to exemplify and define what carbon life and the 
material universe are. Doing so, problematic assumptions over the use of 
information as a concept, and the recuperation of modernist notions of time and 
space, are naturalised and normalised within the unitary narrative computational 
regimes and its partnered definitions of life give. Examining the new entities 
produced by evolutionary computer games within Latour's program of political 
ecology offers the possibility to free carbon and silicon, material and digital from 
bounded essences to instead explore common habits and new relationships of 
mutual histories. 
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